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This dissertation investigates how discrete variations in the autonomy of divested units 
from their parents’ governance impact these units’ innovation outcomes. In particular, this 
dissertation makes a comparative assessment of two divestiture governance modes, corporate spin-
offs and equity carve-outs, that provide a suitable context for the comparison of different levels of 
post-divestiture unit autonomy. The core theoretical insight from comparing these two divestiture 
governance modes is that the parent company’s decision rights and bureaucratic constraints  
differentially affect each mode.  
The first study finds that while divestitures can potentially align market information and 
unit-managers’ agency incentives to unit-level outcomes for both governance modes, only spin-
offs are granted more autonomy from their parents’ constraints to restructure their decision rights 
and ex-post governance as key ‘mechanisms of governance,’ which then impact innovativeness. 
The second study further examines the relationship between divestiture governance modes 
and the application breadth of divested units’ innovations, evaluating the comparative effects of 
governance modes on the units’ application breadth of innovation. Consistent with the explanation 
that economic rents from broad resources are more easily appropriated by large diversified firms, 
and that better technology markets and access to complementary assets allow smaller firms to 
appropriate technology returns, this chapter finds that parent company diversification, importance 
of intellectual property rights, and parent company complementary assets, moderate the 
relationship between the divestiture governance mode and the breadth of application of the 
innovation of divested units. Thus, (more autonomous) spin-off units experience narrower 
application breadth of innovation than equity carve-outs, and this narrowing of breadth is greater 
when the parent company is more diversified. 
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The third study explores the implications of governance consistency (e.g., autonomous 
divestiture governance mode and autonomous divestiture governance design) on the divested 
unit’s innovation performance. Taking into account different governance attributes, from the 
parent-unit divestiture relationship, this dissertation also recognizes that governance choices span 
beyond the choice of a discrete governance mode. The use of these intermediate divestiture 
governance mechanisms (i.e., divestiture governance design) is matched with the choice of the 
focal divestiture governance mode, spin-offs or carve-outs. The findings from this study indicate 
that non-consistent entities, e.g., high(low) autonomous divestiture governance design and 
low(high) autonomous divestiture governance mode, may not realize the full benefits of either 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
“In comparison with the study of market failure, the study of hierarchical failure is seriously 
underdeveloped. If, however, each generic mode of governance enjoys distinctive strengths and 
weaknesses, then that disparity should be redressed” (Williamson, 1996, p. 17). 
 
   
Innovation is the lifeblood for many (technology) firms seeking sustainable competitive 
advantage. This dissertation maintains that different organization governance modes can 
significantly influence innovation outcomes, which are vital to competitive advantage (Teece, 
1986). A governance mode -- defined as an organizational framework within which transactions 
are negotiated, decided, and executed (Williamson, 1979) -- can directly affect sustainable 
competitive advantage (Leiblein, 2003; Mahoney, 1992; Villalonga & McGahan, 2005), as well 
as innovation outcomes, which are the focus of this dissertation. The extant research literature has 
developed theoretically, and has corroborated empirically, the significant effect of firms’ 
governance modes on innovation outcomes through make-buy-or-ally differences across 
organizations (Castañer, Mulotte, Garrette, & Dussauge, 2014; Leiblein, Reuer, & Dalsace, 2002); 
centralization and decentralization differences (Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, & 
Rios, 2013; Nickerson & Zenger, 2002); and differences in the organizational integration of 
acquisitions (Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006). 
While the extant research literature has recognized that coordinating and deploying 
resources within a firm fosters innovation, there is still need for examining the impact on 
innovation of deploying via the divestiture of entire business units beyond the boundaries of a 
parent firm. In general, it is held that theory development and greater empirical inquiry are needed 
concerning boundary-contracting modes for such divestitures, particularly at the business-unit 
level (Moschieri, 2011). The current research focuses on spin-offs and carve-outs as alternative 
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governance modes to business unit divestitures. This dissertation  is complementary to the extant 
research literature, by proposing that the innovation outcomes of corporate spin-offs and equity 
carve-outs can be different. Research in open innovation suggests that the gains in innovation when 
units are divested are primarily a consequence of providing autonomy to divested units 
(Chesbrough, 2003). Because spin-offs and carve-outs provide different levels of autonomy to 
divested units, their innovation outcomes can be anticipated to be different. 
This dissertation seeks to extend the extant research literature both empirically and 
theoretically. Empirically, it aims to fill a gap in the literature by examining the effect of two 
different divestiture governance modes on innovation outcomes, corporate spin-offs, and equity 
carve-outs, and by contrasting the effect of these divestiture governance modes (at a more macro-
governance level) with the effect of divestiture governance design (at a more micro-governance 
level). In terms of theory development, it seeks to go beyond (ex-ante) principal-agent incentive 
alignment and market information problems, to consider governance mode differences more fully 
from a transaction cost economics and value creation approach (Williamson, 1979; Zajac & Olsen, 
1993), and to shed light on research questions regarding firm innovativeness and application 
breadth of innovation.  
In the next three chapters, this dissertation examines how two types of divested units’ 
innovation outcomes, innovativeness, and application breadth of innovation, can be impacted by 
alternative divestiture governance modes, specifically corporate spin-offs relative to equity carve-
outs. A corporate spin-off is defined as a divestiture of a business unit where the parent company 
only holds a minority interest (by law), ranging from 0% to 20%. Whereas an equity carve-out is 
defined as a divestiture of a business unit where the parent company can -- and typically does -- 
hold controlling interest positions. This dissertation leverages this variation in the level of legal 
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control of the parent company over the divested unit to examine how the organizational autonomy 
of the divested unit from its parent company’s governance can affect its innovation outcomes, in 
terms of the innovation counts and breadth of application of their technologies. 
The main contributions from this dissertation can be summarized as follows. First, it adds 
to the divestiture literature by joining the effort of more recent papers in assessing the outcomes 
for the divested units (see e.g., Feldman, 2016a), and it further examines innovation, a well-
established firm value creator. The extant research literature suggests that parent companies 
typically derive economic gains from corporate divestitures (Lee & Madhavan, 2010) by 
refocusing their capabilities (Bergh & Lim, 2008; Chang, 1996), redeploying resources to higher 
growth areas (Kaul, 2012), and reconfiguring to tap into innovative opportunities (Capron, 
Mitchell, & Anand, 2001; Karim, 2009). However, this literature has called for more research on 
the outcomes of divestitures for business units (Lee & Madhavan, 2010), and particularly to 
strengthen our understanding of the impact on the divested unit’s innovation outcomes (Moschieri 
& Mair, 2011). Early research in open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) suggests that the gains in 
innovation when units are divested are primarily a consequence of “unleashing” the divested unit, 
by allowing the unit to be more autonomous from its parent’s internal constraints (Chesbrough, 
2003). However, more empirical evidence is still needed on the effect of divestitures on the 
divested unit, especially in terms of their innovation outcomes.  
Second, this dissertation undertakes a comparative assessment of the innovation outcomes 
of divested business units under distinct divestiture governance modes, corporate spin-offs, and 
equity carve-outs, contributing to the broader literature on organizing for innovation that has 
investigated the contingencies to the make-buy-ally, centralize-decentralize and integrate or not-
to-integrate performance consequences. This literature has suggested that at the aggregate parent-
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company level, centralization spurs innovation by facilitating coordination (Argyres & Silverman, 
2004) and internal knowledge production (Arora, Belenzon, & Rios, 2013), while non-integration 
facilitates exploration by providing autonomy to newly acquired firms (Puranam, et al., 2006). The 
three studies in this dissertation contribute to the literature on the nexus between governance 
modes and innovation outcomes by adding a context (divestitures), which allows me to test the 
contingencies of organizational autonomy at a less examined level of analysis, the business unit, 
and in the last study of this dissertation by adding nuances of divestiture governance design, or 
unpacking bundles of divestiture governance mechanisms associated with modes. 
Third, this dissertation recognizes that divestiture governance modes can distinctly impact 
different types of innovation outcomes. As divested units’ transition from embedded governance 
within their parent companies to stand-alone businesses, these units might not only experience 
changes in their innovativeness, but also experience changes in the breadth of their innovation 
outcomes. Following Nelson (1959), the second chapter considers differences in technology 
appropriability that are associated with the two focal divestiture governance modes and can impact 
the application breadth of divested units’ innovations. 
To summarize, across the three empirical studies in this dissertation, I address the following 
research questions: 
Chapter 2: How do alternative divestiture governance modes affect the innovativeness of 
divested units? 
Chapter 3: How do alternative divestiture governance modes affect the application 
breadth of divested units’ innovations? 
Chapter 4: How do governance design, vis-à-vis governance mode, affect the 
innovativeness of divested units and the application breadth of divested units’ innovations? 
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The key variables examined in these three studies, along with the empirical models and research 
questions are outlined in Table 1.1. The next sections of this introductory chapter present a 
comparative assessment of the two focal divestiture governance modes evaluated in this proposal, 
i.e., corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs, which will set the discussion for the empirical 
studies in this dissertation. 
1.1.DIVESTITURE GOVERNANCE MODES: CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS AND EQUITY CARVE-OUTS  
Divestitures are a relevant phenomenon for practitioners and researchers. Consulting firms 
report that the volume of divestiture deals worldwide represents approximately 30% to 39% of all 
M&As deals -see Figure 1.1 (Deloitte, 2016). Among different types of divestiture transactions, 
corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs represent restructurings in which a parent company 
establishes a new stand-alone company, and issues independent traded common stock, to represent 
direct claims over a divested unit. These two focal divestiture governance modes are different from 
asset disbandment in the sense that the unit’s business remains as a going concern, and from other 
divestiture governance modes, beyond the scope of this dissertation1, in the sense that: (1) 
corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs are driven by the parent company's strategic choice to 
disengage a business unit and (2) corporate spin-offs, and equity carve-outs are constituted as 
stand-alone entities. This view allows the observation of a divested business unit’s performance 
independent from its parent company, or another acquiring parent (as is the case of sell-offs, where 
                                                 
1 Particularly, spin-outs, university spin-offs, buy-outs, and sell-offs are well-known divestiture modes. A spin-
out occurs when a parent company is unwilling or unable to support an entrepreneurial initiative that emerges 
from knowledge generated within the corporation, and a new venture is created by employees (Agarwal, 
Echambadi, Franco, & Sarkar, 2004). Additionally, university spin-offs result from the development, within 
universities, of innovations that are far from commercialization and are spawned as start-ups by academics and 
external investors (Lockett, Siegel, Wright, & Ensley, 2005). A buy-out can take place when a group of investors, 
that often includes managers of the focal company and/or business unit, buys a business unit (Thompson, Wright, 
& Robbie, 1992). 
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another parent company acquires a divested unit). See Table 1.2 for a definition and comparison 
of corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs with other types of divestment transactions. 
A corporate spin-off is a divestiture governance mode that entails the pro-rata distribution 
of shares in a business unit to the existing shareholders of the parent company (Gordon, Benson, 
& Kampmeyer, 1984) resulting in a formal separation between the newly independent business 
unit and its former parent. Spin-offs are structured as a distribution of the shares of a business unit 
to the existing parent company shareholders. The divested unit becomes a publicly traded 
company, with a unique ticker symbol and an independent board of directors. To achieve a fuller 
separation between the parent company and the unit, the Internal Revenue Code, section 355, 
stipulates that parents must distribute at least 80% of the unit votes (pro-rata) to the current parent 
shareholders and retain ‘no practical control’ of the unit after a divestiture event. The parent of a 
spun-off unit must be engaged in an active business with the offspring for at least five years before 
the execution date of the transaction, and have control of the unit (own at least 80% of the voting 
rights) before the distribution. Because most spin-offs in the United States are structured as tax-
free transactions, a spin-off must have a ‘substantial business purpose.’2 In contrast to an equity 
carve-out, a spin-off does not generate any cash income for the parent company. 
An equity carve-out is a divestiture governance mode in which the parent company offers 
to the public a fraction of the shares3 of a wholly owned business unit (Schipper & Smith, 1986), 
                                                 
2 A spin-off transaction cannot be structured simply as a way to save on income taxes, or avoid paying taxes by 
distributing the unit shared as a dividend distribution. Similarly, the parent or the unit cannot be re-acquired 
within two years after the spin-off transaction, or a substantial tax liability at the parent company level will be 
due. The divested unit commits contractually to pay any future tax liability of the parent in the case the spin-off 
is re-acquired within two years. 
 
3 Typically, this fraction is not greater than 20% for three main reasons: (i) Holding at least 80% of the unit’s 
shares, the parent will have tax control over its unit; (ii) it guarantees that the dividend transfers from the unit to 
the parent are tax-free under the Dividends Received Deduction, and (iii) the financial statements of the unit and 
the corporate parent can be consolidated for tax purposes, which is beneficial for the parent because 
deconsolidation may result in a tax liability. 
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but retains control over such a unit. Research shows that on average the corporate parent retains a 
controlling interest of almost 80% of the unit’s shares (Allen & McConnell, 1998). After being 
divested, equity carve-outs have a separate board of directors and management team from its parent 
company. Nonetheless, the members of the carve-out’s board can be, and often are, the same as 
the parent’s board members, and its management team is likely to be appointed by the parent 
company (Anslinger, Klepper, & Subramaniam, 1999). Frequently, carve-outs are a way for parent 
companies to raise cash from the divested unit IPO4 (Nanda, 1991). US regulation requires that 
the parent’s and carve-out’s financial reports be done independently. This regulatory requirement 
implies that, like spin-offs, there will be a significant reduction in agency problems for carve-out 
units due to greater information transparency and better possibilities for the unit’s managerial 
incentive alignment.  
Consistent with this resource-generating view of equity carve-outs, extant research has 
found that carved-out units outperform market returns (Anslinger et al., 1999). Through an equity 
carve-out, a business unit can successfully increase its external market monitoring (Iacobucci & 
Triantis, 2007), while remaining connected to its corporate parent through ownership and other 
informal links, often continuing to receive support from its parent. In a different chapter of this 
dissertation, I document that a substantial fraction of parent companies in my sample continue to 
support their carved-out units in was such as initial cash transfers, favorable (or waived) leasing 
fees, and long-term contracts, among others. Thus, an equity carve-out, as compared to a corporate 
spin-off, is more likely to be able to access its parent company’s capital and resources. 
                                                 
4 When structuring an equity carve-out, the shares offered in the IPO may be sold by the business unit as a 
primary issue, or by the parent company as a secondary issue. In case the unit is the primary issuer, the parent 
can also raise cash by requiring the unit to issue a debt obligation or dividend payable to the parent. In both 
cases, i.e., carve-outs as primary or secondary issuers, the cash proceedings from the divestiture transaction go 




Corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs have been suggested to pursue organizational 
efficiencies (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2008) by increasing the availability of the divested unit’s market 
information (Allen, 2001; Gilson, et al., 2001), providing a dedicated board of directors for the 
divested unit, and aligning the unit’s managerial incentives, (Aron, 1991; Feldman, 2016a; Seward 
& Walsh, 1996; Semadeni & Cannella, 2011). A study modeling the role of institutional investors 
in the choice of spin-offs and carve-outs shows that there is an increase in information production 
arising from all divestiture types (Chemmanur & Liu, 2011). Further, a recent study investigates 
spin-offs and carve-outs as one category of staged divestitures that represent a different set of real 
options when compared to sell-offs or complete divestitures (Damaraju, Barney, & Makhija, 
2015). This extant research focuses on the fact that equity carve-outs’ parents retain higher equity 
stakes on the divested unit, treating equity carve-outs as a continuous extension of corporate spin-
offs. In practice, however, firms may consider these forms of divestitures as discrete structural 
alternatives (Anslinger et al., 1999; Williamson, 1991). 
Building on previous research, this dissertation submits that corporate spin-offs and carve-
outs can have different governance implications for divested units. An empirical analysis of 
vertical divestitures to determine the likelihood of spin-offs vs. carve-outs finds that carve-outs are 
more likely to happen when relationship-specific investments are more prevalent because of the 
ongoing relationship between parents and carve-outs (Jain, Kini, & Shinoy, 2011). Although some 
rationales have been advanced for corporate spin-offs’ value creation (Chemmanur & Yan, 2004; 
Gertner, Powers, & Scharfstein, 2002; Gilson, et al., 2001; Lopez-Iturriaga & Martin Cruz, 2008; 
Moschieri, 2011; Semadeni & Cannella, 2011; Seward & Walsh, 1996), a comparison of spin-offs 
and other forms of restructuring, such as equity carve-outs, would be particularly useful to examine 
the link between governance and innovation outcomes, which are well-known value creators. This 
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dissertation proposes a comparative assessment of the innovation outcomes of stand-alone divested 
units, corporate spin-offs, and equity carve-outs.  
1.2. GOVERNANCE ATTRIBUTES OF CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS AND EQUITY CARVE-OUTS 
Corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs entail distinct and interrelated bundles of 
governance mechanisms, which can affect a divested unit’s innovation outcomes. This section 
explains the similarities and differences across these two governance modes. Table 1.3 
summarizes the governance characteristics of corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs.  
Corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs share similar means to lower the information 
asymmetries about the divested unit’s performance, improve the incentive alignment of the 
divested unit’s managers, and have similar shareholders -or ultimate shareholder ownership.  
Lower Market Information Asymmetries. Divestitures of stand-alone units, corporate 
spin-offs, and equity carve-outs, can correct information asymmetries between the market, the 
parent company, and the divested unit (Madura & Nixon, 2002). These divested units often hold 
more accountability, having to report separately from its parent, stand-alone market prices, and 
increased the quality of external monitoring (Gilson, Healy, Noe, & Palepu, 2001).   
Improved managerial incentive alignment. Divestitures can better align equity-based 
incentives for managers and other key employees. There is strong empirical evidence that supports 
ex-post divestiture adoption of incentive compensation plans based on the unit’s performance for 
corporate spin-offs (Dahlstrand, 1997; Feldman, 2016a; Seward & Walsh, 1996) and equity carve-
outs (Powers, 2003; Schipper & Smith, 1986). This adoption suggests that the agency problem of 
managerial incentives can be similarly addressed through both spin-offs and carve-outs.  
Ultimate shareholder ownership. Corporate spin-offs’ ownership is established as a pro-
rata allocation of shares to the parent company’s current shareholders, and thus, post-divestiture 
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the unit’s ultimate ownership continues to be distributed among the parent company’s 
shareholders. Further, because the parent company is the equity carve-out’s majority owner, 
ultimate shareholder ownership continues to be distributed among the parent company’s 
shareholders - only a minority stake will be owned by new shareholders that have bought the 
divested unit’s shares in the unit’s Initial Public Offer (IPO).  
1.2.1. Differences between Corporate Spin-Offs and Equity Carve-Outs 
To explain potential performance differences between stand-alone divested units, this 
chapter explores differences between the governance attributes of corporate spin-offs and equity 
carve-outs (Table 1.3), and legal differences between spin-off and carve-out transactions (Table 
1.4). From the examination of governance attributes two main differences seem to stand out: unit 
post-divestiture autonomy (from its parent company), and coordination costs between parents and 
units. Further, at the time of a divestiture event, cash proceedings can only be attained through 
equity carve-outs, and not through corporate spin-offs. From examining the legal definitions of 
spin-offs and carve-outs notable differences under the law (approval, fiduciary duty, antitrust, 
corporate veil, Fraudulent Conveyance, and Labor doctrines explained on Table 1.4) seem to make 
the case for discreteness in the divestiture governance choice.  
Autonomy from its parent company. The extent to which parent companies give up 
controlling ownership stakes in the divested business unit influences the discretion or autonomy 
of its managers. The legal definition of corporate spin-offs stipulates that parent companies need 
to divest at least 80% of their unit, whereas there is no minimum divestment requirement for equity 
carve-outs. In practice, parent companies divest on average 99.2% of their unit in corporate spin-
offs (Semadeni & Cannella, 2011), and only 30%, on average, in equity carve-outs (Allen & 
McConnell, 1998). Therefore, a spun-off unit will not be conditioned to respond to the parent 
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company’s management team as their shareholders, as they must respond within an equity carve-
out. Further, the extant research literature has suggested that parent companies often do not grant 
autonomy to carved-out units (Slovin, Sushka, & Ferraro, 1995). 
Potential parent-unit coordination costs. Although transactions among parent companies 
and divested units, in both corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs, are subject to contract and 
not fiat, contracting costs between a parent company and a divested unit can be lower in equity 
carve-outs compared to corporate spin-offs. This difference is often the case because although 
equity carve-outs are held under different legal firms, the parent company and the divested unit 
share the parent company’s control. Thus, a spun-off unit can face increased contractual hazards, 
e.g., economic holdups, with its parent company, which can constrain unit innovation. These 
potential contracting costs can further be associated with the parent company’s technological 
resources that a divested unit may continue to utilize, representing further problems for the unit’s 
innovation outcomes after a divestiture.  
Parent’s cash proceedings. Access to the cash proceedings derived from the divested unit 
IPO will also be different for corporate spin-offs’ parent companies and equity carve-outs’ parent 
companies. Whereas in the case of corporate spin-offs parent companies cannot cash any of the 
transaction proceedings, due to tax regulations governing spin-offs, equity carve-outs’ parent 
companies can benefit from the stock sale on the unit’s IPO. Therefore, while the effects of 
autonomy and potential coordination costs could influence the divested unit’s innovation 
outcomes, the cash generated in the divestiture event often influences only the parent company.   
Corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs provide an interesting context to nuance different 
levels of organizational autonomy, from the effects of other governance mechanisms, such as 
improved market information and managerial incentive alignment. The divestiture of business 
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units through corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs represents a change in governance for that 
unit, i.e., from being embedded in its parent governance structure to having a more autonomous 
arrangement. Corporate divestitures in which a parent company separates one of its existing units 
into a publicly traded firm are a useful context to examine the effect of internal governance on 
innovation, as it allows the observation of the innovation outcomes of a focal business unit through 
a change in governance modes. This dissertation compares the difference before and after 
divestitures, at the business-unit level, across corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs, which 
primarily differ in the unit’s levels of post-divestiture organizational autonomy. A key advantage 
of comparatively assessing changes in innovation outcomes over time (pre- and post-divestiture 
periods) and through variations in the level of organizational autonomy between spin-offs and 
carve-outs, is the ability to investigate more precisely the governance implications of divestitures 
beyond the information and agency explanations that have been examined in the literature.  
To provide a comparative assessment of the innovation outcomes of corporate spin-offs 
and equity carve-outs, this section identified governance characteristics in which corporate spin-
offs and equity carve-outs are similar. Divestitures that result in the creation of stand-alone 
companies, such as corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs, can equivalently benefit from these 
events regarding the better availability of market information, and better managerial incentive 
alignment. This chapter further examined relevant differences between these two divestiture 
governance modes in terms of their unit autonomy, potential parent-unit coordination costs, and 
cash proceedings.  
In the case of corporate spin-offs, the parent company has a lower or non-existing ongoing 
stake, granting the divested unit more autonomy. This autonomy can be a key to the innovation 
process of divested business units. Innovative and entrepreneurial companies often thrive under 
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practices and managerial discretion styles that are different from the ones that can be granted to 
units in bureaucratic organizations (Chesbrough, 2003; Markides & Geroski, 2003). Thus, more 
autonomy can contribute to higher unit innovativeness, an idea that will be explored in Chapter 2. 
However, more autonomy also implies that the divested unit has lower access to its parent’s 
technology base and complementary resources. For an autonomous unit, this comparatively lower 
access to its parent’s resources often indicates more difficulties in appropriating the value of 
particular types of innovation outcomes -- e.g., broad innovations (Nelson, 1959) -- an idea that 
will be explored in Chapter 3. The autonomy granted by the focal divestiture governance modes 
can be nuanced through different bundles governance mechanisms, defined here as governance 
design, and can also impact innovativeness of divested units and the application breadth of divested 






1.3.TABLES AND FIGURE 
Table 1.1 Summary of dissertation research questions and empirical design for three empirical studies 
  Dependent Variable Explanatory Variables Empirical Model 







1. Choice of Governance 
Mode: Spin-Off dummy 
2. Innovativeness of 
Divested Units: Count of 
patent forward citations 
1. Choice: Parent's Fund’s Needs, Unit and parent differences (Industry 
Attractiveness, Investment needs); Unit and parent Related Diversification 
and Vertical Integration. 
 
2. Innovativeness:  
* Governance Mode: Spin-Off dummy 
* Post-Divestiture dummy 
* Unit and parent Similarities and Complementarities 
* Controls: Unit's tech areas Age and Growth, unit's Size and R&D 
investments 
1. Choice: Logit 




Matching. Firm fixed 
effects. 




affect the application 
breadth of divested 
units’ innovations? 
Application Breadth of 
Divested Units’ 
Innovations: Patent 
portfolio generality index 
* Governance Mode: Spin-Off dummy 
* Post-Divestiture dummy 
* Parent Diversification: Diversification of the parent's technology portfolio 
* Technology Appropriability: importance of Intellectual Property and 
Complementarities as appropriability mechanisms. 





Matching. Firm fixed 
effects. 
Chapter 4: How do 
governance design, 
vis-à-vis governance 
mode, affect the 
innovativeness of 
divested units and 
the application 
breadth of divested 
units’ innovations? 




2. Innovativeness of 
Divested Units: Count of 
patent forward citations 
3. Application Breadth of 
Divested Units’ 
Innovations: Patent 
portfolio generality index 
1. Governance Design: Board of Directors Independence, Top Management 
Team Independence, Top Management Team Compensation, CEO origin, 
Licensing Agreement, Supplier Agreement, Corporate Service Agreement, 
Leasing Agreement 
 
2. Innovativeness and 3. Application Breadth:  
* Governance Design: Continuous predicted values of Governance Mode as 
determined by Governance Design; congruence among Governance Mode 
and Governance Design (dummies for “Pure Spin-Offs,” “Pure Carve-Outs,” 
“Mismatched Spin-Offs,” and “Mismatched Carve-Outs”) 
* Post-Divestiture dummy 
* Controls: Unit's tech areas Age and Growth, unit's Size and R&D 
investments 
1. Governance Design:  
Logit 
 
2. Innovativeness and 
3. Application Breadth: 
Difference-in- 






Table 1.2 Differences between divestment transactions 




Spawn as a 
new publicly 
traded stock? 




Divested unit was 
a going business 
concern before 
divestment? 
Divested unit is 
a going business 
concern after 
divestment? 
Corporate     
Spin-Off 
Pro-rata distribution of (majority) new 
shares in a business unit to the existing 
shareholders of the parent company.  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Equity        
Carve-Out 
Public offering of (minority) new shares 
in a business unit. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tracking Stock 
A common stock issued by a parent 
company, and that is based on the 
operations of a business unit. The stock 
"tracks" the performance of such unit, but 
does not grant rights over the assets of 
the unit or the parent company. 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Asset 
Disbandment 
A parent company sells some assets, 
property or equipment, to another 
company. 
Yes No No No No 
Sell-Off 
The parent company sells a business unit 
to another company. 
Yes No No Often yes Not necessarily 
Buy-Outs 
A group of investors that often includes 
managers of the parent company or 




Often yes Yes Often yes 
Spin-Out 
A new venture is created (as a start-up) 






Yes Often no Yes 
University     
Spin-Off 
A new venture is created (as a start-up) 
by academics and external investors. It 
often results from the development of 








Table 1.3 Similarities and Differences of Corporate Spin-Offs and Equity Carve-Outs 
Attribute Corporate Spin-Off Equity Carve-Out 





After a divestiture, units have more accountability and less market information 
asymmetries (Madura & Nixon, 2002). The unit’s share price conveys market-based 





After a divestiture, unit-manager's and key employee's incentives can be aligned with 
divested unit's outcomes (rather than its parent's). There is increased accountability and 
external monitoring to align incentives better. Further, the law does not require the 
maintenance of specific terms and conditions of employment, so it is possible, and likely 




Corporate spin-offs are a pro-rata distribution of the spun-off units' shares to the parent 
company's current shareholders. Although new shareholders can buy shared from carved-
out units in the units' public offers, these shares often represent a minority stake in the 
unit. 
Tax Liability 
Usually, a spin-off is tax-free under IRC 
Section 355. No taxable gain is recognized 
by the parent or the parent's shareholders.  
If the unit issues primary shares -- as 
opposed to the parent -- it is a non-taxable 
transaction.  
Differences 
    
Unit's autonomy 
from its parent 
company 
Higher legal control rights:  There is a 
cleaner separation between the parent 
company and the spin-off. Parent 
companies must spin-off at least 80% of 
their units' shares -- in practice, parents 
divest 99.2% on average. Implications 
from this divestiture are: (i) the parent has 
no control over the unit, (ii) dividend 
transfers from the unit are not tax-free, and 
(iii) the parent cannot consolidate unit's 
statements for tax purposes. 
Lower legal control rights: The parent 
companies carve-out a minority stake of 
their units' shares -- in practice, they divest 
20% on average. Implications from this 
divestiture are: (i) the parent has control 
over the unit, (ii) dividend payments from 
the unit to the parent are tax-free, (iii) the 
parent can consolidate the unit's 
statements; and (iv) a shareholder vote is 





Higher contracting costs: Hold-up 
problems between the parent and the unit 
are potentially higher for spin-offs as both 
parties may have different benefit 
functions. 
Lower contracting costs: Hold-up 
problems between parent and unit are less 
likely in equity carve-outs because their 
benefit function is better aligned. 
Parent's cash 
proceedings 
No cash proceedings: Legally, the parent 
companies cannot raise cash through 
corporate spin-offs. 
Cash proceedings: Parents can raise cash 
from carve-outs’ IPOs and keep those 
proceedings.  
Parent's and unit's 
administrative cost 
of divestiture 
Higher administrative cost: There are 
greater administrative costs for parents, as 
well as more routines disruption for parents 
and units. 
Lower cost: Less administrative costs 
because there is less degree of separation, 
tax reporting can still be consolidated, and 
the routines are usually less disrupted. 
Example from my 
sample 
AT&T spun-off Alcatel in 1996  
Motorola carved-out Freescale 





Table 1.4 Legal Differences between Corporate Spin-Offs and Equity Carve-Outs 
Legal Attribute Corporate Spin-Offs Equity Carve-Outs 
BOD approval A vote by the parent BOD is sufficient to approve a spin-off. Required approval from parent’s BOD. 
Shareholders’ 
approval 
Parent shareholder approval is not needed, as a spin-off does not 
constitute a sale, lease or exchange. 
Required approval because it is considered as a sale of part of 
the parent company's assets.  
BOD Independence 
Divested unit 
Must be independent from its parent after one year (for NYSE) 
or two years (for NASDAQ). An officer of a parent, or an 
employee of a parent that becomes a director of the business unit 
would not be viewed as independent (NASDAQ, NYSE, Amex).  
Controlled company exemptions: carve-out BOD's does not 
need to be independent from its parent if the parent company 




Needs to comply with independence rules (Sarbanes-Oxley). 
Controlled companies (e.g., carve-outs) exemptions also apply 




doctrine - Parent 
Company 
Before a spin-off, parent and unit BODs must comply with 
fiduciary duty and good faith only with the current (parent) 
shareholders. Further, parent companies have provisions to 
indemnify directors for breaches of their spin-off approval 
fiduciary. Units do not have independent representation and 
parents can dictate the terms of the spin-off transaction, subject 
only to the limitation that units must be able to survive as 
independent companies. Post-divestiture, spin-off shareholders 
often complain that they have been unfairly treated by the parent 
and unit BODs, but precedents establish that pre-divestiture 
BODs' only duty is to the parent shareholders (e.g., Andarki 
Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 1998; DuPont v. 
Conoco, 2001; Abbott Laboratories v. AbbVie, 2015). 
Before carve-outs, parents' BODs have a duty to prospective 
unit's shareholders. Further, after a carve-out, parent companies 
have fiduciary duties with divested units as controlling 
shareholders. Because of the equity that parents retain, carve-
outs can create corporate opportunity and duty of loyalty 
problems for the parent company's board of directors. After the 
completion of a carve-out, if an opportunity arises in which 
both the parent and the unit have an interest, the parent runs the 
risk of violating fiduciary duties to the unit's shareholders (if 
the parent takes the opportunity to itself). However, most 
carve-outs sign a Corporate Opportunity Provision where 
parents maintain their rights to pursue potential business 
opportunities that might also be of interest to the divested unit 
(without endangering their carve-out fiduciary duties). 
Antitrust and 
management focus 
Spin-off transactions alleviate problems of management focus. 
Parent and unit are completely separated, and antitrust is not a 
concern for regulators. No filings under the Antitrust Act are 
required for (pro rata) spin-offs. 
It does not completely solve problems of management focus. 
Overlapping ownership structures, such as carve-outs, often 
raise antitrust issues. Thus, carve-outs do not enable a business 
to escape the effects of antitrust regulation or satisfy a judicial 
order to separate from its parent. Antitrust filings are required. 
Antitrust questions could arise regarding non-compete 
agreements, transition services agreements, supply 
arrangements and interlocking directors for carve-outs. 
Re-acquisitions and 
unit operations 
Separates spun-off units' operations and control from parent 
companies. 
Majority parent ownership facilitates reacquisition (of carved-





Table 1.4 (cont.)   
Legal Attribute Corporate Spin-Offs Equity Carve-Outs 
Piercing the corporate 
veil: parents and units 
shared liability 
Shared liability issues are not common in spin-offs. If parents 
and units can be independently identified (as it is often the case: 
different names, non-consolidated statements), there can be less 
shared liability issues. The division of liabilities will often 
follow the business: separation agreements allocate liabilities 
associated with the parent/unit, whether they arise before or after 
the divestiture, as the responsibility of the parent/unit. Parent and 
unit also agree to indemnify each other against these liabilities. 
Parents could be found liable for carve-outs' actions as owners 
when the corporate veil is pierced. Then, courts could set aside 
the separate corporate identities (of parents and carved-out 
units) to hold a corporate shareholder (parent) responsible. 
Some conditions to pierce the corporate veil and hold a parent 
liable are: "actual control"; improper use of units to avoid legal 
obligations; unit's actions represent "mere instrumentality"; 
failure to maintain separate identities (ownership, officers, 
address, tax consolidation); failure to adequately capitalize 
units or follow "corporate formalities". Precedent of shared 




If a spin-off leaves its parent insolvent, the parent's creditors 
may be able to challenge the transaction on 'fraudulent 
conveyance grounds' (property transfer that is not made for a 
reasonably equivalent value). Fraudulent conveyance is key in 
spin-offs because they represent distributions where parents do 
not receive payment in return. It also holds if liabilities (or 
potential risks for liabilities) assumed by spun-off units are too 
large (raise questions of insolvency). 
Fraudulent conveyance is rarely a problem in carve-outs, when 
the parent holds controlling unit's stakes. To avoid any issues 
related with conveyance, parents can transfer part of the 
proceeds to the subsidiary.  
Securities Law 
Parents must distribute an information statement describing the 
spin-off transaction to its shareholders. This statement (subject 
to SEC review) must contain extensive disclosure. When spin-
off shares are registered under the Securities Act, the spin-off 
unit and its parent are liable under S11 for material omissions or 
misstatements in the prospectus. Often, unit and parent agree to 
indemnify each other in the event of these liabilities. 
Carve-outs must be registered under the Securities and 
Exchange Acts. A carve out can be registered as a primary or 
secondary offering. In a primary offering the subsidiary sells 
newly-issued shares to the public directly. In a secondary 
offering the parent sells stock it already owns to the public. 
Parents have 'controlling person' liability for statements or 
omissions in the prospectus. 
Investment Company 
status 
Investment company status does not apply for parents of carved-
out units. 
Parents retaining equity in carve-outs must comply with the 
Investment Company Act. If more than 40% of the company's 
assets (unconsolidated) are represented in investment securities, 
then the (parent) company will be regulated as an investment 
company. The parents carve-out shares could be ruled as an 
investment securities if the parent does not ‘effectively control' 





Table 1.4. (cont.) 
Legal Attribute Corporate Spin-Offs Equity Carve-Outs 
Financial Advisors 
Investment bankers often provide fairness opinions at the time of 
a spin-off. These fairness opinions estipulate that a transaction is 
fair to the shareholders from a financial point of view. Valuation 
opinions are not required.  
Investment bankers act as underwriters in carve-outs. While 
valuation opinions are required, fairness opinions are not 
required in carve-outs. 
Tax Issues 
Most spin-offs qualify under the tax-free treatment IRC section 
355. 
Primary offerings are not taxable, but secondary offerings can 
be partially taxable. Most carve-outs are structured such that 
they combine a primary offering by the unit, with a (taxable) 
dividend from the unit's proceeds to the parent. The only 
requirement would be that the unit cannot be insolvent after this 
dividend. 
Carve-outs can also be consolidated with their parents for tax 
purposes (e.g., take advantage of exemptions, tax credits) if 
their parents own at least 80% of the unit. 
Accounting Issues 
A spin-off cannot be consolidated for accounting purposes with 
its parent. Audited financial statements are required.  
A carve-out can be consolidated for accounting purposes if the 
parent owns at least 50% of the unit. An audit is required. 
Debt Issues 
Most of the spin-offs will require consent from the debtors (from 
at least 70% of the outstanding debt), and request new ratings, 
pay a consent fee (higher interest rate, more restrictive 
covenants). Parents might also retire debt and establish new 
credit agreements. 
Debtors will often negotiate debt with the carved-out unit in 
more amicable terms.  
Financing Issues 
Parent and units do not raise cash through spin-offs. Sometimes, 
parents can reclaim some cash by causing the unit to transfer 
cash upstream before the spin-off. This transfer can be in the 
form of a dividend, repayment of intercompany debt (cash or 
promissory note). When the subsidiary does not have enough 
cash to operate as a stand-alone entity, the parent may make a 
cash infusion prior to the spin-off and/or guarantee support.  
The Initial Public Offering is a capital raising transaction. In 
some transactions, the unit distributes excess cash to the parent 
prior to the IPO. This payment can be in the form of a dividend, 








Table 1.4. (cont.) 
Legal Attribute Corporate Spin-Offs Equity Carve-Outs 
Employee Issues 
* Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA): not 
applicable to parent and spun-off unit relationship. 
* Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act (COBRA): not 
applicable to parent and spun-off unit relationship. 
* Units can redesign compensation packages for its employees, 
hire or fire under the terms of the law. Must follow Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act). 
* ERISA: all employees and directors of a controlled group 
(e.g., carved-out unit and its parent) must be tested for 
compliance together. ERISA tests whether 'highly compensated 
employees' are being unfairly benefited. 
* COBRA: if the total number of employees in a controlled 
group (e.g., carved-out unit and its parent) classify the 
employer as a large group (together), then they must comply 
with COBRA. This Act regulates medical insurance for 
terminated employees.  
* Units can redesign compensation packages for its employees, 
hire or fire under the terms of the law. Must follow Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act). 
Environmental 
liabilities 
The Comprehensive Environmental Responses, Compensation 
and Liability Act (CERCLA) establishes that if a parent owned 
and operated (or controlled) a contaminating site, the parent will 
retain clean-up liability. That is, any (pre-divestiture) 
contaminating site will be only the parent's responsibility, even if 
the site is then transferred to the spun-off unit. 
The Comprehensive Environmental Responses, Compensation 
and Liability Act (CERCLA) establishes that if a parent owned 
and operated (or controlled) a contaminating site, the parent 
will retain clean-up liability. That is, any (pre-divestiture) 
contaminating site will be only the parent's responsibility, even 
if the site is then transferred to the spun-off unit. 
General observations 
from case studies 
Spin-off transactions are often more standard, monitoring or 
planning provisions are uncommon, and mutual compensation is 
often proposed as a first resource for dispute resolutions (Glover, 
2017).  
Contracts between carved-out units and their parents are often 
complex, and specific. However, they also contain provisions 
that are not frequently found in autonomous party contracting. 
For example, dispute resolution and joint planning are 
frequently agreed through joint committees, and third party 
arbitration. (van den Bogaard & Speklé, 2003).  
 




Figure 1.1 Global M&A Activity Vis-à-vis Global Divestiture Activity (number of deals) 
 
Source: Thompson Financial 
 
  










CHAPTER 2: DIVESTITURE GOVERNANCE MODES AND 
INNOVATIVENESS OF DIVESTED UNITS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The study of governance modes that facilitate innovation has long captured the attention 
of strategic management scholars (e.g., Castañer, Mulotte, Garrette, & Dussauge, 2014; Leiblein, 
2003; Nickerson & Zenger, 2002; Teece, 1986; Williamson, 1991). Hierarchical modes can enable 
economies of scale and scope for innovation by easing market frictions using internal authority 
(fiat) (Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Mahoney, 1992; Williamson, 1975). However, hierarchical 
modes are also often coupled with internal constraints that may not always allow this innovation 
to take place (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Rumelt, 1995; Williamson, 1996). Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that internal constraints within companies can restrain the innovative potential of some 
of their business units and that such potential can be ‘unleashed’ by shifting the unit’s governance 
mode (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). One way through which business units can breakout 
from its parents’ internal constraints is through divestitures. Divestitures, the partial or complete 
separation of a business unit, subsidiary, or division, have different governance implications from 
divestments, which are the partial or complete separation of a company’s assets, facilities, or 
workforce (Mair & Moschieri, 2006). It is through divestitures that a new stand-alone company is 
created from the separation of a business unit from its parent company, which can henceforth 
operate more independently in the market.  
Still, not all divestitures have the same “unleashing” potential for divested units. As 
discussed in chapter 1 in this dissertation, a corporate spin-off is a divestiture governance mode 
that grants a higher level of autonomy to the divested unit, making the post-divestiture relationship 
among the unit and the parent closer to market-like governance. An equity carve-out, on the other 





post-divestiture relationship among the unit and the parent closer to hierarchy-like governance. In 
the current chapter, I submit that this post-divestiture difference in the level of unit autonomy, 
derived from the different divestiture governance modes, will have a significant impact in a 
divested unit’s innovativeness. 
The two focal divestiture modes in this dissertation, corporate spin-offs, and equity carve-
outs, involve the creation of stand-alone companies. Divestiture events can be examined as market 
‘information shocks,’ where the performance, inputs, and outputs, of the newly publicly-traded 
unit, is disclosed. The extant research on divestiture has investigated this approach. For example, 
previous studies have shown that separate reporting and stand-alone market prices lessen market 
information asymmetries among unit managers and investors (Allen, 2001). Analysts’ projections 
also become more accurate for divested units following spin-offs and carve-outs (Gilson, Healy, 
Noe, & Palepu, 2001), and unit managers’ incentives are better aligned with the divested unit’s 
performance after a divestiture event (Aron, 1991; Feldman, 2016a, Seward & Walsh, 1996). Thus, 
both modes, spin-offs, and carve-outs can similarly improve the availability of market information 
on the divested unit and provide similar opportunities for fine-tuning managerial incentives to 
unit-specific outcomes. Therefore, observable differences in the (innovation) outcomes of these 
divestiture modes can be attributed to their differences, particularly their governance differences, 
regarding their organizational autonomy.  
The focus of this chapter is to examine the comparative post-divestiture innovation 
outcomes’ changes for stand-alone divested units, (i.e., corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs) 
and the factors that affect how parent firms decide between these two divestiture governance 
modes. Although changes in the performance of stand-alone divested units can be associated with 





for unit’s managers, this dissertation makes the case that differences in the performance of spin-
offs and carve-outs in particular, are associated with the level of post-divestiture organizational 
autonomy at the unit level –as divested units can be more or less independent from their parents, 
notably, depending on the divestiture governance modes, i.e., spin-offs vs. carve-outs, 
respectively.  
Organizational autonomy can be particularly important to explain a units’ innovation 
outcomes in the context of divestitures. The innovation process involves some ability to explore, 
adapt, recombine, and experiment, which is often truncated within larger firms due to their 
bureaucratic rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Further, established parent companies can have 
more difficulties adopting the organizational structures and cultures of innovative companies 
(Markides & Geroski, 2003). Thus, units with lower organizational autonomy can be subject to 
their corporate parents’ rigid cultures, decision-making processes, and (dis-)approval for their 
innovation projects. Key governance attributes from a divested unit’s organizational autonomy, 
include differences in the unit’s decision rights, and freedom from bureaucratic constraints. 
Further, by granting more organizational autonomy to divested units, divestitures can alleviate the 
impossibility of selective intervention5 and governance inseparability6 problems for business units 
that otherwise would be constrained by their parents’ internal governance. 
                                                 
5 The impossibility of selective intervention is the impossibility of self-enforcing promises from owners to 
exercise authority only when there are expected net gains from such intervention (Williamson, 1985). In the 
divestiture context, it can be associated to the difficulty of parent companies to credibly commit to real delegation 
of the decision-making process to their business units.  
 
6 Governance inseparability (Argyres & Liebeskind, 2002) can also be understood as ‘freedom of contract’ 
(Rumelt, 1995) in the divestiture context. For example, a divested but legally controlled unit, e.g., an equity 
carve-out, may not be able to expand its markets due to conflicts of interest with its parent company, or may not 





A central idea in this dissertation is that there can be differences in the levels of 
organizational autonomy of divested units, contingent on the divestiture governance mode, i.e., 
corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs. These differences among organizational autonomy 
allow different/discrete levels of separation between spun-off and carved-out business units from 
their parent companies. The current chapter of this dissertation examines how the divestiture 
governance mode –i.e., corporate spin-offs as compared to equity carve-outs– affects the 
innovation outcomes of divested business units. This approach is used because more autonomous 
governance modes for divested business units can facilitate exploration and free divested units to 
be more innovative and market driven (Chesbrough, 2003). I submit that by establishing a more 
autonomous governance mode for divested units, i.e., a governance mode that will allow these 
units to not only mitigate their agency costs, but also increase local decision rights, and reduce 
exposure to their parents’ constraints, corporate spin-offs will have better innovation outcomes, as 
compared to equity carve-outs.  
I test these ideas using data on patent innovation, pre- and post-divestiture, of a sample of 
US corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs. My empirical results, based on difference-in-
differences estimators, provide support for larger and more positive changes in the innovation 
outcomes achieved by more autonomous divestiture governance modes, i.e., corporate spin-offs, 
as compared to less autonomous divestiture governance modes, i.e., equity carve-outs. Further, 
this positive relationship between autonomy and innovativeness is moderated by the technology 
complementarities among divested units and their parents. That is, units that have higher 
technology complementarities with their parent companies seem to benefit more from less 





The current chapter contributes to the strategic management literature by examining 
business unit-level innovation outcomes from divestitures. Prior research, particularly in the open 
innovation literature (Chesbrough, 2003), suggests that the primary value of divestitures is derived 
from unleashing the divested unit from its parent company’s governance constraints. This chapter 
maintains that the two focal divestiture governance modes (corporate spin-offs and equity carve-
outs) differ regarding the organizational autonomy of such divested units from their parent 
companies’ internal governance constraints. Therefore, the comparative assessment of innovation 
outcomes from high vs. low autonomy divestiture governance modes, i.e., corporate spin-offs vs. 
equity carve-outs respectively, can provide empirical evidence to the impact of internal governance 
constraints on innovation. Theoretically, this approach can shed light on theoretical questions 
concerning how internal governance constraints -- which are different in degree, if not in kind, 
from market constraints (Williamson, 1996) -- can affect innovation outcomes. Thus, this study 
sheds light on the tension between the potential value that a divested unit can ‘unlock’ through a 
more autonomous governance mode, and the value that such unit can derive from having less 
autonomy and more access to its parent’s complementary resources.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows. The second section discussed the theory and 
main hypotheses of my study. Next, Section 3 describes the methods and empirical tests. Then, 
Section 4 presents the empirical results, and the last section, summarizes implications and future 
avenues of work from this chapter.  
2.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
 In this section, I develop hypotheses regarding how different divestiture governance modes 
affect the overall innovation outcomes of divested units. The governance mode of divested units 





reconfiguration of market information and managerial incentives, as well as its legal decision 
rights and exposure to its parent’s internal constraints, can result in variations in the level of the 
divested unit’s organizational autonomy, thereby influencing the innovative environment for the 
unit. The current section develops the core idea that the divested unit’s autonomy from its parent’s 
decision rights and bureaucratic constraints can explain the difference in innovation outcomes 
across the two focal divestiture governance modes. Table 2.1 summarizes the literature on decision 
rights and bureaucratic constraints and suggests how the strength of each changes from pre-
divestiture period to the post-divestiture period -under spin-offs and carve-outs. 
2.2.1. Decision Rights 
From a governance perspective, differences in the innovation outcomes of divested units can 
occur because alterations of the parent’s decision rights over a unit represent intentional variations 
to the level of ‘selective intervention’ (Williamson, 1996) over the generation and dissemination 
of innovative knowledge at the business unit level. The reasoning that I advance here is that the 
level of ineffective selective intervention can be a critical problem in equity carve-outs in ways 
that are non-issues in the more autonomous spin-off.   
Theoretically, parent companies review unit performance using their internal control 
systems and then adjust their internal investment, using selective intervention.  However, previous 
studies suggest that parent companies often fail to only intervene for value-creating purposes. For 
example, centralized systems of cash allocation are a way in which parents intervene, affecting the 
projects a unit can commit to. Extant literature has shown that the allocation of internal investments 
in parent companies is biased towards equalizing allocations across all business units (Bardolet, 
Fox, & Lovallo, 2011) and that most portfolio adjustments are related to the market for corporate 





parent companies’ investment allocation function and innovation has been explained as a failure 
of the internal control systems, or failure in the overall governance systems of firms (Hitt et al., 
1996; Roe, 1990; Seward & Walsh, 1996). Thus, a parent’s internal control and intervention often 
do not result in efficient R&D investment and capital allocations (Jensen, 1993), potentially 
hurting unit-level innovation. 
One of the bedrock principles of property rights theory is that the decision makers with the 
most organizational knowledge concerning the problem at hand should make the decisions 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Particularly, allocating decision rights to the exchange party whose 
behavior would have the greatest effect on innovation should yield superior innovation outcomes 
(Aghion & Tirole, 1994; Grossman & Hart, 1986). However, in less autonomous contexts, such as 
in equity carve-outs, the parent company managers have the autonomy to make decisions that 
could be better made at the business-unit level where the innovation knowledge resides. Hence, 
the equity carve-out is more vulnerable than the spin-off to ineffective and inefficient decisions 
being made in a top-down fashion. Further, higher levels of parent intervention in a business unit, 
which are more likely to occur in equity carve-outs also represent more exposure to a parent’s 
internal constraints. Thus, even if a parent company’s selective intervention problem is negligible, 
and this parent only intervenes where inter-unit synergies can be obtained, a non-autonomous 
business unit would still be subject to its parent’s bureaucratic constraints. 
2.2.2. Bureaucratic Constraints 
A divested unit’s organizational autonomy from its parent’s bureaucratic constraints can 
reduce ‘governance inseparability’ problems (Argyres & Liebeskind, 2002) between the parent 
company and a focal business unit. Particularly, autonomy can free a business unit from its parent’s 





innovation (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Rumelt, 1995; Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales, 2000). Further, a 
unit’s autonomy from its parent’s bureaucratic constraints can increase the unit’s ability to 
combine and contract for external resources and clients (Rumelt, 1995), which can lead to higher 
unit innovation (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 2002; Foss 2003).  
2.2.3. Bureaucratic Constraints: Parent Managers’ Cognitive Biases 
Bureaucratic constraints associated with parent managers’ cognitive biases can be costly, 
and can adversely impact the innovation outcomes of business units, which are often exacerbated 
by a lack of knowledge of the problem at hand at the business-unit level. Cognitive biases can 
include managerial hubris, denial (the inability to judge projects), myopia, political deadlocks, and 
grooved thinking (Rumelt, 1995). It can also include bounds on managerial time and attention, 
which can in turn limit firm growth (Ocasio, 1997; Penrose, 1959) and hinder a business unit’s 
innovation outcomes. Unit managers with less autonomy may take myopic decisions and thus 
might not invest in adaption and maintenance of long-term (innovation) projects (Ostrom, 1990; 
Williamson, 1991). Further, parent company managers are subject to bounded rationality under 
conditions of uncertainty (Knight, 1921), which can impact the effective governance of internal 
interdependencies in multi-business companies and negatively impact innovation outcomes 
(Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000).  
While parent companies’ routines can help units cope with bounded rationality (Cyert & 
March, 1963), the inheritance of past routines has been shown to constrain opportunities for 
learning (Dosi, 1982; Teece, 1986), and limit spawned units’ financial performance (Bergh & 
Sharp, 2011). Divested units with lower organizational autonomy, i.e., equity carve-outs, are more 





organizational routines, resulting in constrained learning opportunities, and possibly less 
innovation for the unit.  
Further, there can be constraints associated with parent-unit capability gaps. Parent 
companies might have no effective way of managing a focal unit that has a different ‘dominant 
logic’ (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995) from other parent company’s units. When a parent company’s 
competencies do not match, the capabilities needed to manage a focal business unit, i.e., when 
there is a parent-unit capability gap, innovation can be reduced.  
Case studies have shown that units’ innovation can considerably benefit from autonomous 
governance modes, such as corporate spin-offs when parent companies’ organizational processes 
and values do not support the value proposition -- or dominant logic -- of the business unit 
(Christensen, 1997). Thus, governance needs for management and innovation might be different 
at business-unit and parent-company levels. This phenomenon is common in settings where, for 
example, the parent company is in a low-cost business, but its focal unit needs to implement 
different types of innovation strategies; the unit’s and parent’s human capital needs are different; 
or the parent is in a mature or declining business, while the focal unit is in a growing business.  
Even if a business unit needs to coordinate resource exchanges with its parent company, 
they could have different dominant logics, making an external exchange superior to a hierarchical 
one (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002). For example, the project selection process at the parent-
company level, which helps maintain internal parent coherence and coordination, might not be 
equally beneficial for all business units. Because the level of unit autonomy is likely to be higher 
in corporate spin-offs, as compared to equity carve-outs, the effect of a parent company’s dominant 
logic is also likely to be higher in equity carve-outs, potentially constraining the focal business-





One prominent consequence of parent companies trying to manage and provide incentives 
for units with different dominant logics is costs of comparison or envy derived from parent 
companies’ attempts to adjust incentives and compensation only for a specific unit, which has been 
associated with a lower propensity of employees to engage in innovation (Argyres & Silverman, 
2004; Mui, 1995; Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). Further, political constraints, due to vested values 
and beliefs, can increase influence costs and core rigidities in ways that are detrimental to a multi-
unit company’s ability to adapt and innovate (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Rumelt, 1995). Not only are 
time and attention diverted towards influencing decision makers in unproductive ways (Milgrom, 
1988), but these political constraints can also lead to resource misallocation among a parent 
company’s business units, e.g., through inefficient cross-subsidization (Rajan, Servaes, & 
Zingales, 2000) that may occur in equity carve-outs. 
2.2.4. Bureaucratic Constraints: Divested Unit’s Access to External Markets 
Bureaucratic constraints are also associated with the unit’s lower access to external markets 
for business units. Higher levels of business unit’s organizational autonomy typically results in 
‘freedom of contract’ (Rumelt, 1995). In which business units may not be able to expand their 
markets due to conflicts of interest with their parent companies, or may not be able to enter into 
alliance and supply contracts (as sellers or buyers) with their parents’ competitors.7 Combined 
ownership can result in costly legal interdependencies between parties, e.g., limit new technology 
acquisitions because of antitrust regulations. Corporate spin-offs can facilitate access to a wider 
range of exchange partners and ‘freedom of contract,’ as compared to equity carve-outs.  
                                                 
7 For example, once divested from AT&T as a spin-off, Lucent Technology could make deals with other 
telecommunications companies more effectively because it had cut ties to its parent, and no competitive 
information from these deals would spill over to its parent company. This outcome would very likely have been 





Further, more autonomous divested units can reconfigure relationships with companies that 
they would not be able, or which would be too costly, to contract as part of their parent companies. 
This contractual and relationship flexibility could help the innovative process of divested units by 
making them more open to potential partners, ideas, and businesses (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 
2002). Further, as a more autonomous entity, a unit can attract new investors, customers, suppliers 
and partners from the external markets that might have been unwilling, e.g., for competitive 
reasons, to deal with its parent company in the pre-divestiture period.  
2.2.5. Internal Governance Constraints, Divestiture Governance Mode, and Innovativeness  
Corporate spin-offs, as compared to equity carve-outs, are more autonomous units with 
higher levels of decision rights where the parent company’s selective intervention problem, i.e., 
top-managers meddling with unit managers’ decision rights, is less pronounced. Being free from 
their parent’s intervention (Williamson, 1996), a corporate spin-off’s employees and managers can 
have more motivation to take (responsibility for) longer-term (innovation) decisions. Further, 
corporate spin-offs, as compared to equity carve-outs, represent a de-facto solution for governance 
inseparability (Argyres & Liebeskind, 2002) problems between corporate parents and spun-off 
units, freeing the unit from its parent’s bureaucratic constraints (e.g., cognitive biases and 
constrained access to external markets). Business unit’s innovation can benefit from less exposure 
to parent’s cognitive biases and better external market’s access that more autonomous governance 
modes provide, by allowing business units to take higher risks and appropriate the innovation 
returns (Chesbrough & Teece, 1996; Teece, 1996). 
Innovation often benefits when decision rights are allocated to the party that has the greater 
potential to influence the innovation outcomes (Aghion & Tirole, 1994; Grossman & Hart, 1986). 





processes and to appropriate the gains when they show good judgment (Corley & Gioia, 2004). 
Divested unit managers in corporate spin-offs may apply their unit-specific expertise better than 
they would if they were embedded in their parent company’s internal governance (Brockner, 
Grover, O'Malley, Reed, & Glynn, 1993; Dranikoff, Koller, & Schneider, 2002; Reilly, Brett, & 
Stroh, 1993), for example, in equity carve-outs. Corporate spin-offs, as compared to equity carve-
outs, have autonomy over their innovation decision rights and from their parents’ bureaucratic 
constraints. Thus, a spin-off’s autonomy, combined with the knowledge unit managers have about 
the units’ business, and markets can have greater ability to enhance innovation outcomes.  
The extant research literature on organizing for innovation (e.g. on R&D centralization vs. 
decentralization) also offers insights into the effect of (divestiture) governance modes on 
innovation outcomes. Previous studies have found that centralized R&D, i.e., where internal units 
are less autonomous, can lower coordination costs for the parent companies and is associated with 
these parent companies generating innovations that have larger and broader impact (Argyres & 
Silverman, 2004). Innovation performance, being an uncertain function, can benefit from the 
coordination competencies and dispute-settlement mechanisms of larger firms that internalize and 
more centrally control business units.  
I submit that business unit innovation outcomes in equity carve-outs are predicted to be 
lower than those of corporate spin-offs. It can be expected that a more autonomous governance 
mode, benefiting from greater decision rights (Aghion & Tirole, 1994), more easily implementable 
entrepreneurial processes (Chandler, 1962), better cognitive appropriability sense (Corley & 
Gioia, 2004), enhanced learning opportunities (Dosi, 1982; Teece, 1986), and less exposure to the 
parent company’s internal constraints in general, will be associated with higher innovation 





parent company’s less autonomous governance, change might be irremediable (Williamson, 1996) 
when parent ownership and decision rights are that high, because that change would disturb the 
parent’s organizational structure in which it is embedded. This logic, derived from agency theory, 
transaction cost economics, and property rights principles, leads then to the first hypothesis: 
H1: Corporate spin-offs, as compared to equity carve-outs, will experience larger 
increases in innovation outcomes after divestiture.  
 
More autonomous units can benefit from higher decision rights and freedom from 
bureaucratic constraints. However, in some cases, the innovation gains that a business unit can 
obtain from having a more autonomous divestiture governance mode, do not fully compensate for 
the coordination costs that such unit would have to incur if it needs access its parent’s technology 
resources. The next section discusses key advantages that parents may provide to units they control 
more closely, i.e., less autonomous units such as equity carve-outs, regarding access to internal 
technology resources.  
2.2.6. Internal Governance Advantages, Technological Relatedness, and Innovativeness 
Organizational headquarters often perform long-term value-creating activities, as well as 
day-to-day administrative functions, such as monitoring the performance of business units 
(Chandler, 1994). In their value-creation role, parent companies coordinate (demand and supply) 
activities and synergies across their related businesses by sharing economic rent-generating 
activities and transferring skills and (technology) resources, across an organization (Porter, 1987). 
Corporate parents often coordinate these related activities across their business units to achieve 
synergies in their demand and factor markets (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994). Innovation 
competencies within firms can arise from the ‘interconnectedness of asset stocks’ (Dierickx & 





difficult to build and identify by others. Thus, parent companies play a central role in combining 
these resources, and “preventing loss” (Foss, 1997: 314), or averting redundancies, both in and 
across business units through related technologies.  
Managing technology relatedness can be less costly within parent-company's hierarchies 
than through markets. Hierarchies are often comparatively efficient in organizing and governing 
related knowledge (Demsetz, 1988). The knowledge-based view (Grant, 1996) emphasizes that 
knowledge relatedness can be more efficiently exploited in hierarchies as intra-firm knowledge 
transfer is more effective than inter-firm transfer. Parent companies can exploit economies of 
scope in their knowledge bases (Teece, 1982) to support their business units’ innovation outcomes. 
Also, a parent company’s internal knowledge-market can offer a comparatively superior 
alternative (Williamson, 1985) to external knowledge-market transactions when such parent owns 
technology resources related to its unit’s innovation needs. Thus, managing related technologies 
is likely to require fewer coordination costs if the unit is controlled by the parent.  
For a more comprehensive understanding of the coordination costs involved in managing 
technology relatedness, this chapter examines technology similarities, concentrating on the same 
narrowly defined technology areas, and technology complementarities, and focusing in different 
narrowly defined knowledge areas but within broadly defined technology areas (Makri, Hitt, & 
Lane, 2010). Similarities -- between parent companies and their units -- in innovation resources 
facilitate the exchange and combination of existing knowledge (Nonaka, 1994), often speeding the 
exploitation of this similar innovation knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Complementarities 
-- between parent companies and their units -- in innovation resources enable exploration and 
experimentation with new technologies (March, 1991). The extant innovation research has 





Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Often, a unit might be subject to market 
frictions when transacting complementarities in the market –as opposed to internally within its 
parent -- (Teece, 1982). Thus, more autonomous units -- e.g., spin-offs-- might bear rising 
coordination costs to integrate these complementary resources (Katila & Ahuja, 2002).  
Further, when there is more relatedness, governance constraints can also be lower. 
Particularly, related resources can be managed using the same dominant logic, i.e., similar resource 
allocation, and strategy formulation (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Related technology stocks, even in 
broadly defined areas, can facilitate communication and coordination, and mitigate cognitive 
biases. For example, myopia and short-term risk preferences can be mitigated when the corporate 
level centralizes related resources (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988). Managerial attention can also be 
economized by shared processes and cognitive maps among related resources. Unrelated units 
would receive less attention than related ones (Bergh, 1998), potentially arising internal influence 
costs (e.g., envy, political games).  
The consequences of granting more autonomy to divested units can be less desirable when 
technological relatedness is high. The organizing for innovation literature has emphasized the 
importance of lower coordination costs to increase firm innovativeness (Argyres & Silverman, 
2004). More separation between the divested unit and its parent -- i.e., more business unit 
autonomy -- can increase their coordination costs, making it costlier to leverage their related 
resources, which could lead to less impactful innovative discoveries for the unit (and the parent). 
More business-unit autonomy, i.e., through corporate spin-offs, can result in higher coordination 
costs between the business unit and the parent company, which may need to exchange related 
innovation knowledge. Equity carve-outs allow the divested unit to draw on the experience, 





relationship-specific investments (Teece, 1982), more readily than if they were two independent 
entities –e.g., through spin-offs. Thus, the effect of divestiture governance mode on the unit’s 
innovation outcomes may represent a tradeoff between autonomy, i.e., from the parent company’s 
internal constraints, and relatedness, i.e., with the parent company’s resources. 
Related technological resources can be more easily exchanged between parents and units 
with stronger ownership ties, i.e., less autonomous units. As compared to spin-offs, equity carve-
outs’ key advantage resides in the fact that the divested unit is likely to have superior access to its 
parent’s related resources. Therefore, 
H2.  The post-divestiture increase in corporate spin-offs’ innovation outcomes, relative to 
equity carve-outs, will be lower when the parent and the unit’s technological resources 
are more closely related (high similarity or high complementarity).  
 
 
2.3. METHODOLOGY  
To address some of the empirical challenges that exist in the context of divestitures (see, 
e.g., Goold, Campbell, & Alexander, 1994) the empirical design of this dissertation uses a 
difference-in-differences approach to examine whether there are differences in innovation 
outcomes between spin-offs and equity carve-outs after divestiture.  This section will discuss the 
data and present the difference-in-differences approach used to test my hypotheses, which are 
grounded in the (agency, transaction cost, and property rights) mechanisms of governance that 
provide the theoretical underpinning that warrant such predictions.  
2.3.1. Data and Sample  
To construct my sample, I used the Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) United States 
Mergers and Acquisitions database to identify all spin-offs and carve-outs from 1990 and 2010 





of divestiture announcements. From those divestiture announcements, their respective decision-
makers withdrew 163 spin-offs and 25 equity carve-outs, and the population of non-withdrawn 
transactions thus totaled 1,383 completed divestitures. However, not all divestitures involve 
innovative firms, and not all divestitures involve patents. I then applied the following sampling 
criteria: First, patent data from the USPTO must be available for the divested unit (spin-off or 
equity carve-out) as well as the parent company before the divestiture event. Specifically, I 
searched for all divestiture parent companies and divested units in Thompson Innovation and 
Patents View, to obtain their patent assignee codes, and associated patents. This search yielded 
217 divestitures of companies that had available patent data. Throughout these searches, I also 
identified the patents that were initially assigned to the parent company, but at the time of the 
divestiture were transferred to the divested unit (and vice versa), to account for a complete unit 
and parent patent portfolio at the time of the transaction. Second, COMPUSTAT annual financial 
data must be available for the divested unit (spin-off or equity carve-out) as well as the parent 
company. For the units’ pre-divestiture period, I compiled financial information from parents’ 10K 
reports at the divestiture year, where parents are legally bounded to disclose data from its unit 
performance at least for two years before the divestiture. After searching in COMPUSTAT and 
the companies’ reports by CUSIPs, names, and potential name changes, financial data on the 
relevant explanatory variables of this study were available for 192 divestitures. Third, I 
corroborated that the transaction was a spin-off or carve-out by reading its related news report 
from Lexis-Nexis or Factiva. The sample of divestitures that will be used for this dissertation is 
composed of 192 divestitures from 1990 to 2010 and consists of 123 corporate spin-offs and 69 
equity carve-outs. As a last step, the observations in my final sample undergo a matching process 





are matched using a coarsened exact matching technique. From which I obtained a balanced 
sample of 106 spin-offs and 52 equity carve-outs (158 matched observations) -see Table 2.2.  
2.3.2. Methods, Empirical Strategy, and Measures 
2.3.2.1. Choice of Divestiture Governance Mode 
Endogeneity has been a widespread concern in strategic management research (Hamilton 
& Nickerson, 2003), and in corporate strategy research because (top) managerial choices are 
intended to be strategic (i.e., endogenous). For example, in the context of this study, there might 
be self-selection in which parent-company managers can anticipate that a business unit is going to 
be more or less innovative in the near future. If this self-selection is the case, parent-company 
managers might decide to: (a) keep under their control those units with the highest likelihood of 
success, or (b) close-keep the less successful units. Under scenario (a), managers would carve-out 
units with the highest innovativeness potential, and thus, this logic would work against the larger 
increases in innovativeness for spin-offs that H1 proposes. If scenario (b) becomes more likely, 
managers may spin-off units with incipient/potential high impact innovation. In this later case, 
innovativeness would have a shorter-term innovation effect (post-divestiture). However, this effect 
is not the case. The gap between the innovation of spin-offs and carve-outs widens over time (see 
Figure 2.1). It is also important to acknowledge that I cannot completely rule out a reverse 
causality story in which parent-company managers know that spin-offs are better modes for 
innovativeness. Because this explanation is consistent with my developed theory, the current 
chapter “embraces” this kind of endogeneity. 
I start my empirical analysis by exploring the underpinning process that can determine the 





to spin-off vis-à-vis the decision to carve-out. The data were organized as cross-sections for the 
pre-divestiture period of each divested unit. For each variable, I computed the average for the three 
years before the divestiture.  Here, the main interest is in understanding differences between units 
with different governance modes.  I estimated the following regression: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖) =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑍𝑖 
In this equation, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of ‘1’ if the 
unit was divested as a corporate spin-off, and a value of ‘0’ if it was divested as an equity carve-
out. The operationalization for the explanatory variables 𝑍𝑖 is as follows: 
Parent's Fund Needs: this variable operationalizes the funding needs of the parent company. 
This study follows the finance literature (e.g., Maksimovic & Phillips, 2008) in determining the 
extent to which companies need to spend (Capital Expenditures) more than the cash flow they 
generate from operations: 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑖 = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 − 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 
This variable is important for the focal divestiture governance choice -- spin-offs and carve-outs   
-- because parent companies can only raise cash through equity carve-outs, and not from corporate 
spin-offs (see Table 1.3). Thus, a higher level of parent’s funding needs is expected to be associated 
with a lower probability of spin-off8.  
Uncertainty in Capex Needs (Parent and Unit difference): to characterize differences among 
parents’ and units’ predictability of investment needs, this measure computes the unit’s and 
parent’s standard deviations of the capital expenditures within three years before the divestiture. 
                                                 
8 A variable that could also be associated with the choice of divestiture governance mode is the financial 
‘independence’ of the unit (from its parent) before being divested. To control for potential variation in the unit’s pre-
divestiture financial independence, the author collected information, from the parent companies’ and units’ 10K, on 
whether the divested unit was part of its parent’s centralized cash distribution system. These data collections 





Then, the absolute value of the difference between the patent and the unit’s CAPEX standard 
deviations is taken: 
𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥 𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 (𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)
= 𝐴𝑏𝑠[𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡′𝑠  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡−3 𝑡𝑜 𝑡
− 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡′𝑠  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡−3 𝑡𝑜 𝑡] 
For firms with relatively predictable investment needs (lower standard CAPEX deviation), it is 
easier to allocate and budget the cash (and capital) to undertake their investments. Conversely, 
firms with higher uncertainty in their investment needs may require to hold more cash, and follow 
a different financial budgeting logic (e.g., to take advantage of investments when they arise). 
Consistent with dominant logic constraints (see Table 2.1, Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Christensen, 
1997), it will be challenging for a parent company to combine two different budgeting logics under 
the same corporate umbrella. For example, a parent with higher capital expenditure uncertainty 
might under-fund a unit with more stable capital expenditures because it needs to hold-on to the 
cash for unexpected expenses. Similarly, a parent with more stable capital expenditures might not 
have the access (to capital markets) or capabilities to manage the focal unit’s volatile investments 
needs. Thus, I submit that larger the differences between the parent and the unit uncertainty in 
CAPEX needs, are likely be associated with higher probability of spin-offs, where the unit and the 
parent company are more autonomous to implement different managerial/budgeting logics. 
Unit's Industry Attractiveness: this variable is aimed to capture the unit’s industry general 
valuation or growth opportunities. It is operationalized as the average Tobin’s Q for the unit’s 
industry. 
Unit's Market Share: this measure is operationalized market share as the unit’s sales over 





expectations regarding the likelihood of success of a divested unit, market share, and the 
combination of industry attractiveness with market share, is likely to contribute to forming these 
expectations (Csaszar & Levinthal, 2016; Henderson, 1970). Often, a business unit with high 
market share combined with high industry attractiveness lead managers to anticipate a higher 
success rate. Thus, managers might prefer to keep such “star” businesses closer. That is, the 
combination of high market share and high industry attractiveness is expected to lower the 
likelihood of a spin-off.   
Controls:  
Related Diversification: This variable controls for relatedness at the two digit SIC codes. 
It takes the value of ‘1’ if both parent and unit are in the same two digit SIC code or ‘0’ otherwise. 
It is important to note that this type of relatedness (through SIC classification) is most likely 
associated with product market diversification than to relatedness in technologies (Gambardella & 
Torrisi, 1998) or other inputs. 
Vertical Integration Parent & unit (I/O Matrix): to control for potential vertical 
relationships between the parent company and the divested unit, I used a proxy based on how the 
unit and parent patent classes interact within the input/output matrix (Leontief, 1951). This 
operationalization considers an economy’s (country’s) patterns for the flow of goods and services 
among different industries and can be used to predict inter-industry vertical interactions 
(Maddigan, 1981). The input-output matrix from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is used 
to construct the parent and unit vertical integration relatedness. The Input/Output matrix provides, 
for each year, a vector of sales from one industry to the others (e.g., sales from industry j to industry 
i), and the total sales made to each industry (i). This vector that can be used to determine how 





four digit NAIC codes, and there are approximately 310 four digit NAIC codes. The USPTO 
concordance between patent classes and NAIC codes is used to match each patent class with a 
NAIC code. To make the calculations, I took units’ and the parents’ patent portfolios in the pre-
divestiture period. That is, the patent portfolio of each firm contained all the patents applied for by 
the divested units and their parents, 1 to 5 years prior the divestiture event. With the information 
about the patent classes represented in each portfolio, I calculated 𝑢𝑖 as the percentage of a unit’s 
patents in patent class 𝑖 (percentage from the total number of patents in the unit’s pre-divestiture 
portfolio); and 𝑝𝑗 as the percentage of a parent’s patents in class 𝑗 (percentage from the total 
number of patents in the parent’s pre-divestiture portfolio): 
𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  ∑    ∑ 𝑢𝑖  ×   𝑝𝑗   ×   
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑗 𝑡𝑜 𝑖







This variable is useful because a big part of this calculation stems from a source of external 
variation (input-output interactions in the economy), lessening some of the endogeneity problems 
from a vertical relationship emerging because of a specific governance mode.  
Pre-Divestiture Innovativeness: the last control in this regression is the level of pre-
divestiture innovativeness. This variable is computed as the count of forward citations received by 
the pre-divestiture parent portfolio of each business unit. This measure of forward citation counts 
was corrected for truncation problems that have been identified in the patent research literature 
Hall et al. (2001) –section 2.3.1.3 explains with more detail this correction. 
2.3.2.2. Coarsened Exact Matching 
The main goal of the current chapter is to examine the differential performance 





there can be underpinning factors influencing the likelihood of choosing one focal divestiture 
governance mode over the other, in this section I use Coarsened Exact Matching (Iacus, King, & 
Porro, 2011) to minimize these potential sources of heterogeneity between my sample of corporate 
spin-offs and equity carve-outs and thus mitigate endogeneity and self-selection into each 
divestiture mode. By balancing the spin-off and carve-out sub-samples on a set of known 
attributes, CEM can mitigate potential biases in coefficient estimates that might arise due to 
differences in observed (or even omitted) variables (Iacus et al. 2011). After the CEM, 
observations for spin-offs and carve-outs will be very similar on observed variables that could be 
related to the outcome and the selection process. Using CEM bounds the sample average treatment 
effect error so that selection bias is less problematic, reduces model dependence, increases 
precision by balancing variance, and reduces the sensitivity to measurement error (Iacus et al. 
2011). 
It is important to acknowledge that I cannot fully address the endogeneity from the choice 
of divestiture governance mode. However, pre-processing the data by applying Coarsened Exact 
Matching [CEM] can mitigate the endogenous effects of governance mode heterogeneity. CEM 
allows me to obtain a matched sample of corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs, and weights 
for each observation, to assemble a more balanced sample regarding the pre-divestiture variables 
level. Means before and after matching are presented in Table 2.3 for spin-offs and carve-outs. 
The logic developed in the previous section (2.3.2.1.) served as the starting point to configure a 
set of matching variables that provides a good balance to the sample, i.e., balance the pre-
divestiture means of key variables. The sample of corporate spin-offs is matched with the sample 
of equity carve-outs on the following characteristics:  Parent's Fund Needs, Difference in Capex 





Matrix) and five-year windows for the announcement of the divestitures in my sample. This last 
variable is included within the CEM methodology to match transactions that occurred in similar 
time-frames, and account for potential macro-conditions at different points. Table 2.3 presents 
descriptive statistics of these variables before and after the CEM matching.  
2.3.2.3. Governance Modes and Innovativeness 
After obtaining a coarsened exact matched sample of spin-offs and cave-outs, I next use a 
difference-in-differences approach (Card & Krueger, 1994) to examine the comparative effects of 
both divestiture modes. Difference-in-differences uses longitudinal data comparing two groups, to 
observe the changes in the outcomes of a focal and a reference group through time. However, the 
divested unit’s innovation impact before and after a divestiture is estimated by comparing a group 
of divested units that have a higher level of autonomy post-divestiture, i.e., corporate spin-offs, to 
a ‘reference’ group with a lower level of autonomy post-divestiture, i.e., equity carve-outs.  The 
average effect of corporate spin-offs on the innovation outcomes of divested units, compared to 
the effect of equity carve-outs as the reference group, is estimated using firm fixed effects 
regressions. These fixed effects regressions are estimated using only the observations that were 
successfully matched in the CEM.  
𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊,𝒕
=  𝛼 + 𝛿0 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓 𝑖 +  𝛿2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓 𝑖  
×  𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽 𝑥𝑖,𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑ 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓 = 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦  (𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒) 





Because these specifications included firm fixed effects, the model does not include firm-specific 
characteristics that are time invariant.  
An important step for difference-in-differences approaches is to account for possible 
differences between groups with a graphic illustration. To examine graphically possible trends that 
could equally affect all divested units in my sample, I build a set of “placebo” control business 
units to compare graphically with divestitures in my sample, i.e., corporate spin-offs and equity 
carve-outs. This “placebo” set from previously divested units allows for at least ten years to pass 
between the divestiture of a unit and the year when they can be included as part of the placebo 
group. Thus, it should be noted that the number of available observations that could be included 
in the placebo group is small. Forward citations in 5-year window pre-period and 5-year window 
post-period for a ‘fictitious’ divestiture year is calculated for each of the units in the placebo 
sample. I matched these placebo units with my sample units by size, divestiture year, and similar 
industry. Figure 2.1 shows the normalized count of forward citations, normalized to year 0 total 
citations, for corporate spin-offs, equity carve-outs, and placebo units.  
This Figure also suggests that, although corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs appear 
to have similar citations trends before being divested, they seem to differ considerably after the 
divestiture. Corporate spin-off forward citations seem to take off after the divestiture, while equity 
carve-out citations look more stagnant. Further, the forward citations of the built control group of 
previously divested units do not seem to have a clear reaction to the ‘synthetic’ divestiture date 
(i.e., built to match with one of the sample observations), suggesting that divestments do matter. 
Figure 2.1 reinforces the idea that the raw differences in the innovation outcomes of corporate 
spin-offs and equity carve-out can be wider over time, i.e., the more years into the post-divestiture 





outcomes. This outcome suggests that post-divestiture changes in the unit’s innovation outcomes 
are less spurious, and consistent with the long-term character of the innovation process9. 
To lessen some concerns regarding different pre-divestiture innovation levels (non-
randomly) affecting the magnitude of the change at the post-divestiture innovation levels, for 
example, through a mean reversion, Figure 2.2 graphically presents the correlation between the 
level of pre-divestiture innovativeness (x-axis) and the change in the post-vs-pre- divestiture 
innovativeness (y-axis). This graph does not seem to indicate a clear mean reversion or a tendency. 
Further, lower levels of pre-divestiture innovativeness do not seem to be associated with higher 
changes in their post-pre divestiture innovation.  
Dependent Variables - Innovativeness 
This study examines a set of innovativeness variables for divested units, i.e., forward 
citations -- with and without self-citations and parent citations -- forward citations per patent and 
number of patents. Triangulating through different measures can be useful to have a more robust 
representation of the divested unit innovativeness. 
Number of Patents. To calculate this variable, I summed the number of patents applied for 
by the divested units in my sample in the pre-divestiture period, five years prior the divestiture 
event, and in the post-period, five years after the divestiture event. For example, for a divestiture 
announced in 1995, I took all the patents that the unit applied for during 1990-1995 (Pre-
Divestiture period) and 1996-2000 (Post-Divestiture period). For the pre-divestiture period, I also 
added the patents that the parent company transferred (re-assigned) to the business unit at the time 
                                                 
9 These potential long-term gains for corporate spin-offs have also been suggested in previous research studies, 
which found no evidence for immediate financial performance increases, but some evidence that the payoffs for 





of the divestiture, to consider innovations that both parties deemed to be part of the unit’s 
technology base.  
 Forward Citations: I operationalize innovativeness as the count of forward patent 
citations. Forward citations is a measure extensively employed in the innovation literature to proxy 
for innovation impact (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005), beyond the raw number of patents. Other 
measures in the literature, that this study includes, are forward citations without self-citations, and 
forward citations without cross-citations with another focal firm. I added the forward citations 
received by the unit’s patents within the first 5-years of a patent’s life. Thus, consistent with prior 
research (Hall, et al., 2005) this 5-years-window (from each patent’s application date) can proxy 
for innovativeness. Using forward citations poses potential truncation problems as the researcher’s 
observation period might not cover the entirety of granted patents and patent citations. To improve 
my measures and lower the probability of truncation, I updated my patent data --USPTO database 
measures, and transaction measures: number of patents, characteristics, and patent citations -- in 
January 2017.  
The extant empirical research in patents and innovation has noted two main truncation 
problems with the measure of forward citations. The first problem derives from the fact that there 
is often a lag between patent applications and patent grants (i.e., application-grant lag). Thus, for 
the latest years of the observation window, of the latest transactions included in my sample -- e.g., 
for divestitures occurring in 2010, patents applied for (by units) in 2015 -- patents might not yet 
show in the USPTO because they have not been granted, and the number of patents (and citations) 
might be underestimated. To correct for this underestimation bias, Hall et al. (2001) suggests 
computing “weight factors” (by NBER subclass, by year) using the empirical distribution of 





closer to the end of my observation period (e.g., 2014 and 2015 patents) will have higher weight 
factors, as compared to patents applied in earlier years10.  
The second problem is truncation in the number of patent citations observable within the 
period of data collection. For example, for a divestiture occurring in 2010, the post-divestiture 
patent portfolio will include patents applied for in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 (5-years after 
the transaction). However, for patents applied for in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, this citation 
window (five years of forward citations) will be truncated, because the observation period of this 
study ended in January 2017. Consistent with prior research (Hall et al., 2000), I also computed 
“weight factors” for each NBER subclass, taking into account the forward citations truncation. 
That is, using the USPTO empirical distribution for the percentage of forward citations (from the 
total citations each patent received), I calculated the percentage of forward citations an average 
patent (in each subclass) has received after 1, 2, 3, and 4 years of application. 
To smooth the distribution and facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients, I logged this 
measure of forward citations for the difference-in-differences estimation. I also accounted for self-
citations, when a unit cites one of its patents, and parent citations, when a parent company cites 
the unit’s parents and excluded these citations from the total forward citation count. 
Explanatory Variables 
Corporate Spin-Off Dummy: I assigned a dummy equal to one when, in accordance with 
the data collected from SDC, the divested unit was a corporate spin-off, as compared to an equity 
carve-out. In the absence of complete integration among parents and units, research shows that 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that application-grant lags have been recently improving (Hall, et al., 2005), so this type 
of truncation is less likely to happen. For example, from the USPTO database patents, the average application-
grant lag is of 2.23 years (author calculations from the USPTO patent database) for patents applied for after 





greater equity ownership (carve-outs) represents a greater parent company influence on how unit-
level managers allocate resources and manage their business units (Eisenhardt, 1989; Oswald & 
Jahera, 1991). 
Time Dummy: I assigned a dummy of t=1 for the post-divestiture period. This assignment 
will account for time differences (before-after) of the difference-in-differences estimator.  
Technology Relatedness: Following the extant literature on innovation (e.g., Karim & 
Kaul, 2015; Makri, Hittz, & Lane, 2010; Schijven & Hitt, 2012) technology relatedness can be 
measured through two constructs: similarity and complementarity. This extant literature has 
defined technology similarity as the degree to which the technologies of two parties focus on the 
same narrowly defined technology areas.  Further, technology complementarity is the degree to 
which the technologies of two parties focus within the same broadly defined areas, but are also 
different narrowly defined technology areas. While similarity has been theorized to be easily 
identified by the market (based on publicly available information); complementarity has been 
theorized to be more easily identified by the managers/incumbents of the focal firms (Schijven & 
Hitt, 2012). The units’ and the parents’ patent portfolios are assessed to operationalize these 
measures. In the pre-divestiture period, the patent portfolio of each firm contained all the patents 
applied for by the divested units and their parents, 5 to 1 years prior the divestiture event. In the 
post-period, each firm’s (unit and parent) patent portfolio contained patents applied for 1 to 5-
years after the divestiture event. To capture technologies in the same narrowly defined technology 
areas, I used the number unit and parent patents in the same three-digit USPTO parent classes. 
There are four hundred-seventy-three classes in the USPTO patent classification system, which 
corresponds to detailed technology areas. To capture technologies in the same broadly defined 





There are thirty-six subclasses in the NBER patent classification system that can proxy for broader 
technology areas (as compared to the USPTO classification).  
 Technology Similarities: I operationalized this variable as: 
∑ (𝑔𝑗,𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 ×  𝑔𝑗,𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 )
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𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡′𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑂 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑗
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡′𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
 
and  
 𝑔𝑗,𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦′𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑂 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑗
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡′𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
  
 
 Technology Complementarities: I measured this variable as: 
[ ∑ (𝑤𝑖,𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 ×  𝑤𝑖,𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 )
36
𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑅 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑖=1 
]     − [ ∑ (𝑔𝑗,𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 ×  𝑔𝑗,𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 )
473




𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡′𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑅 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑖




 𝑤𝑖,𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦′𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑅 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡′𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
 
Control Variables 
Patent Classes Characteristics: the pace and level of innovation can be different in distinct 





the unit’s patent portfolio (five years before, and five years after for the pre- and post-divestiture 
period respectively).  
 Patent Class Growth in a Divested Unit's Portfolio: This measure is the natural log of 
the average growth of all the classes represented in the divested unit’s patent portfolio. 
This value addresses the problem of controlling for rapidly growing technology areas, 
i.e., as compared to more stagnant ones.  






× (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡′𝑠 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜)𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠=𝑖,    𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟=𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  
 
 Patent Class Age in a Divested Unit's Portfolio: This measure is the natural log of the 
average age of all the classes represented in the divested unit’s patent portfolio. This 
variable captures the average stage of the technologies in the unit’s patent portfolio 
innovation, which can impact the number of citations that a patent receives -e.g., older 
classes having less overall patent citations (Hall, et al., 2001).  






× (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡′𝑠 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜)𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠=𝑖,    𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟=𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  
Divested Unit Size: The divested unit size is measured as the natural log of total assets of 
the divested unit. Controlling for size is important for R&D activity, among others because it 
captures the impact of firms’ scale on innovation (Ahuja, Lampert, & Tandon, 2008). 
Divested Unit R&D Investment: R&D investments are measured as the natural log of R&D 





Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics on the characteristics of the firms in my sample, and Table 
2.5 presents correlations. The statistics presented in this Table correspond to the pre- and post-
divestiture patent portfolio, which covers patents applied for five years prior to the divestiture year, 
and five-year average after the divestiture year. Financial characteristics such as total assets and 
R&D investments correspond to three-year average (t-3 to t-1) for the pre-divestiture period and 






2.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
2.4.1. Choice of Divestiture Governance Mode 
Table 2.6 presents the coefficients of the logit models for the choice between corporate 
spin-offs and equity carve-outs. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to ‘1’ when the 
divestiture was a spin-off, and ‘0’ if the divestiture were a carve-out. These models are run on 192 
observations, my full sample before matching, and they include divestiture time-period and sector 
dummies. Model 1 reports the control variables only, Model 2 includes the set of explanatory 
variables derived from the empirical exploration presented in section (2.3.2.1), and Model 3 
includes an interaction term for unit’s industry attractiveness and unit’s market share. Model 5 
includes the explanatory variables without the controls to compare for over-fitting. The 
coefficients of most of the variables have the expected signs: higher parent’s fund needs are 
associated with a lower probability of spin-offs (as parents cannot raise cash through spin-offs, but 
only through carve-outs); higher parent-unit differences in the uncertainty of capital expenditure 
needs are associated with higher probability of spin-off; industry attractiveness and market share 
both impact negatively the probability of the spin-off choice and their interaction effect is negative 
and significant at 1%. This empirical result suggests that parent companies are more likely to 
choose spin-offs, as compared to carve-outs, for units with comparatively lower growth prospects 
and market share. These findings seem to support the view that parent managers are picking winner 
(“star”) units to keep under their corporate control -- i.e., through equity carve-outs. 
The control for Vertical Integration is also statistically significant and indicates that carve-
out units are more likely to have vertical integration nexus with their parent companies. The 
coefficient for related diversification is significant and positive, setting a puzzle over the way 





(carve-outs). It seems that units whose parents operate in related product markets (as proxied by 
the being in the same 2 digit SIC codes) are more likely to be divested through spin-offs. This 
empirical finding is consistent with the resource-based-approach, which predicts that relatedness 
in the input markets that are the highest are most relevant to firm diversification (and restructuring) 
decisions. Further, in more complete models (less omitted variables), pre-divestiture 
innovativeness levels do not seem to play a statistically significant role in determining the choice 
between spin-offs and carve-outs. 
2.4.2. Coarsened Exact Matching  
This study estimated coarsened similarities for the relationship of parent’s fund needs, 
(parent-unit) differences in Capex needs, unit’s industry attractiveness, (parent-unit) vertical 
integration and five-year windows for the announcement of the divestitures in my sample, with 
the binary choice of divestiture governance mode. In coarsened exact matching, each variable is 
coarsened by recoding it into grouped values and then using an ‘exact matching’ algorithm to 
determine the matches and discard the unmatched observations, creating a set of strata that contain 
the same coarsened values. Further, CEM assigns weights to each matched observation that 
incorporate the number of units in the treated and control groups, as well as the observations in 
each strata. This approach facilitates the assignment of units into the final sample where the 
treatment group is designated as matched corporate spin-offs, and the control group is designated 
as matched equity carve-outs, to test the changes in innovation outcomes that occur between these 
two modes of divested units. Further, the CEM methodology assigns weights to each observation 
that can be applied to the regression (difference in differences) to attain a more balanced sample. 
Table 2.3 also suggests that although there were some statistically significant differences among 





longer statistically significant after matching with CEM. For example, in the non-matched sample 
parents of spun-off units have significantly lower fund needs and higher differences in the variation 
of capital expenditure needs (with their unit). Spin-offs seem to be in more economically attractive 
industries, as compared to carve-outs and have a lower level of potential of vertical integration 
with their parent companies. All these differences are not statistically significant once Coarsened 
Exact Matching is applied. 
2.4.3. Corporate Spin-Off and Equity Carve-Out Activity 
Table 2.7 presents means and differences in means for corporate spin-offs and equity 
carve-outs. The number of corporate spin-offs between 1990 and 2010 is significantly higher as 
compared to equity carve-outs, and this empirical finding is consistent with the proportions 
occurring in the population of all US spin-off and carve-out transactions (see Table 2.2). The 
statistics for the matched sample suggest that there are no statistically significant differences in 
terms of the pre-divestiture innovation and financial characteristics of corporate spin-offs and 
equity carve-outs. Further, differences in technology similarities and complementarities are not 
statistically significant for spin-offs and carve-outs after matching. The mean for innovativeness, 
measured by patent and forward citations, is not significantly different in the pre-divestiture period. 
These statistics provide initial support for the view that, after the CEM matching, the observations 
for corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs that remain on the sample have similar pre-divestiture 
innovation characteristics, while their post-divestiture innovation outcomes can differ after 






2.4.4. Divestiture Governance Modes and the Level of Innovation Outcomes 
This section discusses the results of difference-in-differences regressions that test how the 
innovativeness of divested units comparatively change following the divestiture event. Table 2.8 
presents these difference-in-differences results for different innovativeness proxies. All model 
include firm fixed effects and robust standard errors, and the observations are weighted with the 
weights derived from the CEM methodology. Model (1) introduces the controls and the Post-
Divestiture dummy, which is positive and significant at the 1% level. Models (2) through (5), 
include the regressions for the unit’s forward citations correcting by: parent citations to the units 
in Model (2); unit’s self-citations in Model (3); parent citations to the units and also unit’s self-
citations in Model (4); and the total count of forward citations in Model (5). Model (6) considers 
the total number of citations per patent, and Model (7) the raw number of patents.   
From Models (1) to (7) it can be concludes that the difference-in-differences coefficient on 
Post-Divestiture × Spin-Off is positive, statistically significant, and robust across different 
measures of unit innovativeness. This empirical finding corroborates Hypothesis 1, indicating that 
the innovativeness of corporate spin-offs is larger, as compared to equity carve-outs, following a 
divestiture. The magnitude of the difference-in-differences coefficient can be interpreted (and 
compared) directly from the regressions in Table 2.8, because this coefficient is an interaction of 
two dummies, within a logged (dependent variable) specification.  
The comparison of the coefficients on Post-Divestiture × Spin-Off across Model (7) and 
Model (6), suggests that although corporate spin-offs patenting rates are higher post-divestiture, 
as compared to equity carve-outs, spin-offs seems to have a larger effect on the relevance of each 
those patents, as the coefficient for the number of citations per patent is larger (and statistically 





show that on average, the (pre- and post-divestiture) change in corporate spin-offs’ innovativeness 
is about 29% larger than the change in equity carve-outs.  
Table 2.8 tests whether this improvement in the innovation outcomes of corporate spin-
offs is lower when the divested there is higher unit-parent technology relatedness (Hypothesis 2). 
This hypothesis is tested by interacting Post-Divestiture × Spin-Off with the Technology 
Relatedness between the divested unit and the parent company. Technology relatedness has been 
measured through two different constructs: technology similarities (overlap in very specific 
technology classes), and technology complementarity (overlap in broader technology classes, 
excluding overlap in specific technologies). Model (2) and Model (3) corroborate that the 
coefficients for both relatedness constructs are negative and statistically significant. This empirical 
finding suggests that although spin-offs show higher changes in their post-divestiture 
innovativeness, as compared to carve-outs, technology relatedness between the divested units and 
its parent can (negatively) moderate this positive effect on innovation. Although the main effect 
on innovativeness of the difference-in-differences estimator is approximately +29%, a one 
standard deviation increase in technology similarity could decrease these innovativeness outcomes 
in approximately 19%, while a one standard deviation increase in technology complementarities 
could decrease divested units’ innovativeness in about 18.5%. Thus, there are limits to the benefits 
of autonomy that spin-offs provide. 
Carve-outs with higher levels of relatedness perform comparatively better than spin-offs 
with high unit-parent relatedness. Figure 2.3 shows that divested units’ post-divestiture 
improvement in innovation outcomes is lower for divested units that exhibit higher levels of 
technology similarities with their parent companies. It worth noting, however, that at higher levels 





lessened. However, graphing over the range of technology similarity, allows us to suggest that 
there is a point in the unit-parent similarity continuum where unit innovativeness will benefit 
comparatively more from a carve-out divestiture governance mode. Figure 2.4 also supports the 
idea that higher levels of technology relatedness can weaken the innovativeness of spin-offs. This 
Figure shows an upward slope for the interaction of technology complementarity with the 
difference-in-differences coefficient, but also suggests that there is a level of technology 
complementarities where the innovativeness of divested units benefits more from a carve-out 
divestiture governance mode. As a robustness check, Table 2.9 examines the relationship of the 
explanatory variables with the post-divestiture ownership that the parent company. That is, the 
larger the ownership retained by the parent, the lower the unit autonomy post-divestiture. These 
empirical results are consistent with the results in Table 2.8 (opposite signs), through it is worth 
noting that chapter 1 makes the case for a discrete difference between spin-off vs. carve-outs, rather 
than a more continuous variation in levels. Taken together, Table 2.8, Table 2.9, Figure 2.3, and 
Figure 2.4 provide support for Hypothesis 2.  
The empirical results presented above indicate that corporate spin-offs improve the level 
of innovation outcomes for the divested business units, as compared to the less autonomous 
divestiture governance mode of equity carve-outs. While this study does not claim to establish that 
the autonomy granted to corporate spin-offs conclusively causes improvements in the innovation 
outcomes of divested divisions, the empirical strategy presented here suggest that the above results 
hold using coarsened exact matching joined with difference-in-differences methods that account 
for certain non-random (capabilities) selection. Thus, these empirical findings seem to corroborate 
the idea that differences in the agency, transaction costs, and property rights governance features 





warranted explanation for why there can be greater innovation outcomes for spin-offs relative to 
carve-outs.  
Although this chapter offers both theoretical and empirical contributions, there are research 
limitations that can open opportunities for future work. First, this chapter considers the static 
relationship between divestiture governance modes -- corporate spin-offs relative to equity carve-
outs -- and the innovation outcomes of the divested unit. However, future research could examine 
further changes in the parent’s ownership and decision-rights over their divested divisions, e.g., 
re-acquisitions or complete divestitures, which can also vary according to the divestiture 
governance mode. Second, the divestiture governance modes can be usefully viewed as 
transactions through which firms preserve control over other transactional parties. Thus, the 
empirical results and the corresponding theory development in this dissertation provide important 
steps toward a more systematic examination of the differences in (contractual and relational) 
governance mechanisms (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Williamson, 1996) that underpin differences in 
observable governance modes, which can significantly influence the performance (innovation) 
outcomes of the transactional parties. 
2.5. DISCUSSION  
This dissertation examines how two focal divestiture governance modes -- corporate spin-
offs and equity carve-outs -- differ in terms of their pre- and post-divestiture changes in innovation 
outcomes. This study suggests that the key differences between corporate spin-offs and equity 
carve-outs are due to the distinct levels of divested units’ post-divestiture autonomy from their 
parent companies’ internal constraints. Corporate spin-offs, the divestiture governance mode with 
higher autonomy, are found to be positively associated, on average, with larger post-divestiture 





relatedness with its parent rises, the corporate spin-off governance mode, as compared to equity 
carve-out, becomes decreasingly associated with a change in the innovation outcomes of the unit. 
These empirical results are derived using coarsened exact matching, which considers the parent’s 
choice between two focal divestiture governance modes through a close match of corporate spin-
offs and equity carve-outs based on unit and parent company characteristics, as well as a 
difference-in-differences approach, which considers the unit’s pre-divestiture innovation capacity, 
as well as other unit characteristics.  
The current chapter also makes key contributions to the research literature on divestitures, 
governance, and innovation. Traditionally, the benefits from redeploying resources have been 
examined through the lens of managerial action inside the firm and have been evaluated from the 
perspective of the parent companies. It is therefore important for researchers and managers to 
understand how divesting units outside the boundaries of the firm can improve innovation 
outcomes and create economic value for these divested business units (i.e., spin-offs and equity 
carve-outs). Market responses to corporate spin-offs are found to be positive for the divested unit 
(Schipper & Smith, 1986; Seward & Walsh, 1996), as well as for the parent-unit pairs that share 
board of director ties (Feldman, 2016b). I extend insights on divestitures within the conversation 
of strategic management by examining how longer-term effects of divestitures, such as post-
divestiture innovation outcomes, differ across divested units with distinct divestiture governance 
modes. 
The core theoretical insight from evaluating the innovation outcomes between two different 
divestiture governance modes – i.e., corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs -- is that the parent 
company’s internal constraints differentially affect each type of divestiture mode. Corporate spin-





rights. Thus, while post-divestiture corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs can both potentially 
align the unit managers’ incentives with business-unit outcomes, only spin-offs are granted more 
autonomy from their parents’ constraints to restructure their incentives, governance, and decision 
rights. This approach connects to the Williamson (1996: 17) quote at the introduction of this 
dissertation. While the market failures literature emphasizes the potential shortcomings of a 
corporate spin-off, this dissertation offers a more complete comparative assessment of imperfect 
divestiture governance modes by emphasizing potential bureaucratic failures of an equity carve-
out (e.g., governance inseparability problems, and the impossibility of selective intervention), 
which can have statistically significant impacts on the divested unit’s innovation outcomes. 
Furthermore, complementarities among resources can contribute to competitive advantage (e.g., 
through sustained improvements in innovation outcomes) innovativeness), and governance modes 







2.6. TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 2.1 Organizational Autonomy: Decision Rights and Bureaucratic Constraints 
Organizational 
Autonomy 












•Impossibility of selective intervention 
•Disconnect between parents’ investment allocation function and 
innovation 
•Co-location of legal decision rights with appropriation rights: giving 
decision rights to the party with the greater potential to influence the 
innovation outcomes will provide the correct incentive structure to 
innovate. 
•Williamson (1996) 
•Hitt et al. (1996) 
•Seward & Walsh, 
1995 
•Grossman & Hart 
(1986) 
•Aghion & Tirole, 
1994 







•Cognitive biases: managerial hubris, denial (inability to distinguish 
good from bad projects), and grooved/rigid thinking are more likely to 
happen in large established organizations -can lead to inertia and lower 
adaptation. 
•Rumelt (1995) ++ + 0 
 
•Myopia: bureaucracy does not provide unit managers with the same 
incentives to utilize resources with the same care and foresight as more 
autonomous governance modes. For example, myopic managers would 
exploit current resources without investing in proper maintenance and 




++ + 0 
 
•Bounds in cognitive resources: bounded rationality, scarce managerial 
time and attention are aggravated within lager bureaucracies and can 
limit growth and innovation performance. 
•Penrose (1959) 
•Ocasio (1997) 
++ + 0 
 
•Capability gaps: parents may not have the capabilities to operate the 
division's business. E.g., capabilities in factor and product markets. 
•Constraints to govern units with different dominant logics: extending 
the ideas of open, and disruptive innovation to divestiture governance, it 
will be challenging for a parent company to manage a business unit if 
such unit's cost structure or market is different from the parent 
company's. A parent company may not have the capabilities (processes, 
values) to operate a unit's business. 











Table 2.1. (cont.) 
Organizational 
Autonomy 












•Political deadlocks and/or influence costs: inherent values and beliefs 
of a multi-unit company may be constraining individual units from 
adaptation and innovation. Time and resources are spent influencing 
decision-makers instead of more innovative activities. 
•Cross-subsidization and/or misallocation of resources is often a sub 





•Rajan, Servaes, & 
Zingales, (2000) 







•Combined ownership limits "freedom of contract," e.g., legal 
interdependencies could prevent new acquisitions because anti-trust 
regulations, contracts and alliances with the parent company's 
competitors. 
•Rumelt (1995) 
++ + 0 
•Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom (2002) 
•The ability to combine, and contract for, resources and skills available 
in the external market in a more flexible way can provide divisions with 
potentially beneficial exchanges. Contractual freedom could help the 
innovative process of divested units by making them more open to 











Table 2.2 Sample composition: Corporate Spin-Offs and Equity Carve-Outs 
 
  Spin-Offs Carve-Outs Total 
Initial Population from SDC 1030 541 1571 
Not withdrawn 867 516 1383 
Patent information found 137 80 217 
Financial Information found 123 69 192 






Table 2.3 Logit Model for the Choice of Divestiture Governance Mode: Probability of observing a Spin-Off 
Logit Model. Dependent variable: Choice of divestiture governance mode (1=Spin-off, 0=Carve-out) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Parent's Funds Needs 
  -0.1001*** -0.0950** -0.0238 
  (0.009) (0.015) (0.514) 
Difference in Capex Needs (Parent and Unit) 
  0.0701** 0.0774** 0.0910*** 
  (0.031) (0.036) (0.001) 
Unit's Industry Attractiveness 
  0.0279*** -1.5943*** -1.7886*** 
  (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) 
Unit's Market Share 
  0.3528 -3.2079*** -3.6680*** 
  (0.112) (0.005) (0.001) 
Unit's Industry Attractiveness x Unit's Market Share 
    -4.3819*** -4.8893*** 
    (0.007) (0.001) 
Related Diversification  
(Dummy=1 if same 2 digit SIC) 
0.3494 0.6660*** 0.6789***   
(0.118) (0.001) (0.002)   
Vertical Integration Parent & unit (I/O Matrix) 
-1.5085*** -1.8643*** -1.9355***   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Pre-Divestiture Innovativeness 
-0.4084* -0.2629 -0.2377   
(0.052) (0.443) (0.498)   
Constant 
1.9032*** -6.8761 -9.1183* -11.9091*** 
(0.001) (0.141) (0.092) (0.001) 
Number of Divestitures 192 192 192 192 
Spin-Offs 123 123 123 123 
Carve-Outs 69 69 69 69 
Time Period Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
VIF 2.6 3.11     
Pseudo R-squared 0.0844 0.132 0.146 0.0862 




Table 2.4 Difference in means for choice variables between Spin-Offs and Carve-Outs (Pre-
Divestiture period) 
 








Parent's Funds Needs 0.916 1.320 -0.405 
Difference in Capex Needs (Parent and Unit) 1.233 1.174 0.059*** 
Unit's Industry Attractiveness 0.247 0.249 -0.002** 
Unit's Market Share 0.125 0.0790 0.0460 
Related Diversification (Dummy=1 if same 2 digit SIC) 0.333 0.348 -0.0140 
Vertical Integration Parent & unit (I/O Matrix) 0.313 0.372 -0.059*** 
Pre-Divestiture Innovativeness 2.626 2.979 -0.353** 
N= 123 69  192 
        
        








Parent's Funds Needs 0.546 0.623 -0.0770 
Difference in Capex Needs (Parent and Unit) 1.233 1.232 0.00100 
Unit's Industry Attractiveness 0.263 0.248 0.0150 
Unit's Market Share 0.132 0.0610 0.0710 
Related Diversification (Dummy=1 if same 2 digit SIC) 0.321 0.308 0.0130 
Vertical Integration Parent & unit (I/O Matrix) 0.316 0.327 -0.0120 
Pre-Divestiture Innovativeness 2.673 2.786 -0.113 







Table 2.5 Correlation Table for the CEM Matched Sample 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) 
Unit's Forward Citations  
-Parent Cits Excluded (ln) 
1                     
(2) 
Unit's Forward Citations  
-Self Cits Excluded (ln) 
0.995 1                   
(3) 
Unit's Forward Citations  
-Self and Parent Cits Excluded (ln) 
0.995 0.998 1                 
(4) Number of Cits per Patent (ln) 0.587 0.574 0.577 1               
(5) Number of Patents (ln) 0.921 0.923 0.921 0.23 1             
(6) Technology Similarities 0.27 0.258 0.252 0.112 0.272 1           
(7) Technology Complementarities 0.353 0.339 0.339 0.132 0.363 0.889 1         
(8) Average Age in Unit's Tech Areas -0.131 -0.153 -0.161 -0.039 -0.14 0.007 0 1       
(9) 
Average Growth in Unit's Tech 
Areas 
-0.032 -0.019 -0.014 0.023 -0.052 -0.146 -0.159 -0.253 1     
(10) Unit's Total Assets (ln) 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.076 0.462 0.144 0.193 0.091 -0.057 1   





Table 2.6 Difference in means between Spin-Offs and Carve-Outs (Pre-Divestiture period) 
 
Panel A: Difference in Means before CEM matching - Pre-Divestiture period 
VARIABLES After Matching Spin-Offs Carve-Outs Mean Difference 
Number of Patents 167 307.6 -140.621* 
Unit’s Forward Citations (count) 1499 3371 -1872** 
Unit’s Self Citations (count) 218 295.8 -77.70 
Parent Citations to Unit's Patents (count) 70.66 126.4 -55.75 
Technology Similarities 0.079 0.082 -0.004 
Technology Complementarities 0.048 0.056 -0.008 
Average Age in Unit's Tech Areas 5.079 4.941 0.137*** 
Average Growth in Unit's Tech Areas 0.035 0.068 -0.033*** 
Unit's Total Assets 2162 3949 -1787* 
Unit's R&D Investment 97.5 227.8 -130.297* 
N =  123 69 192 
        
        
        
Panel B: Difference in Means after CEM matching - Pre-Divestiture period 
VARIABLES After Matching Spin-Offs Carve-Outs Mean Difference 
Number of Patents 172.9 251.8 -78.92 
Unit’s Forward Citations (count) 1569 3029 -1500 
Unit’s Self Citations (count) 211.8 264.4 -52.58 
Parent Citations to Unit's Patents (count) 81.34 131.8 -50.41 
Technology Similarities 0.085 0.072 0.012 
Technology Complementarities 0.052 0.047 0.005 
Average Age in Unit's Tech Areas 5.069 4.984 0.085* 
Average Growth in Unit's Tech Areas 0.028 0.062 -0.034** 
Unit's Total Assets 2270 1887 382.6 
Unit's R&D Investment 95.5 142.7 -47.20 







Table 2.7 Difference-in-Differences regressions for Divested Unit’s Innovativeness 
Difference-in-differences regressions - Dependent variables: Unit innovativeness 


























0.3729*** 0.1696** 0.1262** 0.1413** 0.1385** -0.0081 0.1692* 
(0.000) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027) (0.936) (0.090) 
Post-Divestiture x Spin-Off 
  0.2968*** 0.2603*** 0.2825*** 0.2468*** 0.3498*** 0.2294** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.043) 
Average Age in Unit's Tech Areas 
0.0752 0.0055 -0.0054 0.0132 0.0173 -0.4391 0.0444 
(0.837) (0.987) (0.983) (0.962) (0.952) (0.175) (0.886) 
Average Growth in Unit's Tech Areas 
-0.9703 -1.0314 -0.4667 -0.4375 -0.8066 -3.3853* 1.0501 
(0.353) (0.313) (0.503) (0.560) (0.356) (0.069) (0.385) 
Unit's Total Assets (ln) 
-0.7545 -0.6885 -0.5152 -0.5692 -0.5388 -0.3395 -0.6730 
(0.149) (0.240) (0.211) (0.201) (0.264) (0.644) (0.221) 
Unit's R&D Investment (ln) 
0.3022 0.1996 0.1225 0.1046 0.1239 0.1323 -0.0670 
(0.315) (0.540) (0.608) (0.681) (0.654) (0.753) (0.848) 
Constant 
5.8358** 6.0950* 4.8620** 5.2703** 5.0463* 6.1116 6.5506* 
(0.043) (0.080) (0.041) (0.042) (0.074) (0.234) (0.079) 
Spin-Offs 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
Carve-Outs 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEM Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted-R2 0.304 0.351 0.378 0.384 0.337 0.232 0.227 




Table 2.8 Difference-in-Differences regressions, for Unit's Forward Citations -Parent Citations 
Excluded, with Interaction Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: Innovativeness - Unit's Forward Citations -Parent Citations Excluded (ln) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Post-Divestiture 
0.1696** 0.1820** 0.1742** 
(0.021) (0.014) (0.018) 
Post-Divestiture x Spin-Off 
0.2968*** 0.3134*** 0.3015*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post-Divestiture x Technology Similarities 
  0.0183   
  (0.713)   
Post-Divestiture  x Spin-Off  x Technology Similarities 
  -0.1916**   
  (0.022)   
Post-Divestiture x Technology Complementarities 
    0.0287 
    (0.482) 
Post-Divestiture x Spin-Off x Technology Complementarities 
    -0.1491** 
    (0.049) 
Average Age in Unit's Tech Areas 
0.0055 0.1138 0.0742 
(0.987) (0.725) (0.820) 
Average Growth in Unit's Tech Areas 
-1.0314 -0.8683 -0.8341 
(0.313) (0.394) (0.418) 
Unit's Total Assets (ln) 
-0.6885 -0.8374 -0.7888 
(0.240) (0.201) (0.217) 
Unit's R&D Investment (ln) 
0.1996 0.1758 0.1579 
(0.540) (0.591) (0.643) 
Constant 
6.0950* 6.4495 6.4221* 
(0.080) (0.113) (0.099) 
Spin-Offs 106 106 106 
Carve-Outs 52 52 52 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
CEM Weights Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted-R2 0.351 0.392 0.368 













Figure 2.2 Reversion to the Mean Graph: Post- vs. Pre-Divestiture Changes in unit’s 
innovativeness (y-axis) as a function of unit’s pre-Divestiture level (x-axis) 
 
 
Or more detailed for the 75% of the observations: 
 
These two graphs do not seem to suggest a clear (non-random) pattern among the pre-divestiture 







Figure 2.3. Technology Similarities: marginal effects on Unit's Innovation Outcomes 
 
 
This Figure represents the marginal effect of technology relatedness in the unit’s forward citations for 













2.7. SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE 
Table 2.9 GLM Model for Post-Divestiture Parent Ownership 
GLM Model. Dependent Variable: Post-divestiture parent ownership 
(continuous) 
Explanatory Variables: Unit and parent characteristics GLM 
Parent's Funds Needs 
0.0572** 
(0.014) 
Difference in Capex Needs (Parent and Unit) 
-0.0206** 
(0.042) 
Unit's Industry Attractiveness 
1.4177*** 
(0.007) 
Unit's Market Share 
2.9062*** 
(0.008) 
Unit's Industry Attractiveness x Unit's Market Share 
3.8812*** 
(0.006) 
Related Diversification (Dummy=1 if same 2 digit SIC) 
0.0111 
(0.937) 










Time Period Dummies Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes 
Log-likelihood -80.24 







CHAPTER 3: DIVESTITURE GOVERNANCE MODES AND 
APPLICATION BREADTH OF DIVESTED UNITS’ INNOVATIONS 
“A broad technological base insures that, whatever direction the path of research may take, the 
results are likely to be of value to the sponsoring firm… It is not just the size of the companies that 
makes it worthwhile for them to engage in basic research. Rather it is their broad underlying 
technological base, the wide range of products they produce or will be willing to produce if their 
research efforts open possibilities” (Nelson, 1959: 302-303). 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION   
An important dimension of companies’ innovation outcomes is the breadth of application 
of their technologies (Nelson, 1959). Wide-application-breadth innovations can be deployed as 
inputs in multiple applications, and can further promote growth and firm productivity due to their 
usefulness in products and processes across a wide range of sectors (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 
1995). The extant research literature has theorized that access to a diverse technological base is 
needed to appropriate the value from innovations with a wide breadth of applications (Nelson, 
1959). However, few firms -- often large and diversified firms -- own such diverse technological 
bases (Nelson, 1959). Thus, diversified firms are in a better position to appropriate the economic 
rents from broadly applicable innovation. However, this hypothesis posits that firms cannot 
effectively transact these broad technologies. To appropriate innovative value from broadly 
applicable innovations, firms may use markets for technology to procure access to a diverse base 
of complementary technological and commercialization resources. 
Because the governance arrangements that would allow smaller, not-diversified companies 
to access a diverse technological base, through the markets for technology, are not frictionless 
(Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001), hierarchy-like governance arrangements may offer a 
superior alternative for technology transactions (Arrow, 1974). This logic suggests an important 




example a hierarchy-like governance arrangement, more likely to produce innovations with wider 
application breadth? 
The current chapter explores this question by comparatively assessing the application 
breadth of innovations produced by business units divested through two focal divestiture 
governance modes, i.e., corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs. This context is relevant for 
testing the relationship between governance mode and application breadth of innovations. 
Corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs differ in the market-like vs. hierarchy-like access they 
grant divested units to their (former) parent companies’ technological base. This study explains 
and predicts how units divested through spin-offs and carve-outs diverge in terms of the pre- and 
post-divestiture changes in the application breadth of the innovations they produce. 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation makes the case that corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs 
have distinct implications for the governance of the parent-unit exchanges. Corporate spin-offs, as 
compared to equity carve-outs, are divestiture governance modes where divested units have higher 
legal control rights and autonomy from their parent company, higher potential parent-unit 
contracting costs, better external dispute mechanisms, and higher access to external markets (see 
Table 1.3). These differences suggest that the exchanges among corporate spin-offs and their 
parent companies are market-like exchanges among autonomous parties, while the exchanges 
among equity carve-outs and their parent companies are hierarchy-like exchanges among less 
autonomous parties. Equity carve-outs on the other hand, can offer a good balance among access 
to complementary capabilities and low transactional hazards, key tradeoffs in the markets for 
technology (see e.g., Somaya, Kim, & Vonortas, 2010). 
Distinct levels of autonomy in the unit-parent relationship can have important implications 




compared to those produced by carve-outs. For example, hierarchy-like governance modes (carve-
outs) can better cope with adaptation (Williamson, 1991), and deal with the uncertainties in the 
technological paths of broadly applicable innovations (Arora & Gambardella, 2010). Further, 
market-like governance modes (spin-offs), where innovations with wider application breadth are 
not co-owned with a diverse technological base where these innovations can be applied, can be 
subject to ‘imperfect appropriability’ problems (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995). ‘Imperfect 
appropriability’ is an externality problem where the payoff to the owner of wide application 
breadth innovations is linked to the payoffs to the owner/s of other technologies in each of the 
innovations’ application areas11 (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995). Due to this externality problem, 
a company would be more likely to produce innovations with wider application breadth only if 
there is a mechanism for that company to appropriate some of the benefits derived from these 
innovations, e.g., through hierarchy-like safeguards, or co-ownership. 
Parent corporations often own diverse technological bases with more potential application 
areas (Nelson, 1959), where a divested units’ broadly applicable innovations can be used. Thus, 
the discrete governance differences, between spin-offs and carve-outs, are relevant because they 
affect the divested units’ access to their parents’ diverse technological base. While spin-offs (more 
autonomous units) are likely to have less access to their parents’ technologies, carve-outs (less 
autonomous units) are likely to have more access to their parents’ technological base.  
This chapter maintains that contingent on divestiture governance mode; a divested unit will 
be more likely to produce innovations that have a comparatively wider application breadth. 
Particularly divested units with a market-like (autonomous) governance mode with their parents, 
                                                 
11 From a technology system perspective, if the owner of the broadly applicable technology is solely a technology 
supplier, there could also be a “horizontal” externality across the different technology areas where the broadly 




e.g., corporate spin-offs, are more likely to produce innovations that have narrower application 
breadth. On the other hand,  divested units with a hierarchy-like (less autonomous) governance 
mode, e.g., equity carve-outs, are more likely to produce innovations that have broader application 
breadth. I test these ideas using a sample of US spin-offs and carve-outs between 1990 and 2010. 
I collect data on the application breadth of these divested units’ innovations, before and after the 
divestiture event, to obtain difference-in-differences estimators.  
The empirical results from this study suggest that corporate spin-offs, as compared to 
equity carve-outs, experience a greater narrowing in the application breadth of innovation that they 
produce. Consistent with the explanation that economic rents from broad resources are more easily 
appropriated by large diversified firms (Nelson, 1959), this chapter finds that parent company 
diversification moderates this relationship between the divestiture governance mode and the 
breadth of application of the innovation of these units. Further, appropriability mechanisms that 
could be more readily available for divested units that have a hierarchy-like governance mode with 
their (former) parent companies, also moderate the relationship between governance mode and 
application breadth of unit innovations. When complementary assets are important as an 
appropriability mechanism in the technology areas where the unit is innovating, a more 
autonomous unit-parent governance mode (i.e., spin-offs) will be associated with greater 
narrowing (as compared to carve-outs) of the applicability of their innovation after a divestiture.  
The current study contributes to the extant literature in three novel ways. First, from a 
theory perspective, this chapter tests propositions regarding the impact of complementary 
resources on the breadth of application of innovations. Second, this study examines details of the 
appropriability problem of the markets for wide application breadth. Not only do I explore the 




accessing downstream complementary resources. This chapter is organized as follows. The next 
section will discuss the theory and hypothesis of the study. Then, the methods and empirical design 
will be presented, and the last section, provides some concluding remarks.  
3.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
3.2.1. Application Breadth of Innovations 
The extant literature on “general-purpose technologies” and markets for technologies shed 
light on our understanding of the application breadth of innovations. It is important to note that not 
all widely applicable innovations have the revolutionary impact (over a country’s economic 
development) that general-purpose technologies have been theorized to have (Bresnahan & 
Trajtenberg, 1995). However, widely applicable innovations and general-purpose technologies 
share a distinctive ability to spread across wide application sectors. Within the markets for 
technology literature, an important characteristic of wide-application-breadth innovations is the 
initial “symmetric uncertainty” (among the innovation producers and users) about the future value 
of the applications of the innovation (Arora & Gambardella, 2010). This idea is comparable to 
wide-application-breadth innovations’ value and uses being unknown-unknowns (Knight, 1921). 
Another key insight is that companies producing widely applicable innovations are at risk of not 
being able to appropriate the value of these innovations. This risk occurs because of the technology 
resources -- i.e., diverse technological bases -- that would allow companies to appropriate value 
from their wide-application-breadth innovations, are often illiquid (Arora et al., 2001), specific 
(Gambardella & Torrisi, 1998), and subject to high transaction costs.  
Theoretical developments on the market frictions associated with wide-application-breadth 




transactions between the producers of broadly applicable innovations and their potential users, will 
undermine the production of such technologies (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995). Both, the 
widely-applicable innovation producer, and the downstream user of such innovation would want 
to innovate less broadly. The producer may produce innovations with lower application breadth 
because she/he cannot appropriate the returns from her/his innovations’ applications. Further, the 
user of the widely-applicable innovation may not want to rely on this specific producer as the user 
knows the breadth may diminish, and the investments she/he would have to make are often specific 
to the innovation producer. Thus, writing a complete technology contract that accounts for all the 
uncertainties in the development and applications of widely-applicable innovations, as well as for 
the division of the innovation process into producers and users, may prove problematic (Arora & 
Gambardella, 2010; Arrow, 1974). Hierarchy-like transactions are an alternative that could 
improve adaptation (Williamson, 1991), which is needed to deal with the “symmetric uncertainty” 
on the value and uses of wide-application-breadth innovation, as well as appropriability concerns, 
needed to establish how the economic rents of wide-application-breadth innovation are distributed. 
Extant empirical evidence has discussed external and internal factors affecting the breadth 
of applications of the innovations firms produce. Past work on external factors influencing the 
breadth of innovation, suggests that innovations sourcing knowledge from outside the firm, e.g., 
from the innovation’s users, will have a broader set of follow-on technologies (Chatterji & 
Fabrizio, 2012). This observation corroborates Nelson’s (1959) claim that innovation breadth is 
contingent upon users’ access. On the internal factors affecting the breadth of innovation, a 
centralized organizational structure has been found to provide the incentives for the production 
innovations that have wide application breadth (Argyres and Silverman, 2004). Firms that have 




innovations with wide application breadth, while keeping low the coordination costs. These studies 
have found a significant effect of external users and internal organizational structure on the 
application breadth of innovations. Still, more empirical evidence is needed on the organizational 
governance modes that provide companies better access to users (and these users’ diverse 
technological base), so that they have incentives to produce innovations with wider application 
breadth. 
3.2.2. Divestiture Governance Mode and Innovation Breadth 
Having access to a high number of potential applications (e.g., a diverse technological 
base), internally or through the market, has been theorized to encourage the production of more 
general innovations (Bresnahan & Gambardella, 1998). Following this logic, having access to a 
diverse technological base of potential innovation applications can be key for a business unit to 
determine the breadth of innovation outcomes that such unit will produce. In the context of 
divestitures, a divested unit’s (former) parent company is a likely user of the unit’s innovation, and 
as such, a potential source of a diverse technological base of applications. Further, the access that 
a divested unit enjoys to its parent’s resources, and in particular to its parent’s technological base, 
is dependent upon the divestiture governance mode of this unit, i.e., on the autonomy of the 
divested unit from its parent in the post-divestiture period (see Chapter 1). Thus, spin-offs and 
carve-outs are divestiture governance modes that can grant different levels of autonomy to the 
divested units (from their parent companies). In this section, I will investigate the effect of the 
governance mode choice on the application breadth of divested units’ innovations, and the 
contingencies that moderate this effect.  
This chapter starts by asking why parent companies are more likely users of divested units’ 




external technology (Arora, Belenzon, & Rios, 2013), due to inertial sources inside their structures 
that slow innovation processes (Leonard-Barton, 1992). However, parent companies often have 
difficulties searching for and assimilating these external technologies (Arora & Gambardella, 
2010). Parents will be in a better position to “evaluate” and “utilize” external technologies if they 
come from a known source (Arora & Gambardella, 1994), e.g., a divested unit12. The ability to 
“evaluate” a technology denotes the ability of a company to predict its value (Arora & 
Gambardella, 1994). In the case of a parent and its divested unit, a parent company is likely to 
enjoy inside information about this unit’s innovations (at least at the beginning of the post-
divestiture period), and have the ability to “evaluate” the unit’s technology more accurately. The 
ability to “utilize” a technology denotes the ability of a company to extract its value (Arora & 
Gambardella, 1994). It also involves the technological (e.g., a diverse technological base) and 
downstream resources (e.g., manufacturing and marketing) that a parent company is likely to 
already have in place. In general, being a carve-out, i.e., an affiliated firm, would increase the odds 
of becoming a transaction partner, and also safeguard the transaction. 
After discussing why parent companies are likely users of their divested unit’s innovations; 
this chapter then asks why divested units would need parent companies as users of their wide-
application-breadth innovations. Larger firms -- e.g., parent corporations -- with established 
downstream capabilities (e.g., production and marketing) will likely be in a better position to 
benefit from more broadly applicable technologies (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001), as 
compared to recently divested units. Similarly, broader scope in technologies’ applications may 
give rise to increasing returns to scale in each of the technology applications (Bresnahan & 
                                                 
12 Anecdotal evidence supports this idea of technology exchanges from divested units to their parent companies 
(Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002), although it does not make a distinction among different divestiture 




Trajtenberg, 1995), which can be more difficult to attain for a stand-alone divested unit. Further, 
the more limited managerial, financial, and downstream resources that newly divested units 
possess, tapping into multiple areas of technology applications would be more difficult for these 
units, and discourage the production of wide-application-breadth innovations. Further, because 
larger firms have low incentives to in-license technologies (Gambardella, Giuri, & Luzzi, 2007), 
divested units that produce wide-application-breadth innovations may have difficulties finding 
other ‘user’ companies willing to rent these technologies from them, besides their former parents. 
Alternatively, newly divested business units with less autonomous (or hierarchy-like) unit-parent 
governance modes, can more easily open access of their wide-application-breadth innovations to 
their parent companies in a mutually beneficial exchange, subject to lower transaction costs.  
An important consideration of the proposed exchange of broadly applicable innovations 
from less-autonomous divested units to their parents, are the costs or market frictions of engaging 
in this transaction. Uncertainties about the technology transaction process (Arora & Gambardella, 
2010) among divested units and parent companies, would be detrimental to the unit’s likelihood 
of producing wide-application-breadth innovations for their parents to use. Some uncertainties in 
these transactions can be related to the bargaining process, i.e., who appropriates which percentage 
of the wide-application-breadth innovation’s value. It can also be related to fear of opportunism 
and an unknown value of the technology, which can be particularly high in the case of wide-
application-breadth innovations (Arora & Gambardella, 2010). From a transaction cost economics 
logic, it can be predicted that these uncertainties, and other transaction costs inherent in the markets 
for technology, can be attenuated by a hierarchy-like governance mode such as equity carve-outs.   
Thus, less autonomous divestiture governance modes, i.e., carve-outs, not only allow 




provide incentives to these units to produce wide-application-breadth innovations. This effect on 
innovation breadth occurs because carve-outs lower the costs of exchanging technologies between 
the divested unit and its parent. Carve-outs open access to the parent’s diverse technological base 
of applications, and to its downstream complementary resources, at a lower cost than would spin-
offs. This impact of lowering cost, combined with lower uncertainty of the technology transaction 
process (meaning the unit can more safely transact with its parent and appropriate some of the 
innovation value), can provide the incentives to carve-out units to produce wider application-
breadth innovations. Based on this logic, I submit that while autonomous divested units, i.e., spin-
offs, are likely to produce innovations with narrower applicability, carve-outs are more likely to 
produce innovations with wider application breadth.  
H1. Corporate spin-offs, as compared to equity carve-outs, will experience a greater 
narrowing of the applicability of their innovation after a divestiture. 
  
In this section, I examined how the divestiture mode thus can significantly influence the 
application breadth of divested units’ innovations. This relationship, however, is likely to be 
influenced by the extent to which a divested unit’s parent has a diverse technological base, and the 
importance of some appropriability mechanisms, such as intellectual property protection, and 
complementary assets. 
3.2.3. Parent Technological Diversity and Breadth of Innovations 
One of the main arguments for divested units to produce wide-application-breadth 
innovations is that these units can then rent/sell/share these technologies to their parent companies. 
This exchange is advantageous because extant theory suggests that parent companies have a more 
diverse technological base to appropriate value from the broad uses of wide-application-breadth 




parent company’s technological diversity in the relationship between the divestiture governance 
mode and the application breadth of divested units’ innovations.  
Changes in the application breadth of divested units’ innovations can be contingent on the 
parent company’s characteristics. It has been theorized that broadly diversified firms can more 
easily appropriate the economic rents from broad technological resources and thus, higher levels 
of innovation can be found in more diversified firms (Nelson, 1959; Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
Given the demand uncertainty about which of the applications of a broadly applicable innovation 
will have the highest economic value, these broad technologies are more useful to diversified firms 
that can appropriate more fully the economic rents across different applications (Nelson, 1959). 
That is, technologies with broader applications are more useful within more diversified firms 
because they “have their fingers in many pies” (Nelson, 1959: p. 302). Thus, to the extent that 
wide-application-breadth innovations involve higher technology-based economies of scope, more 
technological-diversified firms will have an economic incentive to innovate in such technologies.  
A divestiture governance mode that facilitates greater coordination with a more diversified 
parent, e.g., a carve-out as opposed to a spin-off, will then facilitate the implementation of 
technology-based economies of scope. Further, because equity carve-outs preserve the closeness 
and strong ownership links with its parent, it is in a better position to leverage wide-application-
breadth innovations through its parent company’s diverse technology base and appropriate some 
of the returns from these innovations. The next hypothesis predicts that carved-outs, as compared 
to spun-off units, may produce even more broadly applicable innovations when their parent 
companies have a more diverse set of technologies. Therefore,  
H2. Corporate spin-offs, as compared to equity carve-outs, will experience a greater 
narrowing of post-divestiture applicability of their innovation when the parent is 





3.2.4. Appropriability and the Application Breadth of Divested Units’ Innovations 
Tapping into markets for technologies is one way in which smaller firms without 
diversified technological resources can access and benefit from the (diversified) potential 
applications of their widely applicable technologies. Previous work has theorized that 
appropriability conditions can influence externalities, which in turn can impact the production of 
broader innovations (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995). Thus, appropriability conditions can pose 
an incentive (or disincentive) for the breadth of the innovation produced by companies.  
Different types of appropriability mechanisms may have different effects on the breadth of 
application of innovation produced by firms. This study examines the importance of two key 
mechanisms to appropriate innovation returns, i.e., intellectual property, and complementary 
assets. Appropriability through intellectual property rights enable firms to use the markets for 
technology to transact with other firms to create and capture innovation value. Thus when 
intellectual property is an effective mechanism to capture innovation value, firms might have more 
incentives to produce wide applicable technologies. By contrast, when complementary assets are 
an effective mechanism to appropriate innovation value, this effectiveness occurs due to the co-
specialization of the innovation and the complementary assets (Teece, 1986). Such co-
specialization inherently implies that firms would need to integrate into the complementary assets 
in order to access their appropriability benefits, and therefore be constrained in the use of markets 
for technology. Put differently, innovating firms would benefit more from owning (or accessing 
through a hierarchy-like arrangement) these complementary assets. 
3.2.4.1. Intellectual Property as an Appropriability Mechanism 
Intellectual property rights are a key factor affecting the transaction costs of exchanging 




mechanism, the underlying technologies are likely to have lower transaction costs -- i.e., firms can 
directly profit from licensing or sales, protect themselves against infringement, and increase their 
bargaining power (Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 2000). Thus, the innovation breadth benefits of 
hierarchy-like arrangements -- e.g., better adaptation and lower transaction costs -- will be more 
pronounced when the companies struggle to protect their innovations through intellectual property.   
More effective intellectual property rights also indicate that smaller firms (e.g., recently 
divested units) can still appropriate some of the economic returns from innovations with wider 
application breadth because they can more safely transact the rights of their technologies in the 
market. Effective intellectual property can enable further value creation and appropriation through 
a business model where the producer of broadly applicable technology can transact with numerous 
partners that can apply such broad technology (e.g., Gambardella & McGahan, 2010). Thus, the 
need for a hierarchy-like governance arrangement (e.g., carve-outs) to appropriate rents from wide-
application-breadth innovations can be less relevant. Therefore,  
H3. Corporate spin-offs, as compared to equity carve-outs, will experience a lesser 
narrowing of post-divestiture applicability of their innovation when intellectual 
property is an important appropriability mechanism for the divested unit.  
 
3.2.4.2. Complementary Assets as an Appropriability Mechanism 
In many cases, the owners of complementary assets might be able to create and appropriate 
most of the profits from innovation (Teece, 1983). Thus, companies with established positions in 
these complementary assets can have more incentives to produce broader technologies because 
they can utilize these innovations in different markets. Complementary assets in marketing, 
manufacturing, and distribution channels, for example, can be useful to create and capture value 
from different innovation applications (Chandler, 1990; Teece, 1986). Access to complementary 




2001; Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006), and matching broad technologies’ commercialization needs -- 
e.g., manufacturing applications, strong legal department. 
In a divestiture, parent companies are more likely (as compared to divested units) to own 
the resources necessary to complement wide-application-breadth innovations. Thus, divested units 
with more autonomous divestiture governance modes (spin-offs) will have more difficulties 
searching and contracting for the complementary resources needed to appropriate the rents from 
wide-application-breadth innovations. The right to access a parent company’s research facilities, 
supplier networks, distribution channels, among others, can provide value added to a divested 
unit’s wide-application-breadth innovations (Arora et al., 2001). Because one divestiture 
governance mode grants divested units more access to their parents’ complementary resources 
(carve-outs), there would probably be an extra incentive to produce broader technologies that can 
be exploited by its parent company ‘in-house.' Therefore, 
H4. Corporate spin-offs, as compared to equity carve-outs, will experience a greater 
narrowing of post-divestiture applicability of their innovation when complementary 
assets are an important appropriability mechanism for the divested unit.  
 
3.3. METHODOLOGY  
The current chapter (Chapter 3) applies the sample and empirical methodology from 
Chapter 2 in this dissertation. This sample covers 192 US divestitures, from 1990 to 2010, that 
include 123 corporate spin-offs, and 69 equity carve-outs. These observations only include 
divested units for which patent and financial information is available. This study applies a 
difference-in-differences specification that examines differences in the changes in the application 
breadth of innovations for corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs, in the pre- and post-
divestiture periods. To attenuate the selection problem of parent companies choosing which units 




Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). I acknowledge this empirical strategy does not fully address 
the endogeneity problem. Nevertheless, a CEM matching allows us to obtain a more balanced 
sample, i.e., similar in their observable attributes, of (106) spin-offs and (52) carve-outs to apply 
a difference-in-differences regression (see Table 2.3). The empirical specification used for this 
chapter also included firm fixed effects, and can be summarized as follows: 
𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑩𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊,𝒕 =
=  𝛼 + 𝛿0 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓 𝑖 +  𝛿2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓 𝑖  
×  𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽 𝑥𝑖,𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑ 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓 = 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦  (𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒) 
 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 , 𝐼𝑃 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  
𝑥𝑖,𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑ = 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 
3.3.1. Dependent Variables 
Breadth of Innovation Application: To proxy for the breadth of application of the business 
unit’s innovation I calculated the bias-corrected generality measure (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 







In this equation, 𝑠𝑖 represents, for each patent, the proportion of citations belonging to class 
𝑖 that a focal patent received. This proportion is added across all patent classes. This study uses 
the NBER patent classification (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001). The Generality index is 
corrected by 𝑁𝑖, the total number of citations observed for a given patent. This correction is 




of citations for a given patent is small. For the difference-in-differences estimation I logged this 
total number of citations for each firm in each period. 
Generality is a measure to proxy for the breadth of innovation applications. If a patent was 
cited by other patents that belonged to a wider range of technology areas, then the generality 
measure will be higher. If on the other hand, most forward citations are concentrated in fewer 
technology areas, then the generality measure will be lower. Patent generality, for the pre-
divestiture portfolio, is calculated with patents applied by the divested business units one, two, 
three, four and five years before the divestiture event. The same sampling procedure is followed 
in the post-divestiture portfolio, i.e., patents applied by the divested business units one, two, three, 
four and five years after to the divestiture event. Generality is first calculated for each patent, and 
then the generality scores are averaged across the pre- and post-divestiture patent portfolios.  
It is worth noting that patent generality, the measure used in this chapter to operationalize 
the application breadth of the technologies, accounts for both, the number of different technology 
areas where an innovation can be applied to, and the extent to which the innovation’s applications 
are concentrated in specific application areas. 
3.3.2. Explanatory Variables 
Corporate Spin-Off Dummy: I operationalized divestiture governance mode as a dummy 
equal to one when an observation corresponded to a corporate spin-off, and zero the observation 
corresponded to an equity carve-out.  
Time Dummy: A dummy equal to one for the post-divestiture period. 
Parent’s Technological Diversity: The parent company’s diversification is measured as 
the inverse of the entropy for the patents in the technology classes that a parent company patents. 




used in the competitive dynamics literature. It is relevant for the current context because this index 
increases as both the number of different classes and the evenness of the distribution among those 
classes increase. 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡′𝑠 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = − ∑ 𝑤𝑖(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡) × ln𝑤𝑖(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡)
∀𝑖 (𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡)
 
Where 𝑤𝑖(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡) is the proportion of patents in the parent’s patent portfolio that corresponds to 
patent class 𝑖. These products are added across all 𝑖 classes in the parent’s patent portfolio. To 
reduce the multicollinearity of interaction terms, and better interpret the regression coefficients, 
parent’s technological diversity is standardized.  
Effectiveness of Intellectual Property: This measure is derived from the CMU survey 
(Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000), where companies from different industries answer what is the 
percentage of innovations for which patenting is considered an effective appropriability 
mechanism. The mean percentage of firms in each industry determines how effective is Intellectual 
Property to appropriate innovation rents within that industry. These industry percentages were 
weighted by the proportion that each industry represented in the unit’s patent portfolio. This 
measure is also standardized to account for multicollinearity of interaction terms, and facilitates 
its interpretation. 
𝐼𝑃 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 = ∑ (𝑢𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑃𝑖)
32
𝐼𝑆𝐼𝐶 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑛 
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑖=1 
 
The CMU survey reports data for ISIC industries -- there are 32 ISIC codes represented in 
Cohen et al. (2000) data. For each industry, 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑃𝑖  represents the average importance of 
IP reported by firms in the ISIC industry 𝑖. To match ISIC industries with USPTO patent classes, 




USPTO concordance between patent classes and SIC codes. For each patent portfolio in the pre- 
and post-divestiture periods, I then calculated 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 as the percentage of a unit’s patents in ISIC class 
𝑖 for the pre-divestiture period (𝑡 = 0), and the post-divestiture period (𝑡 = 0). That is, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the 
percentage of patents in ISIC class 𝑖 from the total number of patents in the unit’s pre- or post-
divestiture portfolio. Thus, for each divested unit, 𝐼𝑃 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡  represents the weighted 
average of the importance of IP in all the technology classes where the unit owns patents. 
Effectiveness of Complementary Assets: similar to IP appropriability, the Importance of 
Complementary Assets as an appropriation mechanism reflects the relative importance of 
complementary assets (manufacturing, distribution and sales) to appropriate innovation rents.  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡
= ∑ (𝑢𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖)
32
𝐼𝑆𝐼𝐶 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑛 
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑖=1 
 
The CMU survey also reports the average of this measure for each ISIC industry 𝑖, 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 . In the current study, this industry-level measure is weighted 
to create a firm-level measure using the patent portfolio. This firm-level measure of 
complementary assets appropriability, weights each sector represented in the divested units’ pre- 
and post- divestiture portfolios. This measure was also standardized in the empirical models.  
Control Variables 
Patent Classes Characteristics: to compare the application breadth of innovations across different 
firms, is desirable to control for some intrinsic differences among technology classes represented 




Patent Class Growth in a Divested Unit's Portfolio: This measure is the natural log of the average 
growth of all the classes represented in the divested unit’s patent portfolio. I operationalized this 
measure as: 






× (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡′𝑠 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜)𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠=𝑖,    𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟=𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  
Patent Class Age in a Divested Unit's Portfolio: This measure is the natural log of the average 
age of the technology classes represented in the divested unit’s portfolio. I operationalized this 
measure as: 






× (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡′𝑠 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜)𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠=𝑖,    𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟=𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  
 
Divested Unit Size: the size of the divested unit is measured as the natural log of total assets of the 
divested unit.  
Divested Unit R&D Investment: R&D investments are measured as the natural log of R&D 
investment of the divested units, and it controls for innovation inputs of such units. 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the units in the sample, 
and Table 3.2 shows the correlations table for the main variables of this study. Table 3.1 suggests 
that in this sample, complementary assets are rated as having more importance than IP, as an 
appropriability mechanism. This observation is consistent with the CMU survey average results 
(across industries) of IP having less importance than other mechanisms for innovation value 




3.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
As discussed in the previous section, the methodology followed for the CEM matching 
process and outcomes in this chapter are the same as that presented in Chapter 2. I will then directly 
discuss the summary statistics and difference in means for spin-offs and carve-outs (see Table 
3.3). In general, there are no significant differences in the pre-divestiture levels for the variables 
of interest in this chapter. Before the divestiture event, the average spin-off in the sample has a 
slightly higher generality index, as compared with the average carve-out. However, this difference 
is not statistically significant in the non-matched, or the matched CEM sample.  
Table 3.4 presents the empirical results of the difference-in-differences regressions testing 
how corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs differ in terms of the pre- and post-divestiture 
changes in the breadth of application of their innovation. All the models include firm fixed-effects 
and robust standard errors. Under all model specifications, the difference-in-differences coefficient 
𝛿1 (Post-Divestiture × Spin-Off) is negative and significant, suggesting that after a divestiture, the 
application breadth of divested units’ innovations is narrower for the corporate spin-offs, as 
compared to equity carve-outs. This empirical finding provides support for Hypothesis 3. The 
magnitude of this coefficient indicates that the application breadth of spin-off’s innovations is 
approximately 11% narrower post-divestiture, as compared to carve-outs’ post-divestiture breadth. 
Thus, although the breadth of technology applications is similar for corporate spin-offs and equity 
carve-outs pre-divestiture (see Table 3.3), the difference-in-differences estimator for the breadth 
of application of the technologies is statistically narrower, following the divestiture. 
To shed light on why the change in the application breadth of spin-off’s innovations may 




coefficients for the moderation effects of parent technological diversification, importance of IP 
appropriability, and importance of Complementary Capabilities appropriabilities, respectively.  
The first set of interaction effects test whether there is an effect of the parent company’s 
technological diversification on the changes of the technology breadth for divested units under 
different divestiture governance modes. The coefficient on the Post-Divestiture × Spin-Off 
interaction with Parent Technological Diversification in Model (3) and Model (6) suggests that for 
corporate spin-offs with more diversified parents, the (narrowing) changes in the application 
breadth of their technologies is greater. That is, corporate spin-offs will narrow their breadth even 
more as compared to equity carve-outs when they have diversified parents. This empirical result 
provides support for Hypothesis 2. Further, an increase in 1 standard deviation in our measure of 
parent diversification, makes the breadth of application of divested units’ innovations 9% narrower 
(on average). Considering Figure 4.1, along with the results from Model (3) in Table 3.4, the 
empirical evidence from this study provides support for Nelson’s (1959) predictions concerning 
the relationship between general technologies and the diversification scope of the firms. 
Model (4) and Model (6) in Table 3.4 examine the interaction of IP Appropriability with 
the Post-Divestiture × Spin-Off coefficient. As hypothesized, the effect of IP Appropriability on 
the relationship between divest unit’s autonomy and application breadth of divested units’ 
innovations is positive. Thus, hierarchy-like divestiture governance modes (e.g., carve-outs) are 
less associated with the breadth of application of the divested unit’s innovations when the 
intellectual property appropriability mechanism is stronger. It is important to consider, however, 
that the coefficient for the difference-in-differences interaction with IP Appropriability is only 
significant at the 10% level (see Figure 4.2 for a graphical representation of this moderation effect) 




the effectiveness of intellectual property as an appropriability mechanism, makes the divested 
unit’s application breadth of innovation rise in about 13%, to cancel out the main effect of 
divestiture governance mode on breadth of application. 
Table 3.5 presents a robustness check that includes different measures of technological 
relatedness into the full model. These specifications include three variables from the previous 
chapter: parent’s citations to unit’s patents, technological similarities (unit-parent), and 
technological complementarities (unit-parent). The results for the difference-in-differences 
estimator and interaction terms (parent diversification, effectiveness of intellectual property, and 
effectiveness of complementary assets) are robust to including any of these measures of 
relatedness. Further, technological similarities between units and parents seems to have a positive 
and statistically significant effect of the breadth of applications of the unit’s technologies.  
Model (5) and Model (6) investigate the moderation effect of Complementary Assets as an 
appropriability mechanism. In this model, the coefficient on the Post-Divestiture × Spin-Off 
interaction with the importance of Complementary Assets as an appropriability mechanism is 
negative and significant at 5%. This empirical finding suggests that when the importance of 
Complementary Assets as an appropriability mechanism is high, spin-offs will narrow the 
application breadth of their innovations even more (as compared to carve-outs). Comparatively, a 
one standard deviation increase in the effectiveness of complementary assets has about an 11% 
narrowing impact -very similar to the impact of divestiture governance mode alone- in the breadth 
of application of divested units’ innovation. Taken together with Figure 4.3, these results are 
consistent with the extant research literature on general-purpose technologies and markets for 
technologies, which predict that access to the ability to procure access to complementary assets is 





This chapter examined the application breadth of divested units’ innovations, and the 
impact of the divestiture governance mode, the parent company’s technological diversity, the 
importance of IP as an appropriability mechanism, and the importance of complementary assets as 
an appropriability mechanism, on the units’ innovation breadth. 
The current study finds that the application breadth of divested units’ innovations is 
narrower for spin-offs after divestitures, relative to carve-outs. This narrower application breadth 
seems to be linked to spin-offs’ arms-length relationship to their parent companies, having then no 
(low-cost) access to potential commercialization opportunities for their broad innovations by 
leveraging their parent’s diverse technological base. This hypothesis is also compatible with an 
organizational ecology perspective that maintains that, under a wide set of environmental 
conditions, newly established organizations, e.g., divested units in the current study’s context, 
increase their survival likelihood by following specialist strategies (Romanelli, 1989), rather than 
attempting to concurrently manage different contexts. Further, although broad technologies can be 
deployed for many applications, they are likely to be less effective than narrower-application 
technologies (Gambardella & Giarratana, 2013). Thus, making it more difficult for a divested unit 
to specialize and achieve minimal efficiency scales.  
Particularly, not only do corporate spin-offs’ innovations have a narrower breadth of 
application post-divestiture, as compared to equity carve-outs, but also this breadth of applications 
is increasingly narrow as the parent company’s diversification increases. It is worth noting that 
anecdotal evidence supports the hypothesis that a parent company’s resources can influence the 
type of innovations produced by divested units, and particularly, that this influence could be 




scope of search activities conducted by its divested units, especially for the units it “effectively 
controlled” (Chesbrough, 2003: 416). 
A spin-off governance mode also implies that divested units will have lower transaction 
safeguards of potential resource exchanges with their parents, and no access to their parent’s 
downstream complementary resources. Thus, when Intellectual Property is an important source of 
appropriability for the business unit’s technology classes, the difference between spin-offs and 
carve-outs’ post-divestiture application breadth of innovations is smaller -- as units won’t need a 
close relationship with their parent to enforce thier IP rights and appropriate the returns from their 
innovations. Further, when Complementary Assets are an important source of appropriability, 
access to the parent company’s resources (through hieharchy-like governance arrangements such 
as carve-outs) is more important, making the breadth of application of spin-offs even more narrow 
(as compared to carve-outs) post-divestiture. Combined, these factors seem to contribute to a 
narrower application breadth of spin-offs’ innovations, contingent on the parent company’s 
technological diversity, and Intellectual Property and Complementary Assets as key 
appropriability mechanisms. 
The empirical findings in this chapter make three main contributions. They suggest that 
more autonomous divestiture governance modes, i.e., corporate spin-offs, will be at a disadvantage 
to appropriate the economic rents from broad innovations. Thus, this study shows that divestiture 
governance modes not only can impact the quantity of innovation outcomes of divested units 
(Chapter 2), but also the type of innovation outcomes of such units (Chapter 3). The findings of 
the current chapter contrast with those in Chapter 2. While, on average, a more autonomous 




narrows the breadth of application of divested units’ innovations. Thus, there are different impacts 
of autonomy on different types of innovation outcomes, i.e., innovativeness and breadth. 
The empirical results in this chapter shed light on the difficulties divested units may 
experience when they have more autonomous divestiture governance modes. Although spin-offs 
have autonomy to determine the pace and direction of their innovation, they also have 
appropriability difficulties linked to technologies that require access to complementary resources 
(such as wide-application-breadth innovations). Thus, the market-like relationship between a spin-
off and its parent company provides less safeguards, as compared to carve-outs, to induce units to 
produce broadly applicable technologies. Without safe access to a broad technological base (e.g., 
its parent’s technologies) to apply broad technologies (Nelson, 1959), spun-off units might solely 
rely on the markets for technology to appropriate some of the value of their broad technologies. 
This exclusive reliance on the market would present a challenge for divested units producing broad 
technologies, given the market frictions (e.g., ‘imperfect appropriability’ externalities) that are 
associated with these technologies (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995). 
Because markets for technologies are important in determining the ability of divested units 
to create and appropriate value from broad technologies (Arora et al., 2001; Arora & Ceccagnoli, 
2006), the current study also examines impacts of the effectiveness of intellectual property and 
complementary assets as appropriability mechanisms. This study corroborates the (statistically) 
significant role of the markets for technology in the decision to produce different types of 
innovations, e.g., broad or narrow. Strong intellectual property can offset the narrowing effect of 
a more market-like divestiture governance mode on the breadth of innovation applications. 
Further, by examining the divested unit’s and parent company’s technology resources, as 




based examination of divestitures, an inquiry called for in the strategic management literature 
(Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). The results suggest that the logic for appropriability mechanisms in 
the resource-based view of diversification seems to work similarly in business units’ divestitures. 
That is, when property rights are well defined, there are less incentives for diversification (i.e., 
breadth of applications), while more co-dependence with complementary assets makes 
diversification (i.e., breadth of applications) more likely.  
The current study empirically tests extant theoretical predictions (e.g., Nelson, 1959) as to 
which firms will have the incentives to produce more broadly applicable innovations. Because 
broadly applicable innovations have been shown to boost economic growth, and have high social 
benefits (sometimes higher than private benefits), an ongoing research question is which 
companies can innovate broadly, while remaining profitable. Thus, an important public policy 
question would be which firms will invent more general technologies, which spur growth and 
positive spillovers. This study corroborates that firms with access to broad complementary 
resources -- which are examined as upstream technology resources, and downstream assets -- are 
more likely to produce widely-applicable innovations.  
 In addition to these contributions, the results in this chapter are subject to several 
limitations, which open many opportunities for future research. The current chapter has compared 
corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs, though it does not examine business units that have not 
been divested, i.e., that continue to be wholly-owned subsidiaries of the corporate parent, to fully 
contrast the implications of unit-parent autonomy on the application breadth of units’ innovations. 
Limitations of identifying and collecting data at the business unit level of analysis prevent us from 
testing this question directly. It would also be useful to compare the application breadth of divested 




chapter are specific for technology assets, there could be contrasts in the way firms decide to 

























3.6. TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics before and after CEM matching  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics before CEM matching 
VARIABLES Before Matching Mean sd min max 
Generality Index 0.329 0.147 0.000 0.949 
Parent Diversification 0.678 0.367 0.000 1.000 
IP Appropriability (CMU) 39.690 5.612 29.840 54.700 
Complementary Assets Appropriability (CMU) 49.780 5.051 31.820 70.000 
N =  192       
     
     
          
Panel B: Summary statistics after CEM matching 
VARIABLES Before Matching Mean sd min max 
Generality Index 0.331 0.142 0.000 0.949 
Parent Diversification 0.687 0.362 0.000 1.000 
IP Appropriability (CMU) 39.530 5.143 29.840 50.510 
Complementary Assets Appropriability (CMU) 49.970 5.087 31.910 70.000 






Table 3.2 Correlation table 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Post-Divestiture 1.000                   
(2) Spin-Off 0.000 1.000                 
(3) Technology Application Breadth - Generality Index (ln) -0.281 -0.113 1.000               
(4) Parent Diversification 0.000 -0.010 -0.050 1.000             
(5) Importance of IP Appropriability (CMU) 0.000 0.012 0.103 0.010 1.000           
(6) Importance of Complementary Capabilities (CMU) 0.000 0.049 -0.166 0.087 0.074 1.000         
(7) Average Age in Unit's Tech Areas -0.159 0.151 -0.032 0.080 0.103 0.075 1.000       
(8) Average Growth in Unit's Tech Areas 0.134 -0.185 -0.120 0.025 -0.195 0.074 -0.253 1.000     
(9) Unit's Total Assets (ln) 0.004 0.182 -0.050 -0.270 -0.239 -0.069 0.091 -0.057 1.000   




Table 3.3 T-test for the differences between Spin-Offs and Carve-Outs 
 
Panel A: Difference in Means before CEM matching - Pre-Divestiture period 
Variables Spin-Offs Carve-Outs Mean Difference 
Generality Index 0.370 0.380 -0.0110 
Parent Diversification 0.685 0.664 0.0220 
IP Appropriability (CMU) 39.74 39.60 0.133 
Complementary Assets Appropriability (CMU) 50.01 49.38 0.625 
Average Age in Unit's Tech Areas 5.079 4.941 0.137*** 
Average Growth in Unit's Tech Areas 0.035 0.068 -0.033*** 
Unit's Total Assets 2162 3949 -1787* 
Unit's R&D Investment 97.5 227.8 -130.297* 
N =  123 69 192 
        
    
    
Panel B: Difference in Means after CEM matching - Pre-Divestiture period 
Variables Spin-Offs Carve-Outs Mean Difference 
Generality Index 0.369 0.380 -0.0110 
Parent Diversification 0.684 0.692 -0.00800 
IP Appropriability (CMU) 39.58 39.44 0.134 
Complementary Assets Appropriability (CMU) 50.14 49.61 0.525 
Average Age in Unit's Tech Areas 5.069 4.984 0.085* 
Average Growth in Unit's Tech Areas 0.0280 0.0620 -0.034** 
Unit's Total Assets 2270 1887 382.6 
Unit's R&D Investment 95.50 142.7 -47.20 






Table 3.4 Difference-in-Differences: Application breadth of divested units’ innovations 
Dependent variable: Application breadth of divested units’ innovations - Generality Index (ln) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post-Divestiture 
-0.1054*** -0.0289 0.0148 -0.0156 -0.0321 0.0379 
(0.000) (0.354) (0.693) (0.745) (0.285) (0.416) 
Post-Divestiture x Spin-Off 
  -0.1122** -0.1962*** -0.1979*** -0.1057** -0.2989*** 
  (0.015) (0.004) (0.010) (0.014) (0.000) 
Post-Divestiture x Parent 
Diversification 
    0.1407**     0.1475** 
    (0.036)     (0.023) 
Post-Divestiture x Spin-Off  x 
Parent Diversification 
    -0.2752**     -0.2623** 
    (0.016)     (0.016) 
Post-Divestiture x 
Effectiveness of IP 
      -0.0187   -0.0327 
      (0.604)   (0.324) 
Post-Divestiture x Spin-Off  x 
Effectiveness of IP 
      0.1046**   0.1388*** 
      (0.050)   (0.008) 
Post-Divestiture x         0.0052 -0.0039 
Effectiveness of 
Complementary Assets         (0.612) (0.723) 
Post-Divestiture x Spin-Off  x 
Effectiveness of 
Complementary Assets 
        -0.1102** -0.1094*** 
        (0.010) (0.006) 
Average Age in Unit's Tech 
Areas 
-0.0168 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0204 0.0472 0.0325 
(0.921) (0.997) (1.000) (0.903) (0.762) (0.847) 
Average Growth in Unit's Tech 
Areas 
-1.9077* -1.8630* -1.9912** -1.8773* -1.5893 -1.6902* 
(0.060) (0.058) (0.044) (0.055) (0.116) (0.096) 
Unit's Total Assets (ln) 
-0.6707 -0.7070 -0.6727 -0.6929 -0.6079 -0.5637 
(0.424) (0.374) (0.385) (0.380) (0.369) (0.375) 
Unit's R&D Investment (ln) 
-0.4385 -0.4057 -0.3718 -0.3865 -0.3652 -0.3045 
(0.252) (0.271) (0.305) (0.293) (0.276) (0.344) 
Constant 6.9292 6.9570 6.7021 6.9468 6.0346 6.0159 
  (0.245) (0.216) (1.000) (1.000) (0.205) (1.000) 
Spin-Offs 106 106 106 106 106 106 
Carve-Outs 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEM Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted-R2 0.382 0.399 0.409 0.406 0.437 0.462 







Figure 3.1 Parent Technological Diversification marginal effects on the Application Breadth of 










Figure 3.2 Importance of Intellectual Property regime (CMU, Yale Survey) marginal effects on 








Figure 3.3 Importance of Complementary Capabilities (CMU, Yale Survey) marginal effects on 




















3.7. SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE 
Table 3.5 Difference-in-Differences: Application breadth of divested units’ innovations with 
Technological Overlap 
Dependent variable: Application breadth of divested units’ innovations - Generality Index (ln) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Post-Divestiture 
0.0383 0.0280 0.0378 
(0.413) (0.536) (0.411) 
Post-Divestiture x Spin-Off 
-0.2990*** -0.2844*** -0.2964*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Post-Divestiture x Parent Diversification 
0.1436** 0.1122* 0.1502** 
(0.041) (0.067) (0.019) 
Post-Divestiture x Spin-Off  x Parent Diversification 
-0.2602** -0.2333** -0.2665** 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.015) 
Post-Divestiture x Effectiveness of IP 
-0.0333 -0.0643 -0.0317 
(0.323) (0.119) (0.320) 
Post-Divestiture x Spin-Off  x 0.1394*** 0.1552*** 0.1329** 
Effectiveness of IP (0.008) (0.006) (0.013) 
Post-Divestiture x Effectiveness of Complementary Assets 
-0.0036 -0.0157 0.0047 
(0.744) (0.199) (0.800) 
Post-Divestiture x Spin-Off  x -0.1096*** -0.1096*** -0.1203*** 
Effectiveness of Complementary Assets (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
Sum of Parent's Citations to Unit's Patents 
0.0000     
(0.840)     
Technology Similarity (Unit-Parent) 
  0.3529***   
  (0.003)   
Technology Complementarity (Unit-Parent) 
    -0.1603 
    (0.563) 
Average Age in Unit's Tech Areas 
0.0328 0.0584 0.0402 
(0.846) (0.623) (0.820) 
Average Growth in Unit's Tech Areas 
-1.6935* -1.6203** -1.6318* 
(0.096) (0.048) (0.073) 
Unit's Total Assets (ln) 
-0.5630 -0.5649 -0.6139 
(0.377) (0.354) (0.332) 
  -0.3041 -0.2874 -0.3263 
Unit's R&D Investment (ln) (0.346) (0.317) (0.308) 
Constant 
6.0078 5.5525 6.3306 
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
Spin-Offs 106 106 106 
Carve-Outs 52 52 52 
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.52 0.464 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
CEM Weights Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted-R2 0.460 0.519 0.463 






CHAPTER 4: DIVESTITURE GOVERNANCE MODES AND 
DIVESTITURE GOVERNANCE DESIGN 
“The object is to effect good order through the mechanisms of governance. A governance structure 
is thus usefully thought of as an institutional framework in which the integrity of a transaction, or related 
set of transactions, is decided. […] Furthermore, because order is accomplished through governance, 
similar efforts need to be made to identify the principal dimensions on which governance structures differ” 
(Williamson, 1996: p. 11-12).  
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Transaction cost economics describe governance modes as discrete structural alternatives, 
each adhering to specific legal doctrines –e.g., the court for markets, and fiat for hierarchies– 
(Williamson, 1996). In practice, however, companies face variations (dimensions) in their 
governance choices that go beyond the governance mode (Foss, 2003; Nickerson, & Zenger, 2002; 
Poppo & Zenger, 1998, 2002). Companies often implement refinements to their discrete 
governance mode choices (which are governance choices at a more macro-level) by effecting a 
variety of governance mechanisms (which are governance choices at a more micro-level) (Heide, 
Kumar, & Wathne, 2014), and by bundling these governance mechanisms. Governance design13 
is defined here as the bundle of governance mechanisms that firms choose to implement, in a 
transaction cost context, and that can complement the choice of governance mode. The extant 
corporate strategy literature has largely focused on investigating the effects of governance 
modes/structures (Castañer, Mulotte, Garrette, & Dussauge, 2014), and the impact of specific 
governance mechanisms (Oxley, 1999; Reuer, & Devarakonda, 2016). Still, more research on the 
underpinning bundling process -governance design- of these governance mechanisms. To shed 
light into this research gap, the current chapter extends the literature by examining governance 
                                                 
13 As defined here, governance design is not referring to the design principles at the institutional level (e.g., 




design choices, or the design of bundles of governance mechanisms, in the context of two 
divestitures modes, corporate spin-offs, and equity carve-outs.  
An important observation from the current research is that governance design, bundles of 
different governance mechanisms can complement each other, may or may not be congruent with 
the governance mode choice. The implications of this potential mismatch between governance 
modes and governance design have not been fully understood. This chapter explores how 
governance design, and the potential mismatch of governance mode and governance design, affect 
innovative outcomes of divested units. Thus, two main research questions will guide the discussion 
in this exploratory chapter. First, this chapter asks whether governance mode is more significant 
than governance design to explain and predict the divested units’ innovation outcomes. Second, 
this chapter chapter also asks whether there are penalties for units with mismatched governance 
modes and governance designs in terms of innovation performance.  
Governance modes in general, and divestiture governance modes in particular, can be 
theorized to operate at a more macro level of firm governance. The first two chapters of this 
dissertation examined the impact of this macro-level of governance in innovation outcomes, i.e., 
how divestiture governance modes, corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs, impact 
innovativeness and the application breadth of the divested unit’s innovation. Past research in 
different corporate strategy phenomena has largely focused on the study of governance modes or 
structures, with less attention given to the underlying micro-level mechanisms of governance 
within firms (Heide, Kumar, & Wathne, 2014; Williamson, 1996). However, firms are constantly 
making decisions not only at the macro-level of governance modes, but also at the micro-level of 




Consistent with this view, some patterns in the post-divestiture relationship of divested units and 
their parent companies can be outlined at the governance-mechanisms (micro-) level.  
Divestitures open opportunities to reconfigure the governance of new divested/stand-alone 
units (Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Moschieri & Mair, 2011; Semadeni & Cannella 
2011), by providing the incentives to implement more aligned managerial compensation and 
improved internal governance (Feldman, 2016a; Seward & Walsh, 1996). These changes in 
internal governance have shown to be sources of abnormal returns (Seward & Walsh, 1996). 
Among these micro-level governance mechanisms are, the compensation and composition of the 
unit’s Top Management Team; and the Board of Directors independence (Semadeni & Cannella 
2011; Seward & Walsh, 1996), all of which have been examined in previous studies. One 
dimension that can complement the current analysis of (micro-level) divestiture governance 
mechanisms is the unit-parent post-divestiture contractual relationship. After a divestiture, 
contractual arrangements between units and parents, e.g., licensing, supplier, lease, and 
administrative services agreements, can play a fundamental role in the unit’s post-divestiture 
governance. To further our understanding on “the principal dimensions on which governance 
structures differ” (Williamson, 1996: p.12), this chapter examines whether bundles of these 
governance mechanisms can be matched with the divestiture governance mode, spin-offs vs. carve-
outs, and how they can be associated with the subsequent innovation outcomes (innovativeness 
and breadth) of divested units. Unpacking this matching process between governance modes and 
mechanisms can be critical to a more inclusive understanding of governance impacts on 
(innovation) performance.  
While legal structures usually drive governance modes (e.g., see Table 1.4), governance 




agreements between corporate parents and units to govern their post-divestiture relationship. 
Extant literature has found that firms substitute among different governance mechanisms (Rediker 
& Seth, 1995). This finding suggests that it is possible that firms intentionally design bundles of 
governance mechanisms. Furthermore, how firms strategically bundle different governance 
mechanisms, and how these bundles impact innovation outcomes are open empirical questions.  
Accordingly, this study seeks to shed light on the design (bundle) and match of divestiture 
governance mechanisms, and governance modes. Towards achieving this goal, I use a sample of 
192 US divestitures, 123 corporate spin-offs, and 69 equity carve-outs, between 1990 and 2010. I 
manually collected information on the divested units’ governance mechanisms from the units’ and 
parents’ financial reports (10Ks, Proxy Statements and Separation Agreements). To better 
understand the relationship between governance modes and mechanisms, this study considers a 
logit model with the observed governance mode (spin-off dummy) as the dependent variable, and 
different governance mechanisms as explanatory variables.  
Further, this study estimates an Autonomous Divestiture Governance Design Index by 
adding the number of governance design mechanisms that promote unit’s autonomy. This chapter 
then considers which observations have consistent Autonomy Divestiture Governance Design 
Index and observed Governance Modes. While “Consistent spin-offs” would be spin-offs with 
high values for their Autonomy Divestiture Governance Design Index; “Inconsistent spin-offs” 
would be spin-offs with lower values for their Autonomy Divestiture Governance Design Index. 
Reproducing the empirical methodology proposed in Chapter 2 for innovativeness and Chapter 3 
for application breadth of innovation, this study includes dummy variables for “Consistent spin-




the effects of Governance Mode and Governance Design on the innovation outcomes of divested 
units. 
The current chapter finds that there are significant differences in the bundle of divestiture 
mechanisms associated with each divestiture governance mode. These results show that there are 
statistically significant differences in the governance design (bundle of mechanisms) for spin-offs 
and carve-outs. Mechanisms such as Parent Ownership, Board of Directors’ independence and Top 
Management Team’s compensation, which can be associated with higher unit autonomy, are 
positively associated with the probability of divesting through a spin-off governance mode, which 
is also comparatively more autonomous than a carve-out. Further, the empirical findings from this 
chapter suggest that there could be a mismatch between governance design and governance modes, 
i.e., that there are different types of spin-offs and different types of carve-outs that implement 
different types of bundles of governance mechanisms. Moreover, governance design seems to be 
associated with the innovativeness of the divested units, in a clearer way than it is associated with 
the application breadth of divested units’ innovations.  
By undertaking a more detailed analysis of the unit’s governance mechanisms following a 
divestiture, the current study contributes to the extant literature in three ways. First, this study 
unpacks the divested unit’s governance into governance choice and governance mechanisms, 
shedding light into the match of macro- and micro-level governance. This chapter offers a more 
comprehensive study of the governance dimensions and outcomes of divestitures. I provide this 
more complete study by comparing two governance modes of divestitures, i.e., spin-offs and carve-
outs, with three types of divestiture governance mechanisms, i.e., unit’s Board of Directors and 
Top Management Team mechanisms (examined in the extant literature), as well as unit-parent 




extant strategic management literature). Second, the insights derived from the current study 
contribute to the knowledge on divestitures as a strategy for innovation. This chapter illustrates 
how different divestiture governance modes and governance mechanisms can promote innovation 
outcomes distinctly for wide vs. narrow application breadth of divested units’ innovations. This 
approach is consistent with the organizational design literature, which maintains that different 
(control) mechanisms vary in their ability to bring specific organizational outcomes (Ouchi 1979; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). In the same way, this chapter examines whether the consistency between 
governance modes and governance mechanisms significantly predicts the divested unit’s 
innovation outcomes and breadth of application of the unit’s innovation. Third, at a broader level, 
the insights derived from comparing governance modes and governance mechanisms contribute to 
the literature on how different levels of governance arrangements impact firm-level outcomes.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next two sections briefly explain how governance 
modes and governance design apply to the divestiture context. Then, the following sections 
describe the empirical approach and variables of interest, and present the analysis of the results. 
The last section concludes.  
4.2. GOVERNANCE MODES 
Governance modes have been defined as institutional frameworks that influence how 
organizations decide and execute transactions (Williamson, 1979). These governance modes are 
intentional variations, and are expected to be derived from a comparative alignment of transactions 
with efficient (transaction cost-economizing) governance modes (Williamson, 1991). Managers 
would then choose a governance mode that comparatively minimizes transaction costs. Mode 
choices at this macro-level of governance have been extensively examined through the canonical 




The two focal governance modes in this dissertation --corporate spin-offs and equity carve-
outs--, in the context of divestitures, can be theorized as a choice among more-or-less autonomous 
relationships between parent companies and divested units after the divestiture event. Corporate 
spin-offs are divestiture governance modes in which a parent company distributes (pro-rata) the 
majority (at least 80%) of one of its business unit’s shares to its shareholders, granting more 
autonomy to its divested unit. Equity carve-outs are divestiture governance modes in which a 
parent company sells (in the stock market) a minority (on average 36%) of one of its business 
unit’s shares, granting comparatively less autonomy than it grants to a spun-off unit. This empirical 
context facilitates the comparative assessment of distinct governance modes, and open research 
opportunities to match these modes with distinct governance mechanisms. 
4.3. GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
Governance mechanisms (at the micro-level of governance) refer to the operative 
“administrative tools” (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989), or “underlying and concrete management and 
control activities, which describe in detail how the required behavior of the [other party] will 
become motivated, influenced, and established” (Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009: 1027). Governance 
mechanisms have been examined in the alliance literature from contrasting perspectives, for 
example, comparing formal-relational mechanisms (Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009; Poppo & Zenger, 
2002), equity-contractual (Oxley, 1999), among others. This literature finds that companies often 
bundle these governance mechanisms, and can achieve better performance by doing so. Building 
on this finding, the current chapter considers different types of governance mechanisms that are 
available to parent companies and divested units. 
Established governance mechanisms in the divestitures literature are dummies for the units’ 




compensation (Feldman, 2016a; Seward & Walsh, 1996). Less examined mechanisms are the 
arrangements that parent companies and divested units agree through their Separation Agreements 
--a document that both parties agree within the divestiture implementation. Some examples of 
these arrangements are licensing agreements, supplier agreements, and parent corporate services 
agreement. Jointly, these governance mechanisms should enable parent companies and divested 
units to safeguard their interests, and align their mechanisms with the governance mode, spin-off 
vis-à-vis carve outs. 
4.4. EMPIRICAL APPROACH: UNPACKING THE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS OF DIVESTITURES 
4.4.1. Sample 
To examine how divestiture governance modes and divestiture governance mechanisms 
are associated, this study uses the research sample from the first two chapters in this dissertation. 
The sample was constructed from SDC Platinum transactions on US corporate spin-offs and equity 
carve-outs between 1990 and 2010, and these data were matched with the parent companies’ and 
divested units’ patent and financial information from Thompson Innovation and COMPUSTAT, 
respectively. These eliminations resulted in a sample of 123 corporate spin-offs, and 69 equity 
carve-outs across different technology sectors. To gather information on governance mechanisms 
in the context of divestitures, this chapter includes information from the unit’s and the parent 
company’s 10Ks and Proxy Statements, as well as divestiture Separation Agreements. These 
reports were retrieved from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system 






This chapter examines the divestiture governance mode as the discrete categorization 
between corporate spin-offs and equity carve-outs, assigning a dummy equal to one when a 
divested unit was labeled as a corporate spin-off, as opposed to an equity carve-out in SDC. 
Further, by examining the descriptions of the post-divestiture relationship between a parent 
company and its divested unit in their 10Ks, Proxy Statements, and Separation Agreements, this 
chapter identifies eleven sub- categories of governance mechanisms. The mechanisms include 
divested units’ Board of Directors independence, divested units’ Top Management Team 
independence and compensation, and divested units’ and parents’ contracts (licensing, supplier, 
corporate service agreements). 
Parent Ownership Post-Divestiture: 
Parent ownership has been considered in the extant divestiture literature as a key mechanism of 
control over divested units (e.g., for spin-offs, Semadeni & Cannella, 2011). Chapter 1 in the 
current dissertation makes the case that the main distinctions between spin-offs and carve-outs are 
discrete. Figure 4.1 presents the distribution of ownership in this study’s sample to empirically 
emphasize the non-continuous differences in parent ownership between the two focal divestiture 
governance modes. 
Divested Units’ Board of Directors Independence:  
Board of Directors Independence – parent company’s BOD. This variable is 
operationalized as one minus the percentage of the divested unit’s Board of Directors members 
that are also parent company’s Board of Directors. Building from agency theory, lower board of 
directors’ independence --higher levels of this variable-- can be associated with monitoring 




counted the total number of board of director members for the unit at the time of divestiture14, and 
use it as the denominator. From the description of each of the units’ board members’ credentials, 
as well as the parents’ reports, I counted the number of board members that had seats on both 
boards (the parent’s and the unit’s), but were not employees of the parent company and I used it 
as the numerator.  
Board of Directors Independence – parent company’s employees. Similar to the previous 
mechanism, this variable captures the percentage of unit’s Board of Directors members that are 
not parent company’s employees, or one minus the percentage of board of directors that are also 
parent company’s employees. This proportion could also be conceptualized as part of the parent 
companies’ monitoring mechanisms. Here, the denominator is the total number of the unit’s BOD 
members, and the numerator is the number of parent employees’ (usually high-level managers) 
that are part of the divested unit’s board of directors. 
Divested Units’ Top Management Team Independence and Compensation:  
Top Management Team Independence – parent company’s employees. This mechanism is 
operationalized as the percentage of unit’s Top Management Team members that are former parent 
company’s employees. Similar to the measure we use for Board of Directors independence, this 
variable takes the number of unit managers (in the Top Manager Team) that worked under the 
parent company’s corporate umbrella before the divestiture and divided this number by the total 
number of managers in the Top Management Team.  
                                                 
14 The board members are usually part of the parent Board of Directors before the divestiture, and continue to be on 
the parent’s and the unit’s Board of Directors after a divestiture. Assessing the exact number of these members that 
continued and were newly appointed, would require new data collection (reading through all the directors’ bios). 
Further, the members in BOD are relatively stable in large corporations (Fich & Shivdasani, 2007; Yermack, 2004), 




Top Management Team Compensation. This mechanism accounts for the differences 
between divested units and parents top management team compensations. It estimates the 
difference between the divested unit’s shares vs. the parent company’s shares assigned as top 
management team compensation. Executive compensation can help the alignment of managers’ 
and shareholder value maximizing strategies, including innovation (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988). The 
fact that spin-offs can improve the alignment of the units’ managers with the stock market 
performance (Feldman, 2016a), opens the question to whether this mechanism is being 
implemented among spin-offs as well as carve-outs in a different way that it was implemented 
within parent companies. 
CEO was Unit Manager. This variable takes the value one if the unit CEO was the unit 
manager before the divestiture, and zero otherwise.  
CEO was Parent Employee. This variable is operationalized as a dummy for whether the 
unit CEO is a former parent company employee 
Divested units’ and parents’ contracts 
Licensing agreement is an indicator variable taking the value one if the unit and parent 
company signed a licensing agreement, and zero otherwise.  
Supplier agreement is defined as a dummy variable for whether the unit and parent 
company signed a supplier agreement. 
Corporate Service Agreement indicates whether the unit and parent company signed a 
corporate service agreement, where the parent continues to supply administrative services to the 
divested unit such as accounting, consulting, and human resources. 
Leasing Agreement. Part of the services that a parent company can continue to provide a 




Table 4.1 presents summary statistics on the financial characteristics of the 192 divestitures 
in my sample. All the statistics in this Table are reported as of the year in which each divestiture 
was announced. Spin-Offs’ Board of Directors and Top Management Teams are significantly more 
independent from their parents than Equity Carve-Outs. Similarly, the difference between spin-
offs’ and carve-outs’ Top Management Team equity-compensation seems to be statistically 
significant, and higher for corporate spin-offs. However, internal CEOs --whether they were 
division managers, or parent employees before the divestiture—do not appear to characterize one 
or the other divestiture mode significantly. Regarding the contractual agreements between divested 
units and their parents, licensing agreements seems to be more prominent among Carve-Outs, and 
leasing agreements, appear to be more common in the case of Spin-Offs.  
4.4.3. Methods 
To investigate the relationship between divestiture governance modes and divestiture 
governance mechanisms, this chapter compares the observed divestiture governance mode (a spin-
off dummy) with estimated values for divestiture governance design, to classify each divestiture 
as ‘Consistent’ and ‘Inconsistent.’  It is classified as ‘Consistent’ when the autonomy of the 
observed governance mode (e.g., a spin-off) is matched with the autonomy of the estimated 
governance design (e.g., a divestiture with autonomous governance mechanisms). The estimated 
values for governance design are obtained from the mechanisms explained in Section 4.4.2., in 
three ways. First, with a logit model for the observed divestiture governance mode as the dependent 
variable 𝑦, and the divestiture governance mechanisms as explanatory variables 𝑥  (see Table 4.2 
and Table 4.3). Second, with an autonomy index (see Table 4.4 and Table 4.5) that aggregates 
different divestiture governance mechanisms. And third, as a robustness test, with a Generalized 




as the dependent variable 𝑦, and the divestiture governance mechanisms as explanatory variables 
𝑥  (see Table 4.7 and Table 4.8). This approach is not intended to prescribe causality in the 
relationship among governance modes and governance mechanisms, but instead it proposes 
patterns of association.  
Prob(𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓)
=  𝛼 + 𝛽2 𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
′𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽3 𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
′𝑠 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 
+ 𝛽4 𝑇𝑀𝑇 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
′𝑠 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠  + 𝛽5 𝑇𝑀𝑇  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠  
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽7 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 
+ 𝛽8 𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  (𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡), (𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡), (𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙)  
+ 𝛽9 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑ (𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡), (𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡), (𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙)
+ 𝛽10 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽12̅̅ ̅̅  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝑒𝑖 
First Approach: Logit model. Dependent Variable: observed divestiture governance mode. 
Explanatory Variables: divestiture governance mechanisms.  
To examine the predictive power of the association between governance mode and 
mechanisms, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 present graphically how the estimates from the logit 
regressions in Table 4.2 are associated with the divestiture governance mode. For each 




?̅? =  𝛼 + 𝛽2 𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
′𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽3 𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
′𝑠 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 
+ 𝛽4 𝑇𝑀𝑇 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
′𝑠 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠  + 𝛽5 𝑇𝑀𝑇  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠  
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽7 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 
+ 𝛽8 𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  (𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡), (𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡), (𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙)  
+ 𝛽9 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑ (𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡), (𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡), (𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙)
+ 𝛽10 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
To determine the threshold at which a divested unit would be classified as a spin-off --from 
?̅? or the predicted value (scaled to range from 0 to 1), this study used a cutoff that minimizes the 
number of observations incorrectly classified as ‘1s’ and ‘0s’ jointly. That is, making the 
percentage of spin-offs correctly classified in the model (actual spin-off classified as spin-offs by 
the model’s predicted probability) (Sensitivity), closest to the percentage of carve-outs correctly 
classified in the model (actual carve-outs classified as carve-outs by the model’s predicted 
probability) (Specificity). Thus, the threshold (?̅?∗ = 0.66) selected was such that the model 
Sensitivity and Specificity was the closest (see Figure 4.2). In this case, observed spin-offs that 
have a predicted probability ?̅?  > 0.66 were classified as ‘Consistent Spin-Offs’, while carve-outs 
for which ?̅? ≤ 0.66 were classified as ‘Consistent Carve-Outs’. Figure 4.3 suggests that there can 
be four types of observations, depending on whether the observed Governance Mode, is consistent 
with the estimated Governance Design. 
For some divested units, the level of autonomy provided by the divestiture governance 
design mechanisms chosen will be consistent with the observed divestiture governance mode. This 
study refers to these observations as “Consistent Spin-Offs” and “Consistent Carve-Outs.”  
However, there could also be units with inconsistent governance design mechanisms, where the 




is different from the observed mode. Table 4.3 includes these types of divestitures in the 
difference-in-differences models for the divested units’ innovativeness (count of forward citations) 
and breadth of application of the divested units’ innovations (generality index), as dependent 
variables. Thus, this methodology sheds light into the distinct effects of different types of 
divestitures --Consistent Spin-Off, Consistent Carve-Out, Inconsistent-Carve-Out or Inconsistent 
Spin-Off--. 
Second Approach: Autonomy Index. Dependent Variable: observed divestiture 
governance mode. Explanatory Variable: autonomy index. Based on the measures for governance 
design mechanisms, the following dummy variables are coded: (1) dummy equal to one if the 
percentage of a unit’s Board of Directors that are also directors in the parent company is lower 
than 30%; (2) dummy equal to one if the percentage of a unit’s Board of Directors that are parent 
employees is lower than 30%; (3) dummy equal to one if the percentage of a unit’s Top 
Management Team that was inherited from the parent company is lower than 30%; (4) dummy 
equal to one if the differences in stock compensation for the parent’s and the unit’s Top 
Management Team is higher than 30%; dummies for (5) unit CEO was not parent employee, (6) 
no licensing agreements, (7) no supplier agreements, (8) no corporate service agreement and (9) 
no leasing agreements. To assess the consistency between governance design and governance 
mode, this study computes an index that captures whether a parent has implemented governance 
design mechanisms to provide autonomy to the business unit. Following the methodology 
proposed by Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003), the current study computes a Divestiture 
Governance Design - Autonomy Index as the sum of these eleven dummy variables. 
With this second approach a spin-off with a high autonomy index (closer to 9), will be 




‘Inconsistent spin-off”. To determine the cutoff value of the Divestiture Governance Design - 
Autonomy Index, and use this cutoff value for classification purposes (high/low index), this study 
computes measures similar to Sensitivity and Specificity. That is, for each cutoff value we count 
the number of observations correctly and incorrectly classified as spin-offs or carve-outs. Then, 
the cutoff is selected such that the number of correctly classified observations from both groups 
(spin-offs and carve-outs) is the highest. In this case, the cutoff value was fixed at 3. Table 4.4, 
Panel B presents the percentage of observations in each cutoff value, and supports the view that 
within governance modes, divested units may have heterogeneous patterns of governance 
mechanisms. The next question this chapter addresses is whether these heterogeneous patterns may 
also help explain the post-divestiture differences in unit innovativeness and application breadth of 
divested units’ innovations. 
To explore whether the implementation of divestiture governance mechanisms can be 
associated with the divested unit’s innovation, this chapter makes use of the specificiations for 
innovation outcomes in chapters 1 and 2, with the same measures for dependent variables, divested 
units’ innovation outcomes and application breadth of divested units’ innovations. Further, the 
models presented in this chapter include a Consistent and Inconsistent classification of spin-offs 
and carve-outs based on the Autonomy Index. The difference-in-differences models in Table 4.5 
include summy variables “Consistent Spin-Offs,” “Consistent Carve-Outs,” “Inconsistent Spin-
Offs,” and “Inconsistent Carve-Outs.”  
𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊,𝒕
=  𝛼 + 𝛿0 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 × Consistent SpinOff𝑖 +   𝛿2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 





𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑩𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊,𝒕
=  𝛼 + 𝛿0 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 × Consistent SpinOff𝑖 +   𝛿2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 
× Inconsistent SpinOff𝑖 + 𝛿2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡 × Inconsistent CarveOut𝑖 +  𝛽 𝑥𝑖,𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑ 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
𝑥𝑖,𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑ = 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 
Consistent SpinOff𝑖 = 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 > 3   
Inconsistent SpinOff𝑖 = 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 ≤ 3 
 Inconsistent CarveOut𝑖 = 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑢𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 > 3 
4.5. RESULTS 
4.5.1. Governance Mode and Governance Mechanisms 
This study starts by modeling the relationship between Divestiture Governance 
Mechanisms and Divestiture Governance Modes. The dependent variable is the observed 
Divestiture Governance Mode (𝑦), and the observations are the divested units. Results appear in 
Table 4.2. All regressions are specified using a logit model, that controls for variables identified 
for the choice between spin-offs and carve-outs (see Chapter 2, Table 2.6), industry and divestiture 
time-period, and robust standard errors. From these models, ?̅?  can be computed as the probability 
of a given business unit to choose a spin-off over a carve-out the predicted values of. 
Model 1 includes all the controls for divestiture governance mode choice (see Chapter 2) 
and variable for parent ownership after the divestiture event, and a set of governance mechanisms 
for the divested units’ Board of Directors independence. Model 2 consists of governance 
mechanisms related to Top Management Team independence and compensation, and Model 3 




relationships after the divestiture event, and the direction of such contractual arrangements. Model 
4, includes all the governance design mechanisms, except the contractual relationships, and Model 
5 is the full specification, including all types of divestiture governance mechanisms. 
From the divestiture governance mechanisms related to the units’ Board of Directors 
[BOD] independence, the percentage of units’ BOD members that are also parents’ BOD members 
seems to have the strongest and more consistent effect. The higher the percentage of members 
from the divested unit BOD that are not part of the parent BOD, the higher the probability of 
having a spin-off as the divestiture governance mode. Other parent employees that are also 
members of the divested unit’s BOD seem to be associated, with the probability of choosing a 
carve-out governance mode. 
In Models 2, 3 and 5, the coefficient on Top Management Team [TMT] compensation 
change, indicates that spin-offs governance modes are more likely to be associated, as compared 
to carve-outs, with higher changes in the equity assigned as TMT compensation. That is, there are 
larger differences between the spin-off and parent equity compensation, as compared to the carve-
out and parent equity compensation. TMT independence, i.e., the fact that the unit CEO was a 
parent employee before the divestiture, seem to be negatively associated with the likelihood of 
observing a spin-off (instead of a carve-out). The fact that a CEO was the division manager seem 
not to be associated with one divestiture governance mode over the other.  
Model 4 and Model 5 also suggest that from the contractual arrangements between divested 
units and their parents, licensing, corporate services and leasing agreements seem to be more 
strongly associated with the divestiture governance mode. While licensing agreements are 
associated with the probability of observing a carve-out, supplier agreements are weakly associated 




contracts. Licensing might be more predominant among carve-outs and their parents than they are 
among spin-offs and their parents. Further, although parent companies retain a majority control 
over their carved-out units, the uncertain and risky nature of technology licensing (e.g., exposure 
to legal risks, and future development infringement), can compel companies (units and parents) to 
assign legal rights over the exploitation of their technologies, instead of simply informally agreeing 
on these exchanges15. The coefficient on supplier agreements indicates that this type of contractual 
arrangement is more strongly associated with spin-offs than it is with carve-outs. Chapter 1 (see 
Table 2.3), suggests that spin-offs are less likely, as compared to carve-outs, to be vertically 
integrated with their parent companies. Together, these two empirical findings suggest that in the 
(rarer) cases where spin-offs are vertically integrated with their parents, they make use of 
contractual mechanisms (i.e., supplier agreements). It suggests that when units are suppliers to 
their parents and parents are licensors for their units, the likelihood of observing a spin-off is lower. 
Further, when the unit is licensing technologies to their parent companies Table 4.6 indicates we 
are more likely to observe a spin-off as the divestiture governance mode. The significant 
relationship of licensing with the divestiture governance mode, seem to provide support for the 
ideas in Chapter 3, where more formal arrangements between spin-offs and their former parents, 
as compared to carve-outs and their parents [incomplete sentence … please fix]. Table 4.6 includes 
some robustness checks that explore whether the existence of licensing and supplier agreements 
(regardless of the direction of these agreements) matter for the likelihood of observing one 
divestiture governance mode over the other. These analyses suggest that both licensing, and 
supplier agreements are significantly associated –though in different directions—with the 
probability of observing a spin-off. 
                                                 
15 See some conditions under which informal agreements may not be sufficient to replace formal contractual 




After controlling for other variables, Corporate Service Agreements seem to be more 
significantly associated with carve-outs (instead of spin-offs). From Table 4.1 it can be inferred 
that both, spin-offs and carve-outs, usually sign this type of agreement with their parent companies.  
 
4.5.2. Divestiture Governance Design - Autonomy Index 
 This chapter measures governance design with an index that aggregates indicator (dummy) 
variables for whether more autonomous governance design mechanisms were chosen to govern 
the unit-parent post-divestiture relationship. With 10 indicators, the index could range from 0 to 
10, however, Table 4.4 shows that in this study’s sample, the proposed Divestiture Governance 
Design - Autonomy Index ranges from 1 to 8. Panel A provides descriptive statistics on the number 
of companies choosing each divestiture governance design mechanism. These results indicate that 
the least common mechanism for spin-offs is Top Management Team independence, while the 
least common in carve-outs are leasing agreements. Conversely, the most common mechanism 
implemented by spin-offs is the independence of their Board of Directors from their parents’ board 
members. Carve-outs most common mechanism is the implementation of a corporate service 
agreement with their parents. Panels B and C present descriptive statistics about the distribution 
of firms in the sample.  
Results in Table 4.5 present difference-in-differences regressions for innovativeness (log 
of the count of forward citations) and breadth of application (log of the generality index) with 
dummy variables of Consistent and Inconsistent divestitures, classified according with the 
Autonomy Index. Both consistent and inconsistent spin-offs seem to perform better in terms of 
their innovativeness measure than consistent carve-outs. There is, however, no statistically 




largest impact in innovativeness seems to be implementing an autonomous divestiture design 
jointly with a spin-off (autonomous mode). 
4.5.3. Consistent Governance Mode and Design, and Divested Units’ Innovation Outcomes 
Thus far, the methodology in this chapter has presented an estimate for the autonomy of 
divestiture governance design (Table 4.2) and an autonomy index (Table 4.4) with the number of 
autonomous governance design mechanisms that each divestiture has implemented. It could be the 
case that this governance design proxies (estimate of design, and index) are also associated with 
the innovation outcomes of the divested unit. While chapter 1 (see Table 2.8) showed how the 
observed spin-off governance mode (𝑦) is positively associated with the divested units’ 
innovativeness, this chapter will examine how the consistency of the governance design index and 
the choice of governance mode impact the divested units’ innovativeness. Table 4.3 and 4.5 
present the results for the difference-in-differences regressions using the interactions of the Post-
Divestiture dummy with the dummies for each focal type of divestitures, “Consistent Spin-Offs,” 
“Consistent Carve-Outs,” “Inconsistent Spin-Offs,” and “Inconsistent Carve-Outs,” which 
resulted from contrasting governance design choices vis-à-vis observed governance modes. 
 Model 1 in Table 4.5 supports the finding from Table 4.3 that with respect to consistent 
carve-outs, all types of spin-offs (consistent and inconsistent) perform better. However, there 
seems to be no significant differences among consistent and inconsistent carve-outs (in terms of 
their innovativeness). Models 1 and 2 also seem to corroborate that higher autonomy, as 
implemented by governance design mechanisms, has different impacts from the autonomy 
provided the governance mode (spin-off vs. carve-out). This result suggests that governance design 
has significant explanatory power over divested units’ innovativeness. That is, both, macro-level 




Chapter 3), help explain and predict divested units’ innovativeness. Contrary to the 
Consistent/Inconsistent classification based on estimates (from the logit regression of governance 
mechanisms), Model 1 in Table 4.5 also suggest that “Inconsistent spin-offs” seem to perform 
slightly better, in terms of innovativeness, than “Consistent spin-offs” -Consistent/Inconsistent 
classified according with a cutoff for the number of mechanisms employed. Further, differences 
in governance design captured by this Autonomy Index, seem to also have a statistically significant 
impact on innovation breadth.  
The difference in the coefficients for “Consistent Spin-Offs” vis-à-vis “Inconsistent Spin-
Offs” (0.078, Wald Test significant at 0.01); and “Consistent Carve-Outs” vis-à-vis “Inconsistent 
Carve-Outs,” indicate that governance design could change the effect of governance mode on 
innovativeness and application breadth.  
 Models 3 and 4 present the results for evaluating application breadth divested units’ 
innovativeness based on the four focal types of divestitures in this chapter, “Consistent Spin-Offs,” 
“Consistent Carve-Outs,” “Inconsistent Spin-Offs,” and “Inconsistent Carve-Outs.” Although 
Inconsistent spin-offs seem to have the greater impact on the breadth of application of divested 
unit’s innovations, these models do not seem to suggest that the consistency between governance 
mode and governance design matters for the innovations’ breadth of applications. 
4.6. DISCUSSION 
 This chapter examines governance design features of corporate spin-offs and equity carve-
outs. I manually collected data for 192 divestitures (123 spin-offs and 69 carve-outs) on the details 
of the unit-parent post-divestiture relationship. Divestitures provide a useful context to test the 




macro-level) because restructurings have often been characterized as opportunities for managers 
to re-arrange distinct governance dimensions.  
The first empirical finding from this study is that there is a significant association between 
some of the divestiture governance mechanisms examined in this study and the divestiture 
governance mode choice. This finding suggests that firms are likely making strategic decisions on 
how to bundle governance mechanisms, a process defined here as governance design. Second, 
divestiture governance mechanisms that promote unit autonomy seem to reinforce the divestiture 
governance mode associated with more unit autonomy (spin-offs). For example, more 
independence (BOD and TMT) is associated with the likelihood of observing a spin-off.  
Further, the empirical evidence in this study suggests that governance design does not have 
the same effect across all innovation outcomes. While the measures we used to evaluate the effect 
of governance design (index and consistency with governance mode) are robust when predicting 
a positive and significant effect of governance design on the innovativeness of divested units, the 
effect of governance design on the application breadth of divested units’ innovations is less clear. 
Thus, the primary managerial concern in the case of application breadth seems to be the divestiture 
governance mode, and a secondary (less explanatory power) problem would be to get the 
governance mechanisms right. 
The significance of autonomy as a mechanism to spur business unit innovativeness, seems 
to be consistent across divestiture governance design and divestiture governance mode. The choice 
of spin-offs as divestiture governance mode, or governance design seems to always impact 
innovativeness positively. For example, ‘Consistent’ and ‘Inconsistent’ spin-offs have always 
positive and significant innovativeness outcomes. This finding provides support for spin-offs as 




Finally, one of the key results from the empirical methodology in this chapter is that 
governance design’s contribution to predict divested unit innovativeness seems to be significant 
and independent from the contribution of governance mode, e.g., see the positive and significant 
coefficient of ‘inconsistent carve-outs,’ and the significant difference in coefficients among 
‘consistent’ and ‘inconsistent’ spin-offs.  
 This chapter contributes to our understanding of governance design, and its potential to 
complement the choice of governance mode by unpacking the macro-level governance mode 
impact on innovation outcomes, to a more micro-level of governance design mechanisms that have 
a significant impact on innovation outcomes. This chapter points to at least two useful paths of 
research. Future studies can expand the consideration of governance design mechanisms to cover, 
for example, more informal ways in which units and parents interact. Further, examining the 
dynamics of these governance mechanisms and the way these bundles change over time could 




4.7. TABLES AND FIGURES 
 









Board of Directors Independence: parent company’s BOD 0.894 0.846 0.048*** 
Board of Directors Independence: parent company’s employees 0.557 0.483 0.073** 
Top Management Team Independence: parent company’s employees 0.309 0.283 0.027 
Top Management Team Compensation Change 7.653 6.823 0.830* 
CEO was Unit Manager 0.585 0.649 -0.063 
CEO was Parent Employee 0.293 0.243 0.049 
Licensing agreement 0.298 0.456 -0.157* 
Unit is licensing to parent 0.065 0.088 -0.024*** 
Parent is licensing to unit 0.121 0.206 -0.085* 
Unit and Parent cross-license 0.113 0.162 -0.049* 
Supplier Agreement 0.323 0.294 0.028 
Unit is supplier to parent 0.121 0.088 0.033** 
Parent is supplier to unit 0.113 0.103 0.01 
Unit and Parent are both suppliers 0.089 0.103 -0.014 
Corporate Service Agreement 0.707 0.757 -0.049 
Leasing Agreement 0.163 0.176 -0.013 




Table 4.2 Divestiture Governance Mode explained by Divestiture Governance Mechanisms 
 
 
Logit Model. Dependent variable: Choice of divestiture governance mode (1=Spin-off, 0=Carve-out) 
Governance Design Mechanisms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parent's Funds Needs 
-0.1102** -0.1337** -0.0950* -0.1764*** -0.1034 
(0.046) (0.010) (0.085) (0.002) (0.102) 
Difference in Capex Needs (Parent and Unit) 
0.1354*** 0.0928*** 0.1256*** 0.0975*** 0.1310*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Attractiveness 
-0.0295 -0.0260 -0.0251 -0.0261 -0.0212 
(0.212) (0.283) (0.302) (0.275) (0.403) 
Unit's Market Share 
-0.0797 -0.3192* -0.1590 -0.2600 -0.1462 
(0.619) (0.082) (0.345) (0.133) (0.422) 
Related Diversification (Dummy=1 if same 2 digit SIC) 
0.9986*** 1.0772*** 0.9853*** 0.9013** 0.8619** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.027) 
Vertical Integration Parent & unit (I/O Matrix) 
-3.8078*** -3.5387*** -3.9586*** -2.9884*** -4.3224*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pre-Divestiture Innovativeness 
-0.0368 -0.1809 -0.1354 -0.1599 -0.2464 
(0.786) (0.187) (0.343) (0.247) (0.113) 
Board of Directors Independence: parent company’s BOD 
2.2948***   2.2641***   4.0026*** 
(0.006)   (0.008)   (0.000) 
Board of Directors Independence: parent company’s 
employees 
2.0434***   2.0537***   2.2698*** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Top Management Team Independence: parent company’s 
employees 
  0.1594 -0.1892   -0.0534 
  (0.762) (0.727)   (0.925) 
Top Management Team Compensation Change 
  0.0726*** 0.0715***   0.0772*** 
  (0.004) (0.004)   (0.003) 
CEO was Unit Manager 
  -0.4632 -0.2394   -0.3218 
  (0.269) (0.582)   (0.478) 
CEO was Parent Employee 
  -0.1265 0.1157   -0.2066 
  (0.760) (0.789)   (0.646) 
Unit is supplier to parent 
      -0.2636 0.6730* 
      (0.442) (0.094) 
Parent is supplier to unit 
      0.4288 0.7378 




Table 4.2 (cont.)      
Unit and Parent are both suppliers 
      0.8056** 1.3060*** 
      (0.044) (0.004) 
Unit is licensing to parent 
      1.3982*** 1.7312*** 
      (0.005) (0.001) 
Parent is licensing to unit 
      -0.9245*** -1.0098*** 
      (0.006) (0.005) 
Unit and Parent cross-license 
      -0.4822 -0.5272 
      (0.177) (0.157) 
Corporate Service Agreement 
      -0.0121 -0.0853 
      (0.964) (0.773) 
Unit is renting main facility from parent 
      -0.2725 -0.1658 
      (0.467) (0.679) 
Constant 
-16.3106*** -7.3477** -14.9179*** -8.9015*** -18.1719*** 
(0.000) (0.031) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) 
N Spin-Offs 123 123 123 123 123 
N Carve-Outs 69 69 69 69 69 
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Period Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.242 0.227 0.255 0.231 0.283 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
This table presents a Logit model where the dependent variable is the unit’s observed divestiture governance mode, a dummy equal to 





Table 4.3 Divested Units’ Innovation Outcomes: Consistent and Inconsistent Governance Mode 
and Governance Design (Y-bar) 
 
Difference-in-Differences - Dependent Variables: Innovativeness and Breadth of Application 
Explanatory variables: Governance 
Mode-Governance Design Consistency 
(y-bar) 







0.0882 0.5114*** -0.1057*** -0.1705*** 
(0.282) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Post-Divestiture x Consistent Spin-off 
0.4232***   -0.0648   
(0.000)   (0.242)   
Post-Divestiture x Inconsistent Spin-off 
0.3447*** -0.0785 -0.0182 0.0466 
(0.001) (0.413) (0.753) (0.442) 
Post-Divestiture x Consistent Carve-out 
  -0.4232***   0.0648 
  (0.000)   (0.242) 
Post-Divestiture x Inconsistent Carve-out 
0.0944 -0.3289** 0.1598*** 0.2246*** 
(0.470) (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) 
Average Age in Unit's Tech Areas 
-0.1501 -0.1501 0.0408 0.0408 
(0.601) (0.601) (0.796) (0.796) 
Average Growth in Unit's Tech Areas 
-0.9666 -0.9666 -2.0750*** -2.0750*** 
(0.291) (0.291) (0.003) (0.003) 
Unit's Total Assets (ln) 
-0.8418 -0.8418 -0.6603 -0.6603 
(0.189) (0.189) (0.306) (0.306) 
Unit's R&D Investment (ln) 
-0.0039 -0.0039 -0.1375 -0.1375 
(0.988) (0.988) (0.380) (0.380) 
Constant 
8.4539** 8.4539** 5.8918 5.8918 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.174) (0.174) 
Spin-Offs 123 123 123 123 
Carve-Outs 69 69 69 69 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted-R2 0.311 0.311 0.364 0.364 



















Table 4.4 Divestiture Governance Design Index and Observed Divestiture Governance Mode 
 
 
Panel A: Number of Spin-offs and Equity Carve-Outs that implement 
each Governance Design Mechanism 
Mechanism Spin-Offs Carve-Outs 
Independent BOD from parent's Board 110 53 
Independent BOD from parent's employees 53 18 
Independent TMT from parent's employees 16 6 
Larger differences in TMT compensation 52 16 
CEO was not a parent manager/employee 15 8 
No Licensing agreement 86 38 
No Supplier Agreement 84 48 
No Corporate Service Agreement 36 18 






Panel B: Distribution Spin-offs and Equity Carve-Outs and 
Governance Design - Autonomy Index 
Number of mechanisms Spin-Offs Carve-Outs Total 
1 2.44% 1.45% 2.08% 
2 4.88% 14.49% 8.33% 
3 16.26% 26.09% 19.79% 
4 23.58% 30.43% 26.04% 
5 31.71% 14.49% 25.52% 
6 12.20% 8.70% 10.94% 
7 7.32% 4.35% 6.25% 
8 1.63% 0.00% 1.04% 

















Table 4.5 Divested Units’ Innovation Outcomes: Consistent and Inconsistent Governance Mode 
and Governance Design (Autonomy Index) 
 
Difference-in-Differences - Dependent Variables: Innovativeness and Breadth of Application 
Explanatory variables: Governance 
Mode-Governance Design Consistency 
(Autonomy Index) 







0.1440* 0.4837*** -0.0604 -0.1988*** 
(0.076) (0.000) (0.105) (0.000) 
Post-Divestiture x Consistent Spin-off 
0.3397***   -0.1384**   
(0.003)   (0.029)   
Post-Divestiture x Inconsistent Spin-off 
0.3353*** -0.0044 -0.0483 0.0901 
(0.001) (0.968) (0.393) (0.172) 
Post-Divestiture x Consistent Carve-out 
  -0.3397***   0.1384** 
  (0.003)   (0.029) 
Post-Divestiture x Inconsistent Carve-out 
-0.0992 -0.4389*** 0.0214 0.1597** 
(0.445) (0.002) (0.733) (0.017) 
Average Age in Unit's Tech Areas 
-0.1533 -0.1533 0.0630 0.0630 
(0.601) (0.601) (0.682) (0.682) 
Average Growth in Unit's Tech Areas 
-0.8001 -0.8001 -1.9445*** -1.9445*** 
(0.384) (0.384) (0.006) (0.006) 
Unit's Total Assets (ln) 
-0.8546 -0.8546 -0.5837 -0.5837 
(0.180) (0.180) (0.369) (0.369) 
Unit's R&D Investment (ln) 
-0.0166 -0.0166 -0.1770 -0.1770 
(0.947) (0.947) (0.254) (0.254) 
Constant 
8.5724** 8.5724** 5.4407 5.4407 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.215) (0.215) 
Spin-Offs 123 123 123 123 
Carve-Outs 69 69 69 69 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted-R2 0.309 0.309 0.358 0.358 

























































4.8. SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
Table 4.6 Robustness check: Parent-Unit Agreements dummies 
Logit Model. Dependent variable: Choice of divestiture governance mode (1=Spin-off, 0=Carve-out) 
Governance Design Mechanisms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Parent's Funds Needs 
-0.1102** -0.1337** -0.0950* -0.2073*** -0.1259** 
(0.046) (0.010) (0.085) (0.000) (0.036) 
Difference in Capex Needs          
(Parent and Unit) 
0.1354*** 0.0928*** 0.1256*** 0.0873*** 0.1168*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unit's Industry Attractiveness 
-0.0295 -0.0260 -0.0251 -0.0273 -0.0209 
(0.212) (0.283) (0.302) (0.246) (0.407) 
Unit's Market Share 
-0.0797 -0.3192* -0.1590 -0.3086* -0.1593 
(0.619) (0.082) (0.345) (0.098) (0.397) 
Related Diversification 2dSIC 
0.9986*** 1.0772*** 0.9853*** 0.9296*** 0.8490** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.025) 
Vertical Integration Parent & unit 
(I/O Matrix) 
-3.8078*** -3.5387*** -3.9586*** -3.4394*** -4.3292*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pre-Divestiture Innovativeness 
-0.0368 -0.1809 -0.1354 -0.1312 -0.2166 
(0.786) (0.187) (0.343) (0.339) (0.158) 
Board of Directors Independence: 
parent company's BOD 
2.2948***   2.2641***   3.5391*** 
(0.006)   (0.008)   (0.000) 
Board of Directors Independence: 
parent company's employees 
2.0434***   2.0537***   2.4106*** 
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Top Management Team 
Independence: parent company's 
employees 
  0.1594 -0.1892   -0.0529 
  (0.762) (0.727)   (0.924) 
Top Management Team 
Compensation Change 
  0.0726*** 0.0715***   0.0743*** 
  (0.004) (0.004)   (0.003) 
CEO was unit manager 
  -0.4632 -0.2394   -0.2717 
  (0.269) (0.582)   (0.537) 
CEO was parent employee 
  -0.1265 0.1157   -0.1975 
  (0.760) (0.789)   (0.654) 
Supplier Agreement 
      0.2596 0.9128*** 
      (0.286) (0.002) 
Licensing agreement 
      -0.7944*** -0.8595*** 
      (0.002) (0.001) 
Corporate Service Agreement 
      -0.0598 -0.1083 
      (0.822) (0.710) 
Unit is renting main facility from 
parent 
      -0.0476 0.0348 
      (0.898) (0.932) 
Constant 
-16.3106*** -7.3477** -14.9179*** -6.1293** -14.5697*** 
(0.000) (0.031) (0.001) (0.050) (0.002) 
N Spin-Offs 123 123 123 123 123 
N Carve-Outs 69 69 69 69 69 
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Period Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.242 0.227 0.255 0.228 0.276 




Table 4.7 Robustness check: Percentage shares owned by parent post-divestiture to evaluate 
consistent and inconsistent spin-offs and carve-outs  
GLM - Dependent variable: Percentage shares owned by parent post-divestiture 
  GLM 
Parent's Funds Needs 
0.0796 
(0.187) 
Difference in Capex Needs (Parent and Unit) 
-0.0444** 
(0.012) 
Unit's Industry Attractiveness 
0.0199 
(0.520) 
Unit's Market Share 
0.2565 
(0.280) 
Related Diversification 2dSIC 
-0.4303 
(0.267) 






Board of Directors Independence: parent company's BOD 
-2.6745*** 
(0.008) 
Board of Directors Independence: parent company's employees 
-1.9138*** 
(0.000) 




Top Management Team Compensation Change 
-0.0462* 
(0.077) 
CEO was unit manager 
-0.1807 
(0.694) 









Corporate Service Agreement 
0.1112 
(0.718) 






N Spin-Offs 123 
N Carve-Outs 69 
Industry Controls Yes 
Time Period Controls Yes 
Adjusted-R2 0.244 




Table 4.8 Robustness check: Divested Units’ Innovation Outcomes: Consistent and Inconsistent Governance Mode and Governance 
Design (GLM for post-divestiture parent shares) 
 
Difference-in-Differences - Dependent Variables: Innovativeness and Breadth of Application 
Explanatory variables: Governance 
Mode-Governance Design 
Consistency (estimation from GLM) 







0.0278 0.4920*** -0.0642 -0.1614*** 
(0.793) (0.000) (0.320) (0.000) 
Post-Divestiture x Consistent Spin-off 
0.4642***   -0.0972   
(0.000)   (0.210)   
Post-Divestiture x Inconsistent Spin-off 
0.2442* -0.2200** 0.0636 0.1608*** 
(0.051) (0.013) (0.383) (0.001) 
Post-Divestiture x Consistent Carve-out 
  -0.4642***   0.0972 
  (0.000)   (0.210) 
Post-Divestiture x Inconsistent Carve-
out 
 
0.1433 -0.3208*** 0.0159 0.1130*** 
(0.271) (0.001) (0.826) (0.008) 
Average Age in Unit's Tech Areas -0.1242 -0.1242 0.0683 0.0683 
  (0.672) (0.672) (0.667) (0.667) 
Average Growth in Unit's Tech Areas -0.8932 -0.8932 -1.9245*** -1.9245*** 
  (0.323) (0.323) (0.006) (0.006) 
Unit's Total Assets (ln) -0.7731 -0.7731 -0.5949 -0.5949 
  (0.243) (0.243) (0.371) (0.371) 
Unit's R&D Investment (ln) 0.0113 0.0113 -0.1742 -0.1742 
  (0.965) (0.965) (0.271) (0.271) 
Constant 7.8781** 7.8781** 5.4705 5.4705 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.224) (0.224) 
Spin-Offs 123 123 123 123 
Carve-Outs 69 69 69 69 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 4.9 –Difference in Differences including Governance Mode and Autonomy index 
 
 
Difference-in-Differences. Dependent Variables: Innovativeness and Breadth of Application 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Explanatory Variables: Governance Mode and 
Governance Design (Autonomy Index) 








0.1161* 0.2355 0.1136 -0.0536* 0.0126 0.0415 
-0.093 -0.121 -0.467 -0.075 -0.804 -0.452 
Post-Divestiture x Spin-Off (Gov. Mode) 
0.3657***   0.3653*** -0.1019**   -0.0865* 
(0.000)   (0.000) -0.025   -0.052 
Post-Divestiture x Autonomy Index (Gov. Design) 
  0.0266 0.0006   -0.0305** -0.0243* 
  (0.448) (0.985)   (0.020) (0.054) 
Average Age in Unit's Tech Areas 
-0.1619 -0.1296 -0.1621 0.0685 0.0687 0.0764 
(0.575) (0.682) (0.576) (0.663) (0.659) (0.622) 
Average Growth in Unit's Tech Areas 
-0.8547 -0.5914 -0.8550 -1.9493*** -2.0016*** -1.9392*** 
(0.342) (0.529) (0.342) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Unit's Total Assets (ln) 
-0.8215 -0.9279 -0.8207 -0.5960 -0.6019 -0.6273 
(0.198) (0.134) (0.199) (0.368) (0.368) (0.335) 
Unit's R&D Investment (ln) 
-0.0271 -0.0210 -0.0274 -0.1785 -0.1668 -0.1653 
(0.916) (0.947) (0.915) (0.252) (0.323) (0.294) 
Constant 
8.4555** 8.8824** 8.4527** 5.4894 5.4920 5.5938 
(0.023) (0.012) (0.023) (0.219) (0.225) (0.202) 
Spin-Offs 123 123 123 123 123 123 
Carve-Outs 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted-R2 0.311 0.248 0.312 0.353 0.346 0.360 




CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
5.1. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This dissertation offers a useful context to examine the implications of governance modes 
on innovation, while controlling for the antecedents and characteristics of corporate spin-offs and 
equity carve-outs. This link between structural governance alternatives and innovation contributes 
to shed light on a more general level to the governance-capabilities research in strategic 
management. Further, the current work advances strategic management insights on the conditions 
under which divestitures improve long-term value in the form of innovativeness.  
This dissertation developed theory based on the comparison of governance and legal 
attributes of spin-offs and carve-outs. One of the main insights is that beyond the currently 
dominant agency theory perspective in examining equity carve-outs and spin-offs, transaction cost 
economics and capabilities considerations can explain and predict the differential innovative 
performance of divested units. 
From a business unit’s perspective, there is a need to balance parent-synergies and 
autonomy. Autonomy, a well-examined driver of innovation, is more easily attainable through 
corporate spin-offs, a divestiture governance mode that provides a clear separation between parents 
and units. Synergies, however, can be more easily attainable through a hierarchy-like governance 
mode such as equity carve-outs. Chapter 2 then addressed this tension by considering situations in 
which the divested unit’s relatedness with its parent company would predict superior innovation 
returns for a given governance structure --i.e., an equity carve-out.  
Further, divestiture governance modes not only can impact the quantity of innovation 




(Chapter 3). This study corroborates that broadly applicable innovations are more likely to be 
produced by firms with access to more diversified parents, or by firms within a strong IP regime. 
Conversely, when complementary assets are the main value appropriation mechanism, the divested 
unit’s link to their parents become more valuable.  
This dissertation also presents a more comprehensive understanding of how divestitures 
are organized in terms of governance modes and governance design. Chapter 4 illustrates how 
governance consistency (e.g., autonomous governance mode and autonomous governance design) 
has significant implications for business unit innovation performance. Therefore, divestitures offer 
a unique setting to analyze how governance can be consistently configured, because parents are 
not confined to a choice between two modes, but can use intermediate mechanisms that can span 
these boundary choices. Non-consistent entities may not realize the full benefits of either 
integration/hierarchy or tailoring in the market, but they may be suitable arrangements to achieve 
innovativeness.  
Taken together, the three empirical chapters in this dissertation indicate the importance of 
firm’s management of divestitures and innovation. Firm awareness of different mechanisms 
affecting their innovation outcomes can benefit these firms’ governance modes, design, and the 
mechanisms of governance. 
5.2. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
While this dissertation contributes to the strategic management research by offering 
insights into the implications of business unit governance for innovativeness and application 
breadth of unit’s innovations, there are a number of limitations. The first limitation concerns the 
unfeasibility of assigning divested business units at random to different divestiture governance 




design used coarsened exact matching and other controls to obtain a more balanced sample of units 
across the two focal divestiture governance modes, the choice among divestiture governance 
modes could nonetheless be endogenous to each company’s management. To understand this 
decision making in depth, future research could study a smaller set of parent firms that have 
divested through both spin-offs and carve-outs in a short time-period. This type of case study could 
further shed light into the parent company’s logic in this context. 
A second limitation of this dissertation is the potential generalizability of the results to 
other types of outcomes at the business unit level. In particular, the impacts of higher levels of 
autonomy on innovativeness and breadth of application of innovation may not generalize to 
financial outcomes in contexts where units are not competing in technology-related industries. 
Therefore, one extension of this dissertation is to test these predictions in alternative contexts 
where non-technology factors –e.g., financial, substantial sunk-costs-- influence the divested units’ 
outcomes differently. 
A third limitation relates to the context of divestiture events. Divested business units may 
have different characteristics from other (not-divested) business units within the parent company. 
Therefore, the autonomy strategies proposed in this dissertation may not apply, in the same way, 
to other business units that have not been divested. For example, divested business units are often 
smaller and in less strong financial positions (Duhaime & Grant, 1983), as compared with other 
non-divested units. Thus, the impact of autonomy on this kind of units might differ from the impact 
of autonomy on units that parent companies keep under their entire control.  
A final limitation concerns the lack of direct measures of unit managerial autonomy and 
unit performance prospects. Prior studies have typically measured unit autonomy through survey 




events (such as technology spin-offs and carve-outs). While the measure I employ can be 
considered as a suitable proxy for autonomy --e.g., Eisenhardt (1989) discusses how greater equity 
ownership has been shown to represent greater parent company influence unit-level managers-, 
the development of other measures remains a subject of future research. In terms of a direct 
measure for performance prospects, managers could have different (private) expectations for each 
of the business units they divest. While better prospects could mean that parent managers provide 
less autonomy to the unit (e.g., carve-out the unit, seeking to benefit from its future expected 
performance), the realization of this managerial expectations would work against the empirical 
results in this dissertation. If, on the other hand, parent managers decide to provide more autonomy 
to units with better prospects (e.g., spin-off the unit, seeking to enhance its potential), it would be 
consistent with governance being a key determinant of a unit’s innovation outcomes. To address 
this last concern, this dissertation matched similar units through a coarsened exact matching 
technique, and controlled for growth prospects and technology age for each of the divested units, 
before and after the divestiture. Still, a direct measure of performance prospects, from the parent 
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